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Abstract 
For some time now there has been a divergence between public support for euthanasia 
and its illegal status within British law as well as its rejection by the medical 
profession. There have been a number of studies of public opinion, and there already 
exists a wealth of expert literature on the topic, by lawyers, health professionals and 
philosophers. This thesis argues that the newspaper coverage of euthanasia can be 
seen as a site where these expert discourses and lay discourses meet. The supporting 
data consists of a complete enumeration of articles containing the word 'euthanasia' 
which appeared in British newspapers over a 12-month period from November 1998 
to October 1999. These documents were analysed using various forms of narrative 
analysis and discourse analysis. It was found that whilst both expert discussions and 
newspaper articles use similar concepts and categories to represent the meaning and 
practice of euthanasia, there are subtle but significant differences between these 
discussions. Newspapers also apply these categories in more grounded but less 
qualified ways. In particular, the 'voluntary euthanasia discourse', which is 
fundamental for experts, is less important in newspaper articles, where it is secondary 
to what I call a 'terminal illness discourse'. In that discourse, terminal illness becomes 
the marker that justifies euthanasia, over and above the concerns of experts. Both the 
'voluntary euthanasia discourse' and the 'terminal illness discourse' address issues of 
agency and responsibility, but they approach these concerns from different 
assumptions. A striking feature of newspaper articles is that their discussion of 
euthanasia in terms of moral universals is grounded in the rhetoric of a world divided 
into nations. 
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Chapter (1) - Introduction 
Introduction 
This introductory chapter has several aims: first of all, it will introduce the substantial 
topic of this thesis, euthanasia, locating it in an historical and social context as well as 
sociological thinking. Secondly, the main aim of the thesis will be presented. Following 
on from this, there will be a discussion of the selection of data for this study. To situate 
the study in context, the several academic perspectives that this study draws on will be 
outlined. This section will conclude by indicating my personal interest in this topic and 
there will be more said about where I, the researcher, am coming from, with a brief 
natural history of the study that led to the thesis as it stands now. The chapter will end 
with an overview of the content of the chapters of the thesis. 
Euthanasia in context 
1. The historical background 
According to Kemp (2002), the modem British euthanasia debate can be traced to the 
early 1870s. From this period there exists documentation of an essentially philosophical 
debate (drawing on the theological concern with the sanctity of life), not yet including 
doctors or the general public. Medical practitioners did not enter the debate until the early 
20`i' century, when involuntary euthanasia or `mercy-killing' was on the agenda, without 
resulting in any practical implementation ('mercy-killing' has only ever been a 
theoretical point for discussion, never resulting in overt social policy - in this country at 
least, but see Burleigh (1994) on `euthanasia' in Germany). In 1935, the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Legalisation Society (today Voluntary Euthanasia Society, or VES) was 
founded in Leicester, with the aim of showing the strength of public support for 
euthanasia. As Kemp shows, however, `the Society's chosen tactic was to secure 
legislative reform by establishing a network of distinguished sympathisers able to 
influence policy at high levels, rather than by means of populist pressure from below 
(Kemp 2002, p83). The Society put forward a Voluntary Euthanasia (Legislation) Bill in 
1936 which was the first of a series of attempts to change legislation, all of which have so 
far been defeated. In the post-war period until the 1960s, public attitudes to euthanasia 
were coloured by the Nazi practice of non- and in-voluntary killing of those they called 
`mentally defective', and throughout the 1950s public interest in the cause of the VES 
was negligible. (During this period, the VES itself was not always clear on what their 
objectives were in terms of voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia, giving 
rise to anxieties about a slippery slope of potentially legalised voluntary euthanasia 
leading to involuntary euthanasia. ) By the 1960s, however, medical technology had 
advanced so much with life-prolonging techniques that the ethical issues around the 
question of euthanasia became issues of `enormous practical bearing' (Kemp 2002, 
p. 174), both for doctors and patients. One response to these advances was the 
development of the hospice movement, and eventually the medical speciality of palliative 
care. The first hospice (St Christopher's) was inspired by the ideals of its founder, Cicily 
Saunders, based in the Christian tradition of helping the sick and comforting the dying. 
While initially palliative care was associated with the ideals of the Western Christian 
tradition, increasingly now palliative care is being conceptualised in terms of universal, 
bioethical norms (Ten Have and Clark 2002, p. 6). While palliative care deals mainly with 
the management of pain, including psychological and spiritual anxieties (see Saunders' 
(1979) concept of `total pain'), and rejects euthanasia as an option, the euthanasia debate 
has changed tack since the 1960s `from a relatively straightforward concern with the 
relief of pain to challenge the apparent conflict between patient autonomy and the actions 
of an overly officious medical profession' (Kemp 2002, p. 21 1). A 1994 study (Seale and 
Addington-Hall 1994) into the reasons for requests of euthanasia found that the problem 
of feelings of dependency and lack of personal autonomy was rated over and above pain 
(at least for people without cancer; for people with cancer, pain was significant, too), 
suggesting that independence and autonomy have become values over which the 
euthanasia movement and the public converge. 
The brief historical and chronological account given above might give the impression 
that understanding the contemporary euthanasia debate is relatively straightforward. In 
fact, commentators differ on the answers to the question of why euthanasia has become 
such a pertinent issue for us today. One reason is that in the contemporary debate, the 
issues that emerged in a former historical context have become resources that participants 
in the debate today draw on when formulating their arguments. Hence, we can see 
arguments invoking the sanctity of life, the slippery slope, pain and autonomy side by 
side in the contemporary debate, provoking disagreements over their relative importance 
for understanding and resolving the as yet unresolved issue of euthanasia. 
2. The social context 
Much attention has been paid to the social context in trying to explain why euthanasia has 
become a contentious issue. Emanuel, for example, concludes after a comparison of 
public discourse on euthanasia in the late 19th/early 20th century in the USA and Britain 
with contemporary discourse, that: 
`Public interest in euthanasia 1) is not linked with advances in biomedical 
technology; 2) it flourishes in times of economic recession, in which individualism 
and social Darwinism are invoked to justify public policy; 3) it arises when physician 
authority over medical decision making is challenged; and 4) it occurs when 
terminating life-sustaining medical interventions become standard medical practice 
and interest develops in extending such practices to include euthanasia' (Emanuel 
1994, p. 121). 
Emanuel's conclusions suggest that the status of euthanasia as a contentious and 
contemporary issue cannot simply be explained by a historical narrative of medical 
advances and changing social attitudes. It has to be situated in the contemporary social 
context. 
In the social context in which the euthanasia debate is taking place today, it appears 
that pro-euthanasia advocacy is associated with `modern, urban cultural conditions' 
(Seale and Addington-Hall 1994). In particular, the conditions leading to pro-euthanasia 
advocacy draw upon the values of democratic liberalism and a secular consciousness: the 
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idea that individuals should be able to make decisions regarding their own lives is held to 
apply equally to the circumstances and timing of their deaths, thus creating a space for 
the acceptability of euthanasia as an option. Opposition comes mainly from the organised 
churches, particularly the Catholic Church: the Christian doctrine of the sanctity of 
human life implies that all life is given by God and should only be taken away by God. 
According to this conception, human beings have no right to take away life, regardless of 
the circumstances, which rules out euthanasia in any shape or form. It is possible to see 
differences between countries in Europe and North America, and also within those 
countries over time, as the strength of the respective groups representing either the ideals 
of liberalism or the values promoted by the church are shifting. The liberal Netherlands, 
for example, has seen a long-standing debate about euthanasia, culminating in the legal 
regulation of the practice. Only recently, however, with the rise of the right-wing party of 
the late Pim Fortuyn, calls to reverse euthanasia legalisation are being heard again more 
widely. 
A liberal, secular outlook does not necessarily lead to pro-euthanasia advocacy, 
however its arguments against euthanasia are different from the principled opposition of 
the churches: it is rooted in an evaluation of prevailing social conditions. Britain is a 
deeply stratified society which, in an untypical moment of its history, established a 
National Health Service, free to all at the point of delivery, which still exists. However, 
over the last decades, the NHS has been financially starved by consecutive governments 
and inequalities in health care have been creeping back in (Hutton 2000), with an 
increasing proportion of people who can afford to pay going private. Waiting lists are 
long, and, in contrast to countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, where it is usual 
to have a family doctor who knows her patients intimately over a long period of time, in 
Britain, the patient only has the right to see `a' doctor, not his doctor. The apparent 
inequalities of the system lead to concerns that a law regulating euthanasia could not be 
adequately controlled. These concerns are less acute in countries where a greater social 
and economic equality exists (like the Netherlands), yet most acute in the United States, 
where many people have no right to free health care at all, and the language of `rights' is 
the one in which the American euthanasia or `physician-assisted suicide' debate is 
conducted (Angell, 1997). 
Secondly, there has been a substantial shift in the age structure of British society (as in 
other developed countries) over the last century with many more old people living longer. 
Death today more often comes as the result of a long illness at the end of a long life 
rather than being a sudden event threatening all ages. Advances in medical technology 
mean that many life-threatening illnesses have been transformed into chronic and 
manageable ones (like cancer, heart-disease, and - to a certain extent - AIDS) and people 
can be kept alive even with the severest disabilities. Senility in old age and Alzheimer's 
disease is an increasing phenomenon. It is against this background that the concept of 
`mere life' as a good in itself is being questioned and issues about the `quality of life' 
come to the fore. 
It is often argued that technological developments in medicine which keep very ill 
people alive over a long period of time, as even severe illnesses become chronic rather 
than fatal, have lead to a growing interest in euthanasia (see Howarth and Jeffreys, 1996). 
It may be that more people today will find themselves in situations where they are faced 
with issues of quality of life, and that might include considerations of euthanasia, 
although that does not necessarily follow. 
Other developments within medicine, for example the shift in the doctor-patient 
relationship (Armstrong 1984; Gothill and Armstrong 1999), may have contributed to a 
wider public acceptance of euthanasia. Paternalistic doctors are not uncommon, but their 
right to making unilateral decisions has been severely questioned and the right of the 
patient to refuse treatment, even if that decision will lead to death, has been enshrined in 
British law (Giesen 1998, p. 201). Even though there is no comparable right to ask for 
particular treatments, in the public consciousness the idea that `doctor knows best' is 
rapidly disappearing and the British medical establishment's objections to euthanasia are 
not simply accepted, as opinion polls with a great majority of the British public voting in 
favour of euthanasia in particular circumstances show. 
3. A sociological approach: Durkheim and the euthanasia debate 
The positive attitude to euthanasia in large parts of the population raises questions 
about the nature of moral changes in society. Britain is commonly described as a plural 
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society, which also implies moral plurality. This extends to beliefs regarding euthanasia. 
First, there are the pro-life groups that are implacably opposed to euthanasia because they 
hold that life is sacred and must never be taken, a position usually justified by religious 
beliefs. Then there are medical practitioners who see their role in curing illness and 
saving lives, never in taking lives. There are philosophers and ethicists who worry about 
the `slippery slope', which expresses the fear that condoning euthanasia, even in very 
restricted circumstances, would encourage widespread killings and a general disregard 
for human life. Many in the legal profession see their role in upholding the status quo 
prohibiting all killing, including euthanasia. On the other side, there are those medical 
professionals who feel that there are cases of protracted suffering in which euthanasia 
would come as a blessing. There are legal and ethical philosophers who argue that the 
law is inconsistent while suicide is legal yet assisted suicide illegal. Friends and 
supporters of individuals, and those stricken individuals themselves, form the largest part 
of the pro-euthanasia lobby, claiming that a law that forbids actions that could bring 
release from intolerable suffering amounts to torture, and is thus inhumane. 
Different protagonists have different ideas about what is at stake in the euthanasia 
debate. On the side opposing euthanasia, the crux of the matter is often represented as 
whether killing another human being can ever be tolerated. On the other side, for 
supporters of euthanasia the crucial issue is whether an individual should be allowed to 
make decisions regarding their own death. This is the way Fox, et al formulate it: 
`Within the context of relatively democratic, urbanised market societies in which 
individuals must constantly make important decisions regarding every aspect of their 
lives, they are suddenly prohibited from doing so when it comes to their health - 
especially, their final life decision: when they want to die' (Fox, et al 2000, p. 52). 
Indeed, it appears paradoxical that at a time when we are not only allowed but `obliged to 
be free' (Rose 1999; see also Giddens 1991), this freedom does then not extend to the 
manner of our deaths. 
Durkheim is the classical sociologist whose insights into questions of the relationships 
between the individual, society and morality, are often considered the most profound 
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(Crow 2002). That Durkheim is still of interest for us today can be demonstrated by the 
light his ideas throw on the euthanasia debate. Durkheim argued that with an increasingly 
complex division of labour in society, different and often opposing moral ideas and 
interests would develop. With regard to euthanasia, we can see particular moral ideas 
linked with particular professional groups, but also within those groups there are contrary 
and even opposing beliefs. While holding that the division of labour is fostering the 
diversification of moral ideas, Durkheim also argues that society needs a common 
morality to hold it together: 
`Whilst commanding men to specialise, it [public opinion] has always seemingly the 
fear that they will do so to excess. [... ] Generally speaking, the maxim that decrees 
that we should specialise is as if refuted everywhere by its opposite, which bids us all 
to realise the same ideal, one that is far from having lost all authority' (Durkheim 
1991, p. 5). 
In Durkheim's view, the division of labour becomes the predominant source of social 
solidarity and the foundation of the moral order. He argues that 
`Being more mobile, the individual changes his environment more easily, leaves his 
own people to go and live a more autonomous life elsewhere, works out for himself 
his ideas and sentiments. Doubtless all trace of common consciousness does not 
vanish because of this. At the very least there will always subsist that cult of the 
person and individual human dignity [... ], which today is already the rallying-point 
for so many minds' (Durkheim 1991, p. 333). 
What Durkheim said over a hundred years ago appears to be strikingly relevant to the 
euthanasia debates today. First of all, euthanasia supporters argue their case from the 
position of the individual and her wishes. Opponents hold that killing has always been 
and should always be forbidden, upholding a long tradition. Following Durkheim, the 
cult of the individual (what he calls `moral individualism') would eventually displace 
tradition. While this has happened in many spheres of life, the taboo on killing has been 
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very resistant (there are clear historical reasons for this, such as, the traumatic events of 
the Nazi regime and the responses to them in the aftermath of the Second World War). 
Does this mean that the legalisation of euthanasia is only a matter of time? Not 
necessarily, for Durkheim himself gives us the reason for this. He holds that because the 
collective consciousness is increasingly reduced to the cult of the individual, 
`[... ] the characteristic of morality in organised societies [... ] is that it possesses 
something more human, and consequently more rational, about it. It does not cause 
our activity to depend upon ends that do not directly concern us. It does not make us 
the servants of some ideal powers who follow their own course without heeding the 
interests of men. It requires us only to be charitable and just towards our fellow-men 
[... ]. The rules constituting this morality have no constraining power preventing their 
being fully examined. Because they are better made for us and, in a certain sense, by 
us, we are freer in relation to them. We seek to understand them and are less afraid to 
change them. [... ] But it is important that it should open up for our activity a long- 
term perspective - and such an ideal is far from being on the point of realisation' 
(Durkheim 1991, p. 338/339). 
There is, then, a difference between evoking individual dignity as a rhetorical strategy in 
an argument that supports euthanasia, and thinking about individual dignity as the 
starting point of our deliberations about whether we should allow euthanasia, legalise it, 
erect clear rules about it or allow it to go on out of sight. According to Durkheim, the 
freedom of the individual can never mean autonomy from society. He insists that `liberty 
(by which we mean a just liberty, one for which society is duty bound to enforce respect) 
is itself the product of a set of rules' (Durkheim 1991, p. xxxiii). From his position, to 
argue in favour of euthanasia on the basis of the freedom of the individual alone is not 
enough. There is always more that has to be taken into account. 
While on the one hand `thou shalt not kill' is opposed by the belief that the individual 
must be allowed to decide for herself, a lot of the euthanasia debate is about establishing 
the ground for being able to say what the consequences of the legalisation of euthanasia 
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would be for society as a whole and the individuals that form part of it, and on the basis 
of that to decide on a strategy in relation to euthanasia: regulate, legislate, or not. 
The main aim of this thesis 
In Britain, as well as most of the rest of the world, euthanasia is illegal. However, opinion 
polls have registered increasing public support for euthanasia, which now stands at over 
80%. Support for euthanasia by doctors and nurses is smaller, but nevertheless almost 
half of them view it favourably2. This obvious discrepancy between the law and public 
opinion led to a House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics to discuss 
euthanasia. In 1994 the Committee recommended that the law on euthanasia remain 
unchanged (Walton, 1995a and 1995b; Walton Report, 1998). Similarly, the discrepancy 
between codified medical ethics which forbids killing, and the views of a large number of 
doctors and nurses, triggered the BMA Physician Assisted Suicide Conference Project on 
the Internet with the intent to get a broad range of people involved in setting the agenda 
for a consensus conference. This conference, held in 2000, could not agree to recommend 
a change in the law to allow physician assisted suicide (BMA 2000). The rift between 
public moral sentiment on the one hand and legal codes and medical ethics on the other 
thus remains unchanged. 
It is the unresolved issue of that continuing rift between the medical and legal 
establishment and public moral sentiment which provides the starting point for this thesis. 
The guiding principle of this study is to further our understanding of why we are at this 
point, and what could help bring about some kind of resolution. Much of the present 
debate about euthanasia goes on reciprocally in the media, particularly newspapers, as 
well as among experts of different kinds - philosophers, lawyers, doctors, and so on. The 
main aim of this thesis is to explore how the concept of euthanasia is represented in these 
82% in 1994 agree that `doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's life' if someone with a 
painful incurable disease' makes such a request (compared with 75% 10 years earlier) (Seale 1997). 
2 In a survey of over 750 GPs and hospital doctors, 46% agree that `doctors should be legally permitted to 
actively intervene to end the life of a terminally ill patient where the patient, when mentally competent, has 
made a witnessed request for euthanasia' (BMA news review, September 1996). Out of 1000 nurses 
responding to a questionnaire in Nursing Times, 49% thought that a doctor would be justified in prescribing 
a lethal dose of drugs for a patient in the final stages of tenninal cancer and in great pain (Nursing Times, 
August 1998). 
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debates, both as an expression and formative influence on public consciousness and 
sentiment. 
`Euthanasia' as a contested concept 
`Euthanasia' is a complex and contested concept. It does not refer to a recognised legal 
category or medical procedure, nor to a specific action or set of actions; rather it is a 
relational concept which, like `palliative care', refers to the expectation of bringing about 
a change in another's physical state. In this case, the state of change is death. However, it 
is distinguished from other forms of killing - murder, manslaughter, accidental death - 
by both the circumstances and the motives and intentions that are typically invoked. 
Thus, `euthanasia' is commonly described as the compassionate killing of a terminally ill 
person who is in unbearable pain or distress. 
Even this description can be contested, for instance, by the argument that there is no 
such thing as `compassionate killing'. Yet, interested groups who want to debate 
euthanasia have to start with some definition. The BMA Physician Assisted Suicide 
Conference Project on the Internet, started with the following definition: `Euthanasia is a 
deliberate act or omission whose primary intention is to end another's life'. However, this 
basic definition is not universally accepted, as it can be argued that omissions are to be 
considered to be something other than `euthanasia'. 
So far, we have talked about the `establishment' of a category of `euthanasia' (a 
concept of euthanasia). There is a second process which has to be distinguished. This is 
the `assignment' of categories (Bowker and Star, 1999). Even if we have an agreement 
over what `euthanasia' means (that is, over the concept that the word `euthanasia' refers 
to), once we are confronted with a case or act, it is by no means certain whether this case 
will be described as an act of `euthanasia'. For example, a doctor gives a large dose of 
morphine to a patient who subsequently dies. Was this a death by `euthanasia' or not? 
Was it a deliberate act with the primary intention to end another's life? It is easier to 
arrive at an agreement when all concerned agree on the definition - which can to a certain 
extent be compared to what has actually happened. It gets very complicated indeed if 
people are using the same word - `euthanasia' - but mean different things by it, that is, 
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they are starting from different definitions of the concept. Another example would be 
switching off a ventilator that a person's life depends on. Is that an act of `euthanasia' or 
simply a `withdrawal of treatment'? The House of Lords Select Committee on Medical 
Ethics in 1994 put down in their report that it would be the second. The aim of a 
Committee like this one is to negotiate some kind of consent and establish a definition 
that ideally everybody who henceforth discusses `euthanasia' agrees upon. However, it 
must be said that the issue is by no means decided; for clearly the BMA definition above 
includes switching off a ventilator, if it is defined as a `deliberate act with the primary 
intention to end another's life', under its definition of what should be called `euthanasia'. 
Hence there are disagreements over how euthanasia should be defined, and differences of 
opinion on what any given definition should include. 
Choice of data 
From what has been said above it should have become clear that it is not self-evident 
what people - experts, the public - mean when they refer to `euthanasia'. Even expert 
bodies clearly mean different things. The aim of this thesis is to explore these meanings 
around euthanasia. Much of the debate about euthanasia goes on in the media as well as 
among experts of different kinds. The media is a broad category, including visual media 
of television and film (and, as Croteau and Hoynes point out, today `claims about `the 
media' are often [limited to] claims about televised images' (Croteau and Hoynes, 
1997)); the medium of the printed word in different forms - newspapers, magazines, 
books; and the medium of the spoken word through radio. There is a spectrum from more 
specialist journals aimed at particular groups of professionals: academic journals, 
doctors' and nurses' magazines, and so on, to mass popular newspapers. With the 
expansion of the Internet and cheap publishing facilities on home computers, output 
aimed at ever more specialist audiences has proliferated. Expert and mass media are not 
however wholly separate categories; in fact, the mass media to a greater or lesser extent 
draw on expert opinions, and experts are dependent on the mass media to communicate 
their views. To a certain extent, the distinction between `expert discourse' and `media 
discourse' is constructed. An understanding of expert discourses is vital before looking at 
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euthanasia in the mass media, precisely because of the flow of ideas between experts and 
that media. This is why Chapter (4) looks in detail at expert discourses on euthanasia. 
However, the main part of the thesis is devoted to exploring media representations of 
euthanasia. The medium chosen is the printed word in newspapers, for several reasons: 
1. Newspapers are aimed at large and diverse audiences: choosing a sample that 
includes national and regional newspapers gives access to a diversity of events 
represented in newspapers relating to euthanasia (including local ones that never 
appear on national television); 
2. Newspapers rely on the printed word as do expert discourses; 
3. There is no evidence that public consciousness and sentiment towards euthanasia as 
expressed in newspapers is any different from consciousness and sentiment expressed 
on television or radio. 
Regarding point 3., it has to be stressed that I do not argue that newspapers are not in 
some way different from other media genres. The difference between genres is a major 
topic within media studies (see Stewart et al, 2001; or Reah, 1998). Genre refers to the 
classification of media texts into groups with similar characteristics; texts that fall within 
a particular genre adhere to certain conventions and are based on a formula that writers 
(or producers) follow and readers (or viewers) expect. Newspapers, for example, adhere 
to realism: `realism [... ] is the process by which the dominant experience of daily reality 
(in terms of what our lives look and sound like, the common narratives and ideological 
perspective they contain) is reproduced in our media representations' (Stewart et al 2001, 
p. 168). We are then not looking at the difference between fact and fiction, because also 
fictitious television programmes are often set within the realist mode; indeed, as Stewart 
et al argue, realism is the `dominant mode of representation, realism is taken for granted 
and rarely considered and it might be easier to explain what it is not' (italics in the 
original) (Stewart et al 2001, p. 1 68/169). Media genres might then differ in their 
conventions of how they present particular issues (differing in the depth of coverage, or 
in the balance between fact and fiction and the extent of adherence to the realist mode), 
however that is no contradiction to the assumption that the underlying consciousness or 
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sentiment regarding an issue like euthanasia is expressed no differently within different 
media genres dealing with the same issue. 
I would like to clarify this view with an example: Friedrichs and Vogt (1996) is a 
collection of case studies of different German magazines and their representation of 
religion. Some magazines are directed at a specialist audience (woman, young people, 
managers), others try to reach a broader audience of generally politically and socially 
interested people. The portrayal of religion differs in details according to which audience 
a magazine directs itself towards: for example, in a feminist magazine, organised religion 
always goes hand in hand with the subordination of women, whereas in a magazine for 
women which tries to combine the traditional with the progressive in women's lifestyles, 
the churches are not generally dismissed but called upon to cater more closely to 
contemporary women's needs. However, if one wants to take the portrayal of religion in 
magazines as an indicator of the contemporary public consciousness of the cultural 
phenomenon of religion in German or Western society, one can find that the magazines' 
portrayals have more in common than not: secularisation, individualisation and 
privatisation, as well as the transformation of institutionally given rules into abstracted 
values and binding norms of solidarity and ethical living, are processes apparent in all 
magazines. Religion has first and foremost become the decision of individuals, and in the 
light of the functional shifts in the understanding of religion (away from the organised 
churches), it is also possible to derive from the magazines' portrayals a re-sacralisation 
(`Resakralisierung') of specific areas of life and life forms, such as the family, love, or 
autonomy. What one can observe is a process of diffusion of religion (religion does not 
disappear in the magazines), but on the contrary, religious phenomena are actually 
broadening out, their boundaries are expanding. It is likely that looking at other media 
genres (newspapers, television, and so on), there will be differences in the details of the 
portrayal of religion (according to the conventions of genre, the restrictions of the 
production process, the target audience), but also, that there will be no difference in the 
underlying public sentiment on the cultural phenomena of religion in contemporary 
society. If a study, like my study of media representations of euthanasia, is directed 
towards that second area of interest, then one can assume that it becomes largely 
irrelevant which type of media is chosen. To minimise the possibility that a minority 
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view might distort results, newspapers were chosen as data for the reason that they attract 
large and diverse audiences - which makes them most likely to be representative of 
public sentiment as a whole. 
Because the interest of this thesis lies in contemporary representations of euthanasia, a 
sample was chosen that represented British newspaper coverage of euthanasia for the 12 
months closest to the time of the research available on LexisNexis. The selection of 
newspaper articles was done on the basis of the presence of the word `euthanasia' in the 
text, as that provided access to material which could reasonably be believed to hold 
information on the conceptualisation of meanings around `euthanasia' in the press (for a 
discussion of LexisNexis and the sampling process, see Chapter (3)). However, rather 
more has to be said on how media representations are conceptualised in this thesis. 
`Representation 'as the collective representation of meaning 
`Euthanasia' is a concept whose meaning is contested. It does not refer to a particular 
action, but to an idea. Those who use the word and debate its definition and meaning, 
discuss a concept and only incidentally particular actions. The debate about `euthanasia' 
is first and foremost a debate about a concept - about its meaning and application. This 
thesis is interested in the `euthanasia debate', and thus the meanings attributed to the 
concept of `euthanasia'. Its focus is the investigation of how the concept is used in the 
media; that is, it deals with media representations of the concept of `euthanasia'. The 
concept of `euthanasia' is being employed within different social spheres, both in and 
beyond the media. This thesis is concerned with the `collective representation' of 
`euthanasia' - `collective representation' being a term used by Durkheim to convey the 
idea that concepts are a collective accomplishment. Media content is here understood to 
be a site where the concept of `euthanasia' as a collective representation can be observed. 
Throughout this thesis, the term `representation' will be employed to refer to the 
socially emergent meaning of concepts - it would be quite mistaken (which should 
indeed have become clear from the discussion above) to understand it as referring to 
things, events, actions as such (in terms of an unrefined realism). The entry for 
representation' in the Dictionary of Sociology (Marshall 1998) begins by stating: 
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`Representation refers to the way in which images and texts reconstruct, rather than 
reflect, the original sources they represent. Thus a painting, photograph, or written 
text about a tree is never an actual tree, but the reconstruction of what it seemed to be 
or meant to the person who represented it' (my italics) (Marshall 1998, p. 565). 
Representation has thus to be understood as the reconstruction of meaning - meaning 
being the original source, not the tree itself This thesis was guided by Howard Becker's 
simple but effective definition of representation as `the ways human beings have 
developed for telling others what they think they know' (Becker 2000), thus combining 
the construction and communication of knowledge and beliefs - that is, the construction 
and communication of meaning. 
Situating the study of media representations of euthanasia 
This thesis is first and foremost situated within the large and ever more diverse field of 
sociology. The one thing that still unites sociology with its different approaches 
('sociologies' (Urry 2000)) is that a study has to start with a problem. This thesis starts 
from the problem of understanding the rift between the medical and legal establishment 
and public moral sentiment on euthanasia. The data was chosen on the basis of its 
potential for shedding light on the problem at hand. In approaching the problem, the 
study draws (where appropriate) on the theoretical perspectives of classical sociology 
(the work of Durkheim 1991, Weber 1964), contemporary sociology (Barnes 2000, 
Baumann 1995, Crow 2002), and poststructural and postmodern social theory, including 
literary theory (Doyle McCarthy 1996, Culler 2000). 
In terms of methodology, the study (being a study of texts) employs ideas from 
discourse analysis as well as more generally textual analysis. `Discourse' is a term that is 
operationalised in different research traditions to mean different things. One version of 
discourse analysis comes out of literary studies and the study of language, such as, 
Fowler's (1991) approach to language in the news. Another one was developed by social 
psychologists (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984, Potter et al 1990, Potter and Wetherell 1994 and 
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1997, Billig 1989 on rhetorical analysis) to investigate how language constructs notions 
of the social world and how it is employed to `get things done' (Potter and Wetherell 
1994, p. 32) in social interaction, both direct interaction and interaction mediated by texts. 
A third one, initiated by Foucault and developed ever since within sociology (Prior 1997, 
Tonkiss 1998), looks at texts for evidence of particular ways of structuring areas of 
knowledge and social practice. What the different traditions of `discourse analysis' have 
in common is the idea that `discourse' structures meaning. An interest in `discourse' is an 
interest in the meaning conveyed by language. A more detailed description of the 
varieties of `discourse analysis' and my application of them can be found in Chapter (3). 
Textual analysis is associated with cultural theory and draws on poststructualist 
understandings of meaning. Many sociologists today (after what has been called the 
cultural or linguistic turn in sociology (see Bonnell and Hunt (eds) 1999)) work within 
and are incremental in developing this tradition (Silverman 1993, Alasuutari 1995). One 
area that is being developed within this tradition is narrative analysis (Berger 1997, 
Lieblich et al 1998), which is an important perspective for looking at newspaper texts 
which are telling stories. 
This study of media representations of euthanasia is thus a study of the representation 
of the meaning of `euthanasia' in discourse, where `discourse' refers to `structures of 
meaning expressed in language'. The way `discourse' is employed here can refer to 
structures of meaning relating to a particular topic ('euthanasia discourse'), structures of 
meaning relating to a particular way of framing an issue ('voluntary euthanasia 
discourse', `terminal illness discourse'), or structures of meaning relating to a particular 
medium ('newspaper discourse') or a particular group of people ('expert discourse'). The 
term `discourse' as employed in this thesis is thus not given meaning by any one 
particular version of `discourse analysis'. The thesis draws on the insights of discourse 
analysis and textual analysis, and narrative analysis. How these techniques are employed 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter (3). 
While the substantial topic of this thesis is `euthanasia', this study should not be 
confused with a study of the practice of euthanasia. Direct research of the practice of 
euthanasia has so far only really been possible in the Netherlands, where euthanasia is 
practised openly in the context of decriminalisation (see Pool 2000). In Britain, research 
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into the practice of euthanasia has so far only been done in an indirect way by Tate and 
Ward (1994) who asked doctors about their attitudes to competent patients' requests for 
euthanasia in order to estimate the proportion of doctors who have taken active steps to 
hasten a patient's death. Social research in Britain is generally confined to the exploration 
of public and professional attitudes to euthanasia (see Donnison and Bryson, 1996), Tate 
and Ward (1994) and related issues such as research into the reasons behind requests for 
euthanasia (Seale and Addington-Hall, 1994). 
The study of media representations of euthanasia also has to be situated in relation to 
the every growing field of media studies. This study is not simply an exercise in media or 
communication studies. It is conceived as a sociological study starting from a problem, 
with the choice of data and analysis directed towards that problem. In media studies, the 
first orientation is towards media theory, whose interest lies in furthering knowledge on 
how the media produce cultural commodities and how those commodities are consumed. 
In fact, according to Louw (2001), trends can be discerned within media studies that can 
be described according to whether the emphasis lies with issues of production or 
consumption: he claims that the earlier central concern with `the encoding dimension of 
the communicative process' with `too great a focus on communicators and the 
medium/media' led to a shift towards the `decoding dimension and `active audience", 
which he sees as simply `another lopsided understanding of the communication process - 
instead of over-emphasising encoding, decoding was now emphasised' (Louw 2001, 
p. vii). Louw himself advocates the understanding of communication as a `total process' 
involving `a concern with both encoding and decoding' (ibid. ). These issues are 
important for media studies, because they lie at the heart of what media studies are about: 
understanding how and why the media produce particular cultural meanings. My study, 
by contrast, is not concerned with how and why the structures of meaning around 
euthanasia are produced in the media, or what exactly audiences make of them. In my 
study, media representations of euthanasia are approached in terms of cultural 
representations of a concept. Chapter (2) presents a personal narrative of how I arrived at 
this approach and its relationship to media studies. 
Having established that this study is neither one of media production nor one of media 
consumption, I want to discuss how it is related to studies of media content. Studies of 
24 
media content fall between media studies, communication studies, cultural studies and 
sociology. Approaches to the analysis of media content range from quantitative content 
analysis, to qualitative textual analysis based on poststructural understandings on 
meaning (Lupton 1999). There have been virtually no studies of euthanasia as 
represented by the media (see p. 59), falling into the first or the second category. 
Euthanasia today is often seen as a medical issue, and there have been a large number of 
studies of health, illness and medicine in the media (see Lupton 1999, Seale 
forthcoming). A number of them exclusively investigate newspapers, some in the content 
analysis tradition (Seale 2001, Freimuth et al 1984), others in the qualitative analysis 
tradition (Lupton 1994, Gwyn 1999). Some studies go beyond looking at content to 
include issues of production and/or consumption (Henderson and Kitzinger 1999, Lupton 
and Chapman 1995), but many are concerned exclusively with content (see above). The 
important thing to note is that all those studies look at media content with different 
objectives in mind: the understanding of discourses within the texts (conceived of as 
resources that people can draw on) around a particular topic in the media (Gwyn 1999 on 
`killer bug disease'); the understanding of wider discourses (beyond the texts) on issues 
like femininity and responsibility by looking at how one particular topic is presented by 
the media (Lupton 1994 on breast cancer); or an understanding the whole process from 
the production of the media coverage of a particular issue to its consumption 
(Henderson and Kitzinger 1999). This means that not only are there different 
methodological approaches to analysing media texts (from quantitative to qualitative), 
but just as important are the theoretical context and the theoretical objectives that a study 
of media content aims to achieve. 
The theoretical context of my study of media representations is thus as follows. It 
starts with the research question: how does the media represent `euthanasia'? The 
meanings given to the concept of `euthanasia' are embedded within particular discourses 
that can found within media content. In particular, this study focuses on the investigation 
of newspaper texts, for the reasons given above. The methods employed in order to 
answer the research question are based on techniques derived from the different 
approaches of discourse, textual and narrative analysis. It is explicitly acknowledged in 
the thesis that the sentiments, interests and moral intuitions expressed in these newspaper 
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texts are constructed according to a number of interests (social, political, economic, 
historical). However, as they appear to us we can take them as `given' in the sense that 
they exist, they are accessible, and they thus play their part in the contested meaning 
embedded in the concept of `euthanasia' which we collectively construct. According to 
Durkheim, 
`It is impossible for offences against the most fundamental of the collective 
sentiments to be tolerated without society disintegrating' (Durkheim 1991, p. 330) 
The question then must be: what are those most fundamental collective sentiments? 
Opponents of euthanasia tend to hold that the most fundamental sentiment is that we 
should not kill each other. If this fundamental sentiment is not only violated, but in 
addition sanctioned by the law, they fear that social solidarity will suffer, with society 
becoming dehumanised. However, the fact that a large proportion of the population 
expresses support for euthanasia points towards a moral change away from that position. 
The media can be approached as a site where expert and lay discourses meet. Also, the 
media can be seen as being both influenced by and influencing public opinion (Croteau 
and Hoynes (1997, p. 161)). On both counts it appears that taking a close look at the 
media can give us a different perspective on the fundamental collective sentiments that 
form the basis of contemporary moral ideas about euthanasia. 
Where I, the researcher, am coming _ 
from 
I am German and my academic background is in sociology, social anthropology and 
Spanish. I was therefore able to follow some of the euthanasia debate in German and 
Spanish, and not just in English newspapers. This allowed me to get a broader overview 
over the topic than I would have been able to if I could only read English, which arguably 
added to my sensitivity on the role of language in the euthanasia debate. I first got 
interested in end-of-life issue while working as a volunteer for a couple of hours a week 
in the Pilgrims Hospice in Canterbury, and for two months in the summer of 1997 full- 
time in the Hospiz, Stuttgart, Germany. In 1997/98,1 did an MA in Sociology by 
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Research and Thesis at the University of Kent on `The Shifting Boundaries of Nature and 
Culture: Implications for Contemporary Social Thought' which was a theoretical and 
library-based project, therefore my previous experience and interest has been more 
theoretical than empirical. 
The PhD project was originally based on a research proposal devised by my 
supervisors Prof Clive Seale and Dr Mike Michael, who secured a PhD Studentship in 
`Psychosocial Research and Education' from the Cancer Research Campaign (now 
Cancer Research UK). The stated aim was to discover the ways in which `euthanasia' is 
portrayed in various media, using discourse analysis. The original proposal did not start 
from a problem, that is any reason for why we would want to know about how the media 
portrays euthanasia - which in my view is the essential starting point for a thesis in 
sociology. Initially, I devoted myself to learning about my substantial topic, euthanasia, 
which meant reading and watching anything and everything to do with euthanasia 
(professional, scientific, news and broadcast media in the realist mode, but also fictitious 
accounts like novels and films3), until I felt I had an understanding of the topic. Also, I 
had to familiarise myself with media studies and different types of analysis and 
methodologies. In the course of developing my theoretical framework (as laid out above), 
I decided to limit my sample to newspaper coverage of euthanasia, as that appeared 
appropriate for achieving my theoretical objectives (exploring the meanings given to the 
concept of `euthanasia' as expressed in the media, as both an expression and a formative 
influence on public consciousness and sentiment). A comparison between professional, 
scientific and general media developed into exploring the concept of `euthanasia' in 
expert as well as media discourse. 
The three authors that have most influenced my thinking were Barry Barnes on 
`Understanding Agency' (2000), helping me to think about the notions of `agency', 
`freedom' and `choice'; Howard Becker and his book `Tricks of the Trade' (1998), with 
As Croteau and Hoynes say, `we conventionally organise media according to how closely they represent 
reality. We talk, for example, about fiction versus non-fiction, news or public affairs versus entertainment, 
documentaries versus feature films, and so on' (Croteau and Hoynes 1997, p. 134). In fact, there is sliding 
scale of how far any one media product diverges from the real world - even media products in the realist 
mode construct the world in a particular way as they re-present it. There is no reason why the portrayals of 
euthanasia in the more realist mode should have a larger influence on public moral consciousness and 
sentiment than more semi-fictional or fictional portrayals. Therefore, from my point of view, any 
contemporary portrayal of euthanasia was interesting. 
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its appropriate subtitle of `how to think about your research while you're doing it'; and 
Michael Billig's work on categorisation and particularisation in his book `Arguing and 
Thinking' (1996) as well as his ideas on scholarship and methodology (1988). 
Clive Seale who has an interest and knowledge in the sociology of health and illness, 
death and dying, the hospice movement, euthanasia, old age, and more recently the 
media, advised me on issues to do with my substantial topic, euthanasia, as well as the 
media. Mike Michael with his background in the sociology of science and technology, 
the public understanding of science and post-structuralist social psychology, guided me in 
questions of methodology, that is discourse, rhetorical and generally textual analysis. The 
sociology department at Goldsmiths College has a distinctive emphasis upon theory and 
qualitative analysis, which combined with my previous interests on the shifting 
boundaries between nature and culture has led to the development of my research and the 
thesis as it now stands. 
The organisation of the thesis 
Chapter (2) argues why it is important to look at the media and advances a perspective on 
how to conceptualise the media in society to develop the understanding of media 
representations as cultural representations which informs this study. 
Chapter (3) discusses methodology by presenting different ways of analysing texts: 
content analysis, discourse analysis and narrative analysis. It then goes on to giving an 
account of the methods used in this study. 
Chapter (4) presents a brief review of the literature available on euthanasia, before 
examining the state of expert debates on euthanasia, which are today predominantly 
philosophical/ethical and medical in character. 
Chapters (5) to (8) are the chapters based on the empirical work on the way euthanasia 
is portrayed in the 12 months of British newspaper coverage from November 1998 to 
October 1999. Chapter (5) explores the stories about euthanasia that have appeared in the 
press; Chapter (6) looks at one story in greater detail (the Dr Moor case); Chapter (7) 
identifies and investigates the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' and the `terminal illness 
discourse' that structure press discourse on euthanasia; and Chapter (8) considers the way 
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euthanasia is represented in the contemporary context of an increasingly global world of 
nations. 
Chapter (9) concludes that there is indeed a distinct press discourse on euthanasia, and 
discusses its implications. 
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Chapter (2) - Conceptualising the study of media representations of 
euthanasia 
Introduction 
This chapter argues that the media provides an important source of access and insight into 
public consciousness and sentiment on euthanasia. Throughout the chapter, the 
perspective informing this study will be developed to clarify an understanding of media 
representations as cultural representations, in the tradition of Durkheim's `collective 
representations'. 
Opinion polls and the media 
So far, very few studies (see Chapter (3)) have been undertaken on how the media report 
on euthanasia. This alone could make a study of euthanasia in the media worthwhile. I 
will begin by explaining why one should study media representations of euthanasia, 
before proceeding to a discussion of the media in society. 
My first premise is that the interest of this study lies in the meaning given to 
euthanasia that forms part of public consciousness on the issue. These meanings can be 
accessed in public discourse, which I take to include all the debates and arguments on the 
topic that can be found in the public domain. This public discourse can be meaningfully 
divided into several distinct parts, for example, medical discourse, legal discourse, 
philosophical discourse'. Discourses are connected with practices - medical practice and 
practices of professional medical associations, for example, or academic practices and 
institutional contexts. Discourses occur within particular institutions and traditions, and 
they have different weight and authority in society, depending on the relative power of 
these institutions. In addition to `expert' discourses, public discourse also consists of lay 
discourses, based on viewpoints and opinions held by `non-experts'. 
' Classifications never just 'are', they are always being developed for a particular purpose. Different 
purposes call for different classifications. 
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Public opinion polls are the method commonly used to capture these public views and 
opinions. They can be aimed at the `general public' (a representative sample of the 
population of a particular society) or particular publics, like doctors, patients or relatives 
of patients. 
Public opinion polls are a means of reducing complex arguments into simple questions 
that can be answered with `yes'/ `no' /'don't know' or `maybe'. The results of public 
opinion polls are generally presented in terms of percentages. For example, in British 
Social Attitudes (13th Report, 1994), it is claimed that 82% of the British population 
agree that `doctors should be allowed by law to end the patient's life' if someone with a 
`painful incurable disease' makes such a request (compared with 75% ten years earlier). 
The same report also notes differences in support (in numerical terms) for euthanasia in 
different situations, for example 80% agreeing that `euthanasia should `definitely' or 
`probably' be allowed by law for a person who has an incurable and painful illness from 
which he will die, for example, someone dying from cancer'; as opposed to only 42% 
agreeing that `euthanasia should `definitely' or `probably' be allowed by law for a person 
with an incurable and painful illness from which they will not die, for example, someone 
with severe arthritis' (reported in Seale, 1997, and Donnellan et al, 1997). 
Here, the numbers are seen to be changing over time and in relation to different 
situations which surely tells us something - but it is by no means obvious what it tells us, 
some work of interpretation needs to be done. My main critique of opinion polls is that 
they appear to be democratic (as we will see below), in that they give equal weight to 
ordinary people's opinions. However, what they really do is to translate snippets of 
opinions into a form that can itself be used as evidence of or support for a particular 
argument. This form is derived from what (and how) the researcher thinks (embedded as 
he or she generally is herself in different institutions with particular purposes) - which 
from devising the questions to interpreting the answers influences every aspect of the 
study; and not just from what (and how) people think about particular issues. 
`Public opinion' has a particular meaning and status today. The determination of 
(general) `public opinion' on all sorts of issues, including euthanasia, is an ever present 
part of social life: `the activity of politics, of advertising, of marketing, indeed public 
debate itself seems unimaginable without reference to public opinion' (Osborne and Rose 
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1999, p. 370/371). Osborne and Rose in their article `Do the social sciences create 
phenomena?: the example of public opinion research' (1999) argue that the concept of 
`public opinion' appears as a self-evident reality, but it has a history that only gradually 
made it into what we now take it to be. In 1828, `public opinion was the attribute only of 
those qualified to have opinions': 
`Public opinion may be said to be that sentiment on any given subject which is 
entertained by the best informed, most intelligent, and most moral persons in the 
community, which is gradually spread and adopted by nearly all persons of any 
education or proper feeling in a civilised state' (the 19th century American political 
thinker William Mackinnon quoted in Osborne and Rose 1999, p. 374). 
Gradually, the concept of public opinion became democratised, it became `the aggregate 
of the opinions of individuals' (Osborne and Rose 1999, p. 376). The technique of the 
opinion poll was developed to capture those opinions. The existence of an objective 
public opinion that can be accessed and represented faithfully (as the `truth') has become 
naturalised and internalised, and public opinion is now being sought for in all kinds of 
organised social activities. However, another view is that 
`public opinion is created by the procedures that are established to `discover' it. The 
phenomenon of opinion is an artefact of the technical procedures that are designed to 
capture it. It is determined by technical considerations: for example, the assumptions 
that go into the construction of a representative sample' (Osborne and Rose 1999, 
p. 3 82). 
In other words, public opinion is constructed just as any kind of knowledge is 
constructed, but subtly manages to disguise its origins and has come to represent an 
objective `truth'. The varying organised activities that determine public opinion in 
today's societies are in themselves permanent confirmations of its existence and validity: 
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`public opinion is something that is demanded by the very activity of asking 
questions in surveys. That is, the existence of questionnaires and surveys themselves 
promote the idea that there is a public opinion `out there' to be had and measured. 
They invite respondents to measure their own responses in relation to the existence 
of such an objective field of opinion. And this idea is actually of a rather self- 
fulfilling sort; we are asked a question, we respond, partly in the light of what we 
project to be the responses of others, and, in doing so, we actually contribute to the 
establishment of the objective field called public opinion' (Osborne and Rose 1999, 
p. 387). 
From the above discussion we can see that `public opinion' is a form of knowledge 
particular if not peculiar to our society today. Public opinion thus exemplifies Thomas' 
famous axiom which states that in social life, what people take to be real is real in its 
consequences (Berger 1966, p. 100). We believe in public opinion. We (individually and 
institutionally) act in response to it. Public opinion is important - even if we are aware of 
its constructed nature. 
This leads me to a discussion of the limitations of public opinion polls (general and 
particular) to explain my interest in media representations. 
Public opinion polls consist of carefully crafted questions devised by researchers and 
developed to elicit specific responses to particular problems. The responses are often 
presented in numerical form, for example giving the percentage of respondents who hold 
one particular opinion as opposed to another one, or other ones. The way the problem is 
posed and the questions asked both bear the mark of the researcher. The respondent has 
to fit his or her answers within that given structure. This is a useful strategy if one knows 
what the question is and what kind of answer one wants or needs (for example, in 
commissioned research that has a particular purpose). However, if one is interested in 
public opinion on a topic like euthanasia, it becomes clear that the researcher relies 
heavily on the given structures of thinking and arguing this issue - both using it and 
contributing to it. If the interest lies precisely in exploring those structures of thinking 
and arguing, then interest has to shift from what the respondents answer to what and how 
the researcher asks. Especially with euthanasia, it is obvious that responses vary greatly 
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depending on who is conducting the survey - surveys commissioned by organisations 
with an interest in the legalisation of euthanasia tend to show higher support for the 
practice than surveys conducted by organisations linked to hospice2. 
Surveys often rely to a great extent on expert opinion, both in the kind of questions 
they ask, and the way they are asked - but experts are not above particular interests 
themselves. 
The reason why a study of the media could be potentially fruitful - if one is interested 
in the structures of thinking and arguing about euthanasia - is that in contrast to the 
carefully worded surveys that bear the mark of the researcher, the media represent what I 
will call for the moment `naturally occurring' data. Let me explain what I mean by that. 
The media themselves are in no way `natural'. They are social institutions with particular 
interests, rules and constraints. What gets into the papers is decided by editors, who often 
claim to be responding to the public interest ('that's what people want to read about'). 
Articles are written by individual journalists with their particular affiliations and areas of 
expertise. Studies of media production in general address those things: how is it decided 
what gets into the news? Why do journalists present an issue in this particular way and 
not that? 3 In contrast, what I propose to do is a study of media representations: to take 
newspaper articles on euthanasia as given, not asking why they present the issue in 
certain ways, but investigating how they present it. The texts themselves are messy, they 
incorporate many different influences. They make reference to `experts' and claim to 
represent `common sense'. They mix lay and expert discourse and create their own 
`media discourse'. Therefore, they are not `natural' but `naturally given'. How they 
2 To illustrate this: in 1997, a survey conducted by the German Hospice Association ('Deutsche Hospiz 
Stiftung') found that only 42% of the German population were in favour of active euthanasia 
(Aertztezeitung, 15.4.1997). In 2000, a survey commissioned by the German equivalent of the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society (`Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Humanes Sterben') found 81 % of the same population to 
be in favour of active euthanasia (Berliner Zeitung, 6.6.2000). We have the image of a minority versus a 
large majority of the population to be in favour of euthanasia -a discrepancy that cannot be result of the 
three years between the surveys. 
For example, Galtung and Ruge (1964) asked the question: `how do `events' become `news"?, 
developing a definition of `newsworthiness' one the basis of twelve factors and three hypothesis describing 
the interrelationship of those factors. Schudson (1989) provides an overview of the three perspectives 
within the sociology of news production: (1) the view of political economy that relates the outcome of the 
news process to the economic structure of the news organisation; (2) the view that relates the outcome of 
the news process to the journalist and the constraints posed to him by the social organisation of news 
production and occupational ideology; and (3) the view that emphasises the constraining force of broad 
cultural symbolic systems. 
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present the topic of euthanasia is not a direct response to a specific interest - it is not 
influenced by the research agenda (if by other agendas specific to the media production 
process that the researcher should be aware of). The researcher can take the texts as given 
in the sense that they are produced in a specific way, but not produced according to the 
researcher's interests, as surveys often are. An analysis of the texts can say something 
about the way the media treats the issue of euthanasia as well as giving some insight into 
how the issue might be understood and reciprocally influence society at large. The 
purpose of a study of media representations is thus to investigate media discourse on 
euthanasia with the ultimate aim of gaining a wider understanding of the structures of 
thinking and feeling about euthanasia that may be influential in public discourse and 
debate (for example, in determining the kinds of questions asked by opinion pollsters). 
Media in societ 
If we can say that media texts are messy, then the relationship between the media and 
society is just as messy. Before embarking on a study of the media, one has to grapple 
with two, albeit related, issues: the role of media in social life, and the relationship 
between media and their audiences. 
1. A social theory of the media 
John Thompson in his book `The media and modernity' (1995) makes an attempt at a 
general social theory of the media. In a sense, we are so used to living in a mediated 
culture that we cannot see the impact the media have on our lives and social 
consciousness. However, as Thompson argues, we have to appreciate that the 
development of communication media has brought with it `a reworking of the symbolic 
character of social life, a reorganisation of the ways in which information and social 
content are produced and exchanged in a social world and a restructuring of the ways in 
which individuals relate to one another and to themselves' (Thompson 1995, p. 11). 
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Thompson holds that what we need today is a theory for an `age whose broad contours 
were laid down some while ago, and whose consequences we have yet fully to ascertain' 
(Thompson 1995, p. 9). Before newspapers, radio, television and internet, 
`for most people, the sense of the past, the sense of distant places, as well as the 
sense of the spatially delimited and historically continuous communities to which 
they belonged, were constituted primarily by oral traditions that were produced and 
handed down in the social contexts of everyday life. But the increasing availability 
of mediated symbolic forms has gradually altered the ways in which most people 
acquire a sense of the past and of the world beyond their immediate 
milieu'(Thompson 1995, p. 33/34). 
As Thompson says, `the role of oral traditions was not eliminated, but these traditions 
were supplemented, and to some extent reconstituted, by the diffusion of the media' 
(ibid). 
Thompson talks about `mediated historicity', `mediated worldliness' and `mediated 
sociality' to delineate the different aspects of media influence in social life. In the 
transmission of historical knowledge, 
`parents and teachers [... ] come to rely more and more on books, films and television 
programmes to convey to children the main themes of a religious or other tradition, 
and [... ] see their own role more in terms of elaboration and explication than in 
terms of the cultivation of tradition from scratch' (Thompson 1995, p. 196). 
History and tradition are seen as our heritage, but it is a heritage stored in books and films 
that are the guardians of objective accounts of `History' and `Tradition', acquiring an 
abstract existence outside the individuals who live the histories and traditions of a 
society. Films and books appear to know more than we do, we go to them to learn about 
ourselves. Tradition, in classical sociological thought, is believed to decline in 
significance in modern societies, ceasing to exist or play any meaningful role in the daily 
lives of most individuals. Thompson tries to show that tradition has not disappeared, but 
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has changed in a society shaped by the increasing mediation of symbolic content. 
Symbolic content gets fixed in media products, and thus has become less dependent on 
ritualised re-enactment. In a sense, tradition has become deritualised. 
Also, being dependent on mediated forms of communication, traditions become 
detached from individuals - they become depersonalised: 
`tradition acquires a certain autonomy and an authority of its own, as a set of values, 
beliefs and assumptions which exist and persist independently of the individuals who 
may be involved in transmitting them from one generation to the next' (Thompson 
1995, p. 196). 
Lastly, `traditions were gradually and partially delocalised as they became increasingly 
dependent on mediated forms of communication for their maintenance and transmission 
from one generation to the next' (Thompson 1995, p. 197). With respect to the last point, 
Thompson insists that the fact that traditions are delocalised does not mean that they were 
`deterritoralised: they were refashioned in ways that enabled them to be re-embedded in a 
multiplicity of locales and reconnected to territorial units that exceed the limits of face- 
to-face interaction' (ibid. ). 
Far from having done away with tradition, the media has been instrumental in re- 
shaping it. The media are responsible for the reinvention of tradition and the re-mooring 
of tradition to territorial units of new and various kinds. In short, `traditions have become 
increasingly interwoven with mediated symbolic forms' (Thompson 1995, p. 202). 
`Mediated wordliness', in Thompson's phrase, means that 
`our sense of the world which lies beyond the sphere of our personal experience, and 
our sense of our place in this world, are increasingly shaped by mediated symbolic 
forms. The diffusion of media products enables us in a certain sense to experience 
events, observe others and, in general, learn about a world that extends beyond the 
sphere of our day-to-day encounters' (Thompson 1995, p. 34). 
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This implies, among other things, that when we visit other places as tourists, `our lived 
experience is often preceded by a set of images and expectations acquired through 
extended exposure to media products' (ibid. ). 
`Mediated sociality' refers to the fact that while `our sense of belonging derives, to 
some extent, from a feeling of sharing a common history and a common locale, a 
common trajectory in time and space', today `we feel ourselves to belong to groups and 
communities which are constituted in part through the media' (Thompson 1995, p. 3 5- 
based on Anderson's (1983) concept of imagined communities). 
The concepts of `mediated historicity', `mediated worldliness' and `mediated 
sociality' do a useful service by putting the role of the media in society today into a 
historical context. Developments in communications technology have already changed 
the contours of social life to an extent that is difficult for new generations to appreciate, 
and they will continue to do so. The shifts are large and have happened rapidly. Still, new 
ways of communication provided by new technologies become `naturalised' very quickly 
- it is difficult to imagine that things could have been otherwise. Therefore, in a sense, 
those shifts fall beyond individual consciousness, even though they may be observable, 
and for that reason they have to be (and can only be) theorised, as Thompson does. 
2. Media and audiences 
The second, related, issue is the relationship between the media and their audiences. 
Thompson draws on and brings together a large amount of theoretical work that has been 
done in sociology to produce his account of how the media intervene in and change social 
life. The kind of work he draws on has been and is being carried out in the form of 
empirical research into the relationship between the media and their audiences. 
Much research has been initiated into determining so-called media effects: effects that 
the media might have on their audiences. The first question is whether media messages 
have any influence on people's opinions, and by extension public opinion. The second 
question is what form this influence takes, if there is any. There are basically three views 
on this: (a), that the media have direct discernible influence on people's opinions; (b), 
38 
that the influence is more indirect or diffuse and hard to pin down; and (c), that media 
messages have no effect at all (this last one is essentially theoretical). 
I will start with the first position: the view that the media have direct influence on 
people. There are two research traditions within this category: what Seale (forthcoming) 
calls the `effects model', and the `active audience model'. The `effects model', assumes 
that media messages will reach the audience in the sense that they were intended by the 
producers, and studies that follow an experimental design aim to determine the extent of 
those direct effects - how far communicated messages have been taken on by the 
audience4. The second `active audience model' still assumes a direct effect of the media 
on their audiences, but denies that we know what this effect will bes. This model holds 
that the media audience does not consist of passive receivers of media messages, but 
active consumers of the media (and not just of their explicit messages, but also their 
implicit assumptions) which they `read' from their own point of view, life situation and 
personal preferences which can, but does not have to lead to `resistant' readings, that is 
finding messages in articles and programmes that were never intended by the author or 
producer. Qualitative research in the form of interviews or focus groups are carried out 
within this tradition to determine the effects that the media has on people's opinions. 
To qualify what I have said above, it may be fair to say that the `active audience 
model' with its assumption of a sophisticated, selective and differentiated audience 
already goes some way towards a view that holds that media influence is more indirect 
than direct. Media messages (explicit and implicit) are filtered through and interact with 
the opinions and views and world view that a person already holds. Some messages 
might be taken on and others not, for all kinds of reason. Whatever direct effect the media 
° As Abercrombie and Longhurst point out, historically, `the earliest attempts at investigation of these 
effects of the media were undertaken from within the mass society or mass culture approach, which was 
given a particular impetus in this field by the rise of, and use of mass media of communication by fascist 
and totalitarian governments in the 1920s and 1930s' (Abercrombie and Longhurst 1998, p. 4/5). The basic 
assumption behind this approach as it was developed historically was that the media did have a direct effect 
on people that could be described and measured. A different approach developing out of this tradition was 
the `cultivation approach' by Gerbner in the 1960s. This approach still started from the assumption that the 
media do have an effect, but its focus had shifted from assuming the direct effect of one individual media 
message to investigating the long-term effects of 'cumulative exposure' to the media (Abercrombie and 
Longhurst 1998, p. 6). 
s See Abercrombie and Longhurst (1998, Chapter (1)) for a more detailed account of the different phases of 
audience research including the encoding/decoding approach developed by Hall (1980) and the 
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has on people is very hard to specify - especially considering that it is near impossible 
empirically to specify the effect that many, recurring media messages have over long 
periods of time, as opposed to one particular message at a time. 
Here I would like to make some reference to a much earlier study that nevertheless is 
still of interest for us today. It was carried out by C. Wright Mills in America 40 years 
ago (Mills 1963). At that time, the situation in terms of the development of 
communication technology was relatively unsophisticated, and as a consequence the 
concerns of sociologists with regard to the `mass media' (as it was called then) were 
somewhat different. There was concern that the then emerging mass media would have 
the power to brainwash people, making it possible for misguided leaders to manipulate 
whole populations (as, it can be argued, happened to a certain extent in Nazi Germany). 
In his article `Mass media and public opinion' (1963) Mills describes how he and his 
colleagues devised a study `to find out how opinions change, how [... ] people, as 
members of the public, actually made up their minds' (Mills 1963, p. 587). To cut a long 
and complex argument short, what they found was that `in the last analysis, it is people 
talking with people, more than people listening to, or reading, or looking at, the mass 
media that really causes opinions to change' (Mills 1963, p. 590). That does not mean that 
the media have no role to play, as it was also found that there were so-called opinion 
leaders that influenced the opinions of other people6. Mills wrote, 
`opinion leaders are more exposed to the mass media of communication of all sorts 
than are the opinion followers. [... ]. What seems to happen is that these opinion 
leaders pick up opinions from the mass media and pass them on to other people in 
face-to-face communication' (Mills 1963, p. 595). 
The way that Mills sees these opinion leaders in their role as media audience is 
remarkably similar to the `active audience model'. He argues that they are not passive 
receivers of all kinds of media messages but (self-)select the media they are getting 
incorporation/resistance paradigm initiated by Morley (1980) - the discussion of which would take me too 
far away from the argument I am pursuing here. 
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exposed to in the first place, which means that media reinforce existing opinions rather 
than enforcing changes of opinion. He holds that media audiences (in general, not just 
opinion leaders) compare what they read, see and hear in the media with their own 
personal experience, while insisting that this experience should not be seen as something 
primary or really direct but instead has to be conceptualised as being `mediated and 
organised in stereotypes' (Mills 1963, p. 593). 
What all this amounts to is the introduction of a new factor into the direct audience - 
media relationship, which, if what Mills says is correct, is even more important than this 
relationship: the direct interaction between people. Rather than other people complicating 
the individual person-as-audience/media relationship, the media can be seen as 
complicating or intervening in interpersonal relationships. Whether one agrees that this is 
indeed the case, or holds that it might have been the case when Mills wrote but that in 
today's communication-saturated world his findings no longer hold, I would argue that 
we still have to appreciate that interaction between people has to be considered when 
thinking about the media and their audiences. 
We can say so far that it seems more likely that media effects have to be seen as more 
indirect than direct, interacting with people's previous experience as well as intervening 
in interpersonal relationships 7. 
A different approach to thinking about indirect effects the media might have on their 
audiences is the idea that the media `may not be successful much of the time in telling 
people what to think, but it is remarkable successful in telling its readers what to think 
about' (Cohen (1963) quote in Ferguson 2000, p. 232 and Louw 2001, p. viii)8. This view 
is not without its critics, and empirical research has not managed to clarify the issue (see 
Ferguson 2000, p. 232ff), yet still it is an interesting point if one considers not just the 
6 The role and importance of opinion leaders had actually already been shown earlier by Katz and 
Lazarsfeld (1955) - it is their study that generally gets quoted today, for example in Curran and Seaton 
(1997). 
' One reaction to this appraisal of the situation is a kind of postmodern capitulation, which is questioning 
the validity of being able to say anything at all about any direct effect the media has on people. This does 
not mean that champions of this view hold that the media has no effect at all on people. They only deny 
that it is ever possible to say what they really are. The book `Message received' edited by Philo (1999) 
brings together much recent work on the media in which this debate can be followed. 
8 Curran and Seaton point out that the other side of this is that people will think less about issues that do not 
receive any coverage in the media: `Martin tlarrop argues that this negative power of the media - 
selectively to neglect some ideas - is a critical, little recognised media effect' (Curran and Seaton 1997, 
p. 275). 
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media/audience relationship, but the wider impact of the media in social life. People are 
not just audiences of media, they are also citizens of political entities. 
Political entities set their own agendas. These agendas are the result of struggles of 
different groups for the recognition of particular issues. These issues may rank higher or 
lower on the political agenda (which of course changes over time) - and it is conceivable 
that far from reproducing this political agenda, the media play a large role in making 
certain issues more or less visible, which will have a direct impact on what people believe 
to be the hierarchy of issues on the political agenda. Only one issue can be the first item 
on the nightly television news, and only very few issues make it to the first page of a 
newspaper. If a newspaper places gossip rather than political items on its first page, we 
can take this to point to a certain alienation of its readers from the political process. In 
`telling readers what to think about', the press may have a very direct impact on the 
political agenda itself - and even on the nature of politics if more and more people 
remove themselves from the processes of political agenda setting by thinking more about 
gossip than issues to do with the distribution of power. 
Ferguson's book `Researching the public opinion environment' (2000) deals with the 
theories and methods of public opinion research. She specifies that the audience that the 
book is written for is twofold: academic and professional. Consequently, she discusses 
academic theories about the impact of the media, but from a pragmatic point of view of 
how to do good public opinion research. She says: 
`Academics spend a great deal of time debating whether media have a direct effect, 
an indirect effect, or no effect at all on audiences [... ]. Presidents, prime ministers 
and corporations, however, rarely ponder such questions. They hold an unwavering 
belief that media have powerful effects of an indirect and direct nature. Adhering to 
this conviction, governments and corporations pay hundreds of thousands of dollars 
to survey research firms, they commission focus groups, and they establish 
sophisticated media monitoring systems designed to track and analyse media 
responses to the organisation's issues. Whereas governments monitor the media to 
obtain feedback on their policies and programs, corporations monitor the media to 
42 
learn more about the pressures exerted on top-level government officials, and to 
project the likely consequences of these pressures' (Ferguson 2000, p. 51). 
We have noted in relation to public opinion (see p. 33 above) that what people believe to 
be real is real in its consequences. This can also be seen here: governments and 
corporations take public opinion to be something tangible that they can monitor and act 
upon. Much more important for this part of my discussion is that they also believe that 
they can get at public opinion, relatively unproblematically, directly from monitoring the 
media. And as it is generally agreed that `the public-media interaction sets the policy 
agenda' (Ferguson 2000, p. 12), all other groups and citizens functioning inside and 
outside government positions and corporations have to look to the media. In large parts of 
her book, Ferguson easily equates public opinion and media opinion, assuming that by 
looking at the media it is possible to get at public opinion. Towards the end of the book, 
however, she draws attention to a range of studies which show that people believe that 
media have a greater effect on others than on themselves - which is called the 'third- 
person effect'. She writes: 
`Some variables affecting the third-person effect are education (people with higher 
levels of education are more likely to overestimate media effects on others), 
knowledge (people with greater knowledge of a topic are likely to overestimate 
media effects on others), the level of engagement with the topic (more involved 
people tend to overestimate the effects of media on others), the nature of the 
communication (people are especially likely to think that negative political 
advertisements or defamatory messages will affect others more than themselves), 
association with other audience members (people are more likely to overestimate the 
influence of a message on the `public at large' or on more remote audiences than on 
individuals in close physical proximity), and perception of source bias (people tend 
to overestimate the influence of biased sources on audiences)' (Ferguson 2000, 
p. 23 6/237). 
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As Ferguson goes on to say, politicians, bureaucrats and chief executives are individuals 
that fit this description (highly educated, involved, remote from other publics) which may 
explain why they concentrate on monitoring the media when they claim to want to know 
about public opinion. One could argue that what they are doing is introducing an opinion 
loop between government, big business and the media that by claiming to be interested in 
public opinion, actually exclude it. But that again would assume that the media is 
completely separate from what people think, which is plainly not the case either. Whilst 
we cannot equate media and public opinion, we should not see them as something 
completely separate. 
A further dimension has to be added now to the relationship between media and 
audiences: this relationship is not only complicated by people's personal situation and 
world view, as well as interpersonal relationships, but also by their beliefs about the 
media itself and its impact. As we have seen above, at the institutional level, the media 
have an impact and an influence that is not based on an appreciation of any actual effect 
that media messages may have on individuals, but on the belief that they do have that 
influence on people's opinions. As social scientists, we clearly have to see that there is a 
difference between the actual relationship of media to audience, and the role that a belief 
in media effects plays at an institutional level. 
We have seen that the relationship between media and audiences is complex, therefore 
complicated, hard to describe and even harder to pin down. In the light of this, it appears 
to be relatively difficult to justify a study of media content on the assumption that it will 
influence what people think, as long as theories of media effects differ as greatly as they 
do. However, we know that the media play an (increasingly) large role in contemporary 
social life (see Thompson), even if we might be hard pressed to specify what that is. 
Arguments about the role, function and position of media in social life are as much a 
facet of contemporary life as the media are themselves. Media are self-referential, they 
talk at least as much about themselves and each other as about events outside themselves. 
Opinions range from media increasingly becoming our universe (shaping our world, 
making our world), to them becoming a parallel universe to the one we generally think 
we live in (replacing our world). In one word, the media are important, and they are and 
should be an important focus of study. 
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At this point, I need to recapitulate what has been said so far in this chapter. I have 
shown why I think opinion polls to be a poor instrument for studying public discourse: 
they contain too many unquestioned assumptions about that discourse on part of the 
researcher, which might influence the design of such a study - from the 
conceptualisation of the problem to the specifics of the questions asked. I have claimed 
the media to be a site of observation of public discourse and superior to opinion polls and 
surveys, if one's interest lies in public discourse. Following on from there, I have 
discussed the role of the media in social life, and the way that the relationship between 
the media and the public has been conceptualised. I have concluded from this discussion 
that the relationship between media messages and individuals is complex and that we do 
not know the impact that media messages have on individuals and, by extension, how 
they affect public opinion (however constructed this concept may be). Neither can we say 
that media opinion equals public opinion, although it is interesting that government and 
corporations seem to think it does and base important policy decisions on media opinion. 
So the question now is: what is the theoretical basis on which a study of euthanasia in the 
media would be both important and interesting? 
Instead of concentrating on the influence of media messages on people, or 
presupposing that media opinions equal public opinion, we can start from the assumption 
that the content of media to a certain extent reflects, or rather shares in, a public discourse 
on a topic like euthanasia. This approach recognises that the media does not equal public 
discourse, but that it is one aspect of it, and that it plays a particular role. To that extent, 
a study of media representations aims to find out how the media represent a particular 
topic. However, we can go further than that. Because, as we have seen above, the media 
play a role in individual lives, public discourse and social life, even if we can't specify 
that role exactly, we can safely assume that media representations are reflections of more 
than just the conventions and interests of the media. We can think about the content of 
media, of media representations as a form of cultural representation. 
9 See Croteau and Hoynes (1997) on how a sociological approach suggests that media content is both cause 
and effect. 
45 
Media representations as cultural representations 
A study of media representations has to be contextualised within the framework of the 
sociology of knowledge. The basic premise of the sociology of knowledge is that reality 
is socially constituted, or, in Durkheim's words: `the world exists only in so far as it is 
represented to us' (Durkheim 1982, p. 238). Representation can be understood, following 
Howard Becker (2000), as the ways human beings have developed for telling others what 
they think they know - it therefore combines the construction and communication of 
knowledge. Representation is thus the basis of any public consciousness. Representation 
is only possible through shared languages (in the wider sense, of systems of signs 
signifying meaning). The meanings given to the concept of euthanasia are continuously 
being developed in a public discourse through a shared language. One way of accessing 
this discourse is by looking at the media, where the public discourse on euthanasia is 
played out as a media discourse (both differing from and sharing in a public discourse). 
Thus, the goal of a study of media representations of euthanasia is to find out what kinds 
of representations the media discourse on euthanasia brings to the public consciousness 
on euthanasia. 
The concept of `cultural representations' is based in the Durkheimian tradition 
stressing the importance of collective ideas or representations for social life. This thesis is 
not about mapping out what different interested groups think about euthanasia or 
investigating their relative access to the media in terms of influencing production; it is 
about the particular way in which `euthanasia' is conceptualised in the media, the 
structures of arguing and thinking around it, the existence of which surely has a 
normalising function on how we can and do talk about the issue, in this society and at this 
particular moment in time. 
I will use the concept of cultural representations in a loose way to mean 
representations in the above sense, which play a part in the culture that takes euthanasia 
to be a public issue. Cultural representations are ways of talking and thinking about a 
particular issue, in this case euthanasia. The next chapter will deal in further detail with 
how a study of media representations of euthanasia is to be conducted, laying out a 
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qualitative approach to `discovery', rather than coming to the text with fixed ideas of 
what one is hoping to find. 
Advantages and limits of a study of media representations 
As has been said earlier, the purpose of this study is to investigate the media discourse on 
euthanasia with the ultimate aim of gaining a wider understanding of the structures of 
thinking and arguing about euthanasia that may set the parameters of and provide the 
concepts for the public discourse on euthanasia outside the media. It has become clear 
that this thesis addresses the issue of euthanasia through looking at the media, rather than 
looking at the media by studying the example of euthanasia. There are limits to this kind 
of study that have to do with a relative neglect of issues to do with the media themselves. 
Within media studies, reception and production are important objects of study. This 
chapter has theorised reception in some detail, because it is of importance to this 
particular study to understand how the relationship between media and their audiences is 
to be conceptualised. My study itself however does not investigate the reception of media 
representations of euthanasia by an audience, an approach which in itself could have led 
to some interesting findings not without relevance to an understanding of the public 
discourse on euthanasia, for example finding out whether media representations of 
euthanasia are endorsed or resisted, by whom and in which circumstances, and so on. 
Neither does my study interrogate issues of production - questions as to how the 
production process influences the eventual media products and the particular media 
discourse that can be abstracted from the individual texts. As the unresolved issue of 
euthanasia is embedded in a long-standing debate, groups have formed that carry 
particular opinions in relation to euthanasia - positive ones with the VES, negative ones 
with the hospice movement and some church groups, for example. The relative influence 
of these groups on the representation of euthanasia in the media is not an issue that can be 
addressed within an approach of media representations as cultural representations. My 
study focuses upon the texts themselves, while assuming the tension that generally exist 
in all media production between the praxis of the media as part of the establishment - and 
as such they are influenced by government and big business - and the partial reality/ideal 
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of the media as the guardian of democratic societies. In that second sense, government 
and business are actually dependent upon the media, and both can be seen to be more 
able to monitor than to influence the media. To reiterate: how exactly the production 
process influences the texts is not part of what I am trying to find out. 
While an understanding of issues of production and reception form a necessary 
background to a study of media representations, these issues are not the focus of it. A 
sociological approach to media representations as cultural representations simply has a 
different theoretical orientation than, say, a political economy approach interested in 
investigating issues of relative power in terms of the production of meaning, or a media 
studies approach wanting to find out about the way audiences decode these meanings. 
One last thing that has to be addressed is the fact that the study of media 
representations is a sociological study in the sense that Doyle McCarthy construes 
sociology: 
Sociology's work must be judged in situ: its concepts and its insights develop out of 
and are addressed to the social worlds of its practitioners. Sociologists are not in the 
business of offering timeless truths. We are neither poets nor metaphysicians. Our 
discipline is really designed for situational diagnosis that allow us better to 
understand what is going on in the world around us. As sociology of knowledge best 
demonstrates, the very concepts and models we employ have their origin in real life; 
they emerge out of a confrontation with the dilemmas of social living and carry with 
them our conscious and unconscious strivings. At best, we try to understand our own 
social world by unraveling its special history. But it is always a history taken from 
our own particular vantage point. Contemporary sociology begins from and returns 
to our situation, the one for which it was fashioned in the first place (Doyle 
McCarthy 1999, p. 9). 
A study of media representations of euthanasia, conceptualised to find out about 
representations that share in public discourse on euthanasia, will itself be part of that 
discourse. Euthanasia has become a problem in contemporary society. The problem is 
how societies should deal with the different demands of terminally ill people who want to 
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be able to end their lives on their own volition, doctors who want to be able to help them, 
and doctors who want to have nothing to do with it, other people that are torn between 
ideas about the sanctity of life and the rights of individuals - including a number of other 
competing interests. A study of media representations of euthanasia aims in a small way 
to contribute to the understanding of that long-standing debate. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has started with a discussion of the disadvantages of opinion polls and 
surveys in furthering our understanding of public consciousness on euthanasia, arguing 
that a study of the media would give a better access to the representations influential in 
that consciousness. A large part of the chapter has been devoted to theorising the role of 
the media in society, especially the way that the relationship between the media and their 
audiences must be understood. This situates the study of media representations of 
euthanasia in the Durkheimian tradition of collective representations, which has a distinct 
theoretical orientation, differing from the ones advanced within media studies where 
issues of production and/or reception come to the fore. 
The aim of this chapter has been to provide the theoretical background that explains 
the particular form that this study of media representations of euthanasia takes. The next 
chapter will deal with methodology and the methods used in carrying out that study. 
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Chapter (3) - Carrying out the study of euthanasia in the media: 
methodologies and methods 
Introduction 
Chapter (2) has established where this study is situated theoretically. The present chapter 
deals with the various techniques developed for studying texts used in this analysis 
(content analysis, discourse analysis and narrative analysis), and indicates how their 
insights are relevant to this study. A section on the methods employed in this study lays 
out how the data for this study was generated and how this data was analysed. In the last 
part, an overview is given of the chapters that follow in order to indicate the structure of 
the thesis as a whole. 
Methodologies of studying texts 
Different methodologies have developed that inform the study of texts. In the first part of 
this chapter, I shall introduce content analysis, discourse analysis and narrative analysis. I 
do not consider these approaches to be mutually exclusive; instead I regard them as the 
`tool kits' that have provided me with the methods that I have applied. 
Content analysis 
Content analysis is the classic approach to studying texts. The basic structure of a content 
analysis is as follows: 
1. Start with a research question 
2. Decide on a sampling strategy 
3. Define the recording unit (individual words, themes, paragraphs... ) 
4. Construct categories for analysis (the most crucial aspect of content analysis) 
5. Test the coding on samples of text and assess reliability 
so 
6. Carry out the analysis 
(the above is adapted from Robson's `Real World Research' 1993, pp. 272-279). 
As we can see, content analysis starts off with a research question. This requires that the 
researcher has already formulated a question that she poses to the text, which should be 
answered through the analysis. Content analysis is about documenting the content of a 
text or texts, and very often is about counting the instances of particular units in terms of 
the categories developed. This is a highly regulated approach to the study of texts, and 
does not allow for discovery of elements that have not been taken into consideration in 
the development of the categories. As Robson states, the most important part of a 
successful content analysis, one that is valid and can be replicated to yield the same 
results, lies precisely in the development of the categories. 
It could be argued that what in content analysis would be called the development of 
the categories of analysis, has become the main part of my analysis of media 
representations of euthanasia. My study has not started with a precise research question, 
the answer to which would be provided by the text - the research question was put much 
more widely: `how does the media represent the issue of euthanasia? '. The research has 
been conceptualised more as a process of exploration than a search for the answer to a 
particular question. I am asking: what are the structures of thinking and arguing about 
euthanasia, as represented in the press? I aim to describe and analyse, rather than simply 
to count. In a sense, the emphasis has shifted between a conventional content analysis and 
what I am doing: content analysis has to operationalise categories, my study wants to 
explore categories. What is only the initial phase in content analysis becomes the main 
research aim in my analysis. 
Discourse analysis 
Robson's textbook on methods from 1993 (see above) has very little to say on discourse 
analysis. In the intervening years until the present, discourse analysis has become 
increasingly popular. One thing that Robson says, however, still holds true: `there is little 
agreement as to its usage' (Robson 1993, p. 287). 
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The term `discourse' is instrumentalised in different ways in different research 
traditions. The `linguistic turn', not only in sociology but in the social sciences as a 
whole, describes a situation in which more attention is being paid to language within 
every tradition. The differences lie in the degree of attention that is paid to linguistic 
detail, and in how language is thought to be related to social or psychological processes. 
Consequently, `discourse' can simply refer to the structures inherent in language. It can 
mean the structure of arguing over a particular topic (the `discourse' on euthanasia, 
independent of texts but found in them), or it can mean ways of thinking and knowing 
that are related to particular institutional practices ('media discourse' as constituted in 
texts). The various versions of `discourse analysis' consequently construct their own 
particular definition of `discourse'. 
In relation to press articles, we could look at the texts from a critical linguistic point of 
view (see Fowler 1991), analysing the language of the articles with the aim of exposing 
the ideology inherent in language - raising awareness of the world as it is conceptually 
created by use of a particular language. `Discourse analysis' here becomes analysis of 
language. 
A more Foucauldian type of `discourse analysis' would look for evidence of 
`discourses' that are held to be particular ways of structuring areas of knowledge and 
social practice, within and beyond the texts. For analysts working in the tradition of 
Foucault, `discourses' constitute objects, and position people as social subjects. 
`Discourses' here are broadly ways of talking about particular topics and people that 
structure what can and cannot be said or done'. `Discourses' are understood to structure 
not just texts (in the narrow meaning of words on paper or computer screen) but relations 
in social life. 
For social psychologists Potter and Wetherell (1994, and Potter et al 1990), `discourse 
analysis' is about `how people use discourse and how discourse uses people' (Potter et al. 
1990, p. 213). `Discourse' is apparent in the actual discursive practices of people. It is 
manufactured out of pre-existing linguistic resources. The choice and selection of 
''In his The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault (1972) pointed out that discourse not only restricts, 
limits and arranges what can and cannot be said about the phenomena within its domain, it also empowers 
(and disempowers) certain agents to speak on this or that question of fact. In many respects one might say 
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particular possibilities inherent in those resources is said to be dependent on 
psychological factors, seen as the orientation and interest of the speakers, who deal with 
the world around them in terms of discursive constructions or versions. These discursive 
versions can be abstracted from talk. People create them, use them, and become 
dependent on them. That is how discourse (now imagined to be prior to people's use of 
it) is said to `use people'. `Discourse' here is understood neither to be simply the 
ideology inherent in the sample of language studied, as suggested by Fowler; nor is 
`discourse' seen to constitute a particular area of knowledge and social practice, like 
`scientific discourse', `medical discourse', and also maybe `media discourse', as in 
Foucault. For example, Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) in their study of scientists' linguistic 
repertoires came to understand that `scientific discourse' is not one discourse but two 
distinct discourses: one is based on `an empiricist repertoire embodying many of the 
ideals of story-book science along with 19th century justificationist philosophy', the other 
is based on `a contingent repertoire which is a fragmentary archipelago of notions about 
psychology, sociology, social interests and institutional functioning' (Potter et al. 1990, 
p. 21 1). Here, two discourses, not one, are seen to sustain modern science. 
Potter and Wetherell are social psychologists, and their version of discourse can be 
understood if one considers the academic tradition they are working in - and what they 
are `arguing against' (see Billig, below). This tradition includes attitudinal studies which 
imagined attitudes to reside within individuals, to be uncovered by methods concentrating 
on the emotive and cognitive structures of these individuals. Potter and Wetherell 
developed their version of discourse analysis against the view that attitudes were 
something to be found within the individual. They say: 
`We do not intend to use the discourse as a pathway to entities or phenomena lying 
`beyond' the text. Discourse analysis does not take for granted that accounts reflect 
underlying attitudes or dispositions and therefore we do not expect that an 
individual's discourse will be consistent and coherent. Rather, the focus is on the 
that discourse empowers certain agents to create representations, and thereby to authoritatively pronounce 
on the shape and form of the world' (Prior 1997, p. 70'71). 
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discourse itself: how it is organised and what it is doing' (Potter and Wetherell 1987, 
p. 49). 
By directing their attention away from the individual and towards the study of discourse, 
Potter and Wetherell effectively bracket off any consideration of thinking (where the 
individual and discourse would have to be considered together). 
Thinking, and thus the relationship between abstract discourse and real people, is 
something that Michael Billig has written about. In his book `Arguing and thinking' 
(1989), Billig lays the foundations for rhetorical analysis, which bridges the gap between 
individuals and discourse, exposed by Potter and Wetherell and others. He writes about 
both the forms and the content of thinking. The most basic forms are the processes of 
categorisation and particularisation. Billig holds that 
`Categorisation does not provide the basis of thinking in a simple sense. The 
automatic application of categories is the negation of thinking, in that it is essentially 
a thoughtless process. Thinking starts when we argue or deliberate about which 
categorisation to particularise, or how to categorise a particularisation' (Billig 1989, 
p. 140). 
We are thinking by putting things together into one category, or separating one particular 
thing out of a general category for special treatment - as well as arguing with others over 
the characteristics and contents of those categories. Rhetorical or argumentative thought 
is different from logical thinking, for `within a rhetorical context, both a statement and its 
negation can be reasonable' (Billig 1989, p. 164). 
Rhetorical analysis always takes into account the rhetorical context. Attitudes, for 
example, are not seen to reside within the emotional or cognitive depths of the individual 
(here Billig is agreeing with Potter and Wetherell), but `an attitude refers to a stance on a 
matter of public debate and disagreement' (Billig 1989, p. 177). If there is no debate, no 
disagreement, nothing to `argue against', then there are no attitudes - only generally held 
beliefs (as Billig says, `the controversial aspect of attitudes implies that not all beliefs are 
attitudes' (ibid. )). Beliefs that are taken for granted do not require any arguments to 
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justify them or to rebut criticism of them, and individuals suddenly brought into a 
situation where they do have to defend their beliefs could be quite hard pressed to do so. 
This is not to say that they could not do so, however, as we are well equipped through the 
forms of our thinking (the strategies of categorisation and particularisation) to invent a 
novel argument. 
But neither does rhetorical analysis stop at the discussions of (controversial) attitudes 
and uncontroversial beliefs. Billig goes on to discuss the dilemmatic aspect of common- 
sense. He says: 
`The contrary structures of our minds are not confined to the possession of those 
contrary forms which are used for shaping arguments, and which enable us to unpick 
categories by particularisation and to bundle particulars into categories. In addition, 
the contents of common-sense thinking may also be marked by contrary aspects' 
(Billig 1989, p. 192). 
Common-sense is thought of as shared by a group of people. Billig uses it in the 
anthropological sense as referring to `particular versions of common-sense to particular 
communities or audiences' (Billig 1989, p. 201)2, rather than `common opinions [... ] 
which were held by all thinking, or reasonable people' (ibid. ). This first of all allows for 
arguments to arise between communities, but Billig goes further in saying that `the same 
common-sense will be the location of arguments which contradict each other' (Billig 
1989, p. 203) - that is, within the same community (or even within the same person). 
Common-sense must be conceptualised as being made up of contrary aspects, 'common- 
places' as Billig calls them, that will be tugging into opposite directions. Billig argues 
that 
`It is because of this proximity between the undefined borders of opposites, that 
common-sense can provide us with the dilemmas to think and argue about; and, only 
if there are such dilemmas and deliberation, rather than the smooth and unthinking 
Billig also says ' [. . .I 
if we say that all communitites have their own common-sense, we are not implying 
that they are equally sensible' (Billig 1989, p. 201). 
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categorisation of all worldly particulars, can our discourse bear a moral quality' 
(Billig 1989, p. 208). 
Billig's version of discourse analysis as rhetorical analysis has direct relevance for this 
study. Euthanasia is generally represented as a controversial topic, one that people can 
have attitudes about (see opinion polls) and one that regularly invokes notions of 
common-sense. Although I am looking at newspaper texts, it is still crucial to hold on to 
the link between discourse and thinking individuals - for thinking has gone into the 
creation of the newspaper articles, and thinking is what makes the debate as a whole. 
Arguments about categories are the prominent feature of expert discourses on euthanasia, 
and attention to the strategies of categorisation and particularisation only makes the 
discursive structure in the data visible. 
In my study of media representations of euthanasia, I inevitably use the term 
`discourse' in different ways. I talk about `expert discourse' on euthanasia and `media 
discourse' on euthanasia as separate, while seeing both as part of a `public discourse' on 
euthanasia, which itself is constituted of other `discourses', for example around notions 
of agency or responsibility. Discourses, the way I understand them, are patterns in the 
structure of thinking and arguing about particular issues that can be discovered and 
described. 
Narrative analysis 
Narrative analysis can be seen as a type of discourse analysis, especially when the 
definition of the term `discourse' is left quite open. Narrative analysis looks for structures 
across several texts: it looks at stories, how they develop, how one thing is said to lead to 
another. Vladimir Propp, who first applied narrative analysis to fairy tales, concluded that 
they all represented different versions of the same plot: the diverse characters and events 
were representative of the same functions, following the same basic story line (see 
Silverman 1993; Alasuutari 1995). Propp's intent was to show that `the individual tales 
studied could be seen as variants of a single `macrotale" (Alasuutari 1995). This, 
however, need not always be the intention of narrative analysis. As Alasuutari points out, 
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stories may be structurally much more complex than fairytales, and depending on what 
elements the researcher singles out to classify stories, one might look like another, or 
nothing like the other, in the corpus of analysis. He holds that: 
`It cannot be argued, then, that the decisions made in the classification of stories are 
the only possible ones. Classification is not the main issue at all; it is a tool that often 
comes in handy during research. To study the structural features of stories by 
creating plot summaries and by summarising those summaries is helpful in the 
comparison of texts which may often be of extensive length. It is a means to discover 
both uniting and separating features. [... ] In this way narrative analysis is helpful in 
locating the differences and similarities between different stories' (Alasuutari 1995, 
p. 74/75). 
Alasuutari then goes on to say that narrative typology is not a research result itself. The 
way I understand this, and have applied it in this thesis, is that narrative analysis can be a 
means of ordering a large number of texts. Abstracting any story line and looking at the 
structural elements in the individual stories, one can quickly see which elements are 
present and which are not, and how they are presented - in a similar or in very different 
ways. 
Narrative analysis is especially helpful when applied to newspaper articles. As Bell 
says: `Journalists are professional story-tellers of our age' (Bell 1991, p. 147). A lot has 
been written about the kind of stories that journalists and editors favour; as Golding and 
Elliott say: good news stories 
`exhibit a narrative structure akin to the root elements in human drama. [... ] 
Dramatic structure is often achieved by the presentation of conflict, most commonly 
by the matching of opposed viewpoints drawn from spokesmen of `both sides of the 
question'. The audience is here felt to be served by being given the full picture as 
well as an interesting confrontation' (Golding/Elliott 1996, p. 406). 
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From a critical viewpoint, this reads: `the problem here is that journalists like to quote 
people with extreme positions, so that they come off in the middle as reasonable people. 
This allows any extremist to skew the debate' (Pence 1998, p. 1223). We can, then, expect 
newspaper stories to incorporate drama and embrace conflict - the question is, however, 
whether that should be our explicit object of analysis. My view is that we can draw on the 
findings of previous studies of the media. The fact is that we know quite well how the 
media in general presents news stories. It has been demonstrated that today, the 
traditional division into `hard' news (serious, fact-based coverage) and `soft' news (light, 
human interest oriented coverage) has broken down in wide sections of the media (see 
Henderson/Kitzinger 1999, p. 66/67), and that we can expect to find elements of both in 
most news stories. What I am arguing here is that a study of media stories does not have 
to replicate studies that show that news stories involve drama, and a mixture of serious 
coverage and human interest angles, but it can use those findings as background 
information about news stories in general and go on to analyse the particular stories for 
their own particular aspects. 
Both narrative analysis and discourse analysis, particularly in the form of Billig's 
rhetorical analysis, allowed me to carry out a study of media representations of 
euthanasia, conceptualised as a study of cultural representations (elaborated in the 
previous chapter). Texts in general, and newspaper articles in particular, work on several 
levels, and consequently their analysis can take different forms. I have chosen narrative 
analysis because it directs attention to the organisation of newspaper articles on 
euthanasia as stories, and discourse analysis (or rhetorical analysis) because it enables a 
concentration on those elements of the stories that are not just about the narrative 
dimension, but relate to the structures of thinking and writing about the substantive topic, 
euthanasia. The actual analysis consisted of reading and re-reading, searching out 
particular words and phrases, counting words, juxtaposing paragraphs, looking for 
repetitions and contradictions, reflecting on what was being said and not being said, and 
so on. The structure of the thesis as it eventually evolved will be described in further 
detail in the section previewing the subsequent chapters below. But first, an introduction 
to previous studies of media representations of euthanasia. 
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Previous studies of media representations of euthanasia 
As has been said in the previous chapter, there have been virtually no studies of how 
euthanasia is portrayed in the media. A search in the International Bibliography of the 
Social Sciences (BIDS) yielded only one result for the combined keywords `euthanasia & 
media' for the whole period between 1951 and 2002. The article `Paging Dr Death: the 
political theatre of assisted suicide in Michigan' by Fino et al (1997) only peripherally 
touched upon the media. The article investigated the political drama unfolding around the 
activities of Dr Kevorkian in the USA (also see Chapter (5) on Dr Kevorkian). The media 
was mentioned in relation to those activities in terms of (a) the inherent newsworthyness 
of Kevorkian's activities, and (b) the conscious use which Kevorkian and his attorney, 
Flieger, made of the media in attempting to win over the public to their cause. In no 
direct sense did this article investigate media representations of euthanasia. 
That BIDS is not exhaustive can be demonstrated by the existence of another article, 
found quite by chance, that falls into the category `euthanasia and the media'. `Baby Jane 
Doe in the Media' by Klaidman and Beauchamp (1986) deals with the media coverage of 
the case of an American baby born with spina bifida and microcephaly. Surgery was 
required to keep the child alive, knowing that she would always be significantly 
handicapped even if the surgery were successful. A controversy developed over whether 
she should be kept alive at all (Klaidman/Beauchamp 1986, p. 271). Klaidman and 
Beauchamp's article is a review of national television, magazine and newspaper coverage 
of the case. The controversy can be seen to fall into the category of euthanasia, although 
this word is not mentioned in the article itself and there is no suggestion that it played a 
role in the media coverage of the case. The review concentrates on evaluating media 
coverage of the case in terms of its accuracy, coming to the damning conclusion that 
`most of it lacked perspective and context; stories were generally incomplete and often 
imprecise; reporting was sometimes inaccurate; and overall, inadequate attention was 
paid to the medical, legal, philosophical, and social implications of the case' (ibid. ). One 
main finding was that: 
59 
[... ] the moral issues illustrated or sparked by the case were cast in highly simplistic 
terms, as if the contest was simply between absolutist right-to-live advocates and 
those who contend that parents have an absolute right to decide whether a defective 
newborn should live or die. The coverage failed to convey that perhaps the majority 
of philosophers and physicians who have reflected seriously on this issue are in the 
vast middle ground, according - among other things - to individual views about the 
status of rights, fair treatment for the handicapped, and what constitutes an 
acceptable quality of life. Very little of the complexity of the debate and the breadth 
and depth of the moral divisions within the philosophical, medical, and legal 
communities were adequately covered by the news organisations we reviewed' 
(KlaidmanBeauchamp 1986, p. 281). 
We can see that a major assumption of this review is that news reporting should 
adequately reflect `reality'. A lot of media analysis of health coverage in general used to 
assume the same thing, and still does (see Seale, forthcoming). While there is a 
continuing concern with `accuracy' in media studies, it can be argued that the `reality' 
that media coverage is being compared with is always a particular reality. 
Straightforward `realist' studies thus become problematic if one starts asking the 
question: whose reality? In the above article on the coverage of the case of `Baby Jane 
Doe', `reality' was the reality of `experts' - philosophers and physicians who `have 
seriously reflected on this issue'. The position of Klaidman and Beauchamp is that the 
media should share in this reality, instead of creating its own `wrong' (or preferred) 
account. 
In studies of science coverage, however, it has become clear that the media was not 
adequately or inadequately reflecting `scientific reality', but the reality as perceived by 
scientists'. If one starts from the assumption that reality is socially constructed, just as 
media messages are constructed, then any comparison between media coverage and the 
' This is supported by Nelkin's research, which found that `the difficulty of evaluating a complex and 
uncertain subject converges with the day-to-day constraints of the journalistic profession to reinforce the 
tendency to rely uncritically on scientific expertise [... ]. Many journalists have adopted the mindset of 
`frame' of scientists, interpreting science in terms defined by their sources, even when those sources clearly 
display a special bias' (Nelkin 1995, p. 164). However, Nelkin also makes the point that this pattern was 
beginning to change in the 1990s, resulting in somewhat more critical and sceptical science reporting today. 
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`real' event has itself to be seen as constructed - and often constructed with particular 
interests in mind. There are two possible responses to the situation understood as such: 
firstly there is the conclusion drawn by `extreme constructionism', which holds that 
everything is constructed, thereby everything (any sense of reality and different 
constructions of reality) gets conflated, and comparison becomes impossible. My own 
standpoint, and the one adopted by the great majority of researchers who carry out studies 
related to health issues in the media, is one which I will call `constructive 
constructionism'. This refers to an approach which is sensitive to constructionism, but 
does not discard realism. I want to argue that, although this is taking on an often 
uncomfortable position between what some people might take to be incompatible 
philosophical stances, this is the only position that makes any sense to hold4. To discard 
any sense of realism (in the sense of another reality or other realities outside the media) 
would be to discard any possibility of making comparisons, at least comparisons that 
have any relevance to a reality outside the texts - of course this argument only makes 
sense as long as one holds on to a notion of the existence of such a reality. It has to be 
remembered that what people believe to be real is real in its consequences (see previous 
chapter), and for that reason some sense of `reality' needs to be considered. The 
particular comparisons made may be contested, but they serve as valuable reference 
points in grappling with diverse issues or problems. The discrepancy between the things 
that are being compared is then not the actual finding, it rather constitutes the starting 
point for an investigation into why there is this discrepancy, what it could mean - rather 
than, as in the review article of the `Baby Jane Doe' case above, assuming that we 
already know what it means: that the media coverage is misleading and needs to be 
changed in accordance with reality outside the media. One thing it could mean is that the 
reality portrayed in the media might actually come close to the reality of some people 
outside the media, and if that is indeed the case, it would raise issues that a `realist' study 
of the media could never deal with. In conclusion it can be said, then, that `reality' for us 
is only ever a reality represented to us and by us (or somebody) in a particular way, 
which does not mean that a `reality' beyond the one represented to us does not exist. It 
° See my MA thesis (University of Kent, 1999): 'The shifting boundaries of nature and culture: 
implications for contemporary social thought'. 
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follows that the more interesting studies of media representations compare them to other 
representations of the same issue (rather than assuming that we know what `reality' is, 
and comparing media representations against those other representations). Accordingly, 
this study of media representations of euthanasia does not compare them to the `reality' 
of euthanasia; rather it is interested in divergences and discrepancies with `reality' 
represented in a particular way, more specifically, the representations of `experts'. 
Methods 
This section discusses in greater detail the sample and the methods of analysis employed 
in carrying out this study. 
Choosing the data: the sample 
The aim of the study was to find out how the media represents euthanasia. It was not 
designed as a comparative study or as part of a study of the media in terms of production, 
representation and reception. It aims to look at media representations of euthanasia, to 
explore discourses in the media on euthanasia, and discourses that the media draws upon 
in its presentation of euthanasia, using textual analysis including methods of content, 
discourse and narrative analysis. In the pilot phase of the study, different possible data 
sets were compiled: video materials of documentaries and film shown on British and 
German television; medical and nursing journals; texts on euthanasia; an archive of 
articles on euthanasia for the last five years from the Times, the Guardian and the 
Independent, and so on. All of those were eventually discarded to favour a data set 
consisting of articles from British newspapers, both national and regional, spanning the 
course of one year (from November 1998 to October 1999). This data set was derived 
from LexisNexis (see below), and it was chosen because it would give access to a range 
of representations on particular events presented in terms of euthanasia, within a 
relatively short time span. It was anticipated that this data would generate evidence of the 
range of media representations of euthanasia for a particular point in time. 
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What is LexisNexis? 
The data used in this thesis was acquired through the data service LexisNexis. LexisNexis 
was started in 1973, it prides itself in virtually creating the online information market. 
Today it is the world's leading source of news, legal, business information and market 
intelligence. LexisNexis has access to over 3.7 billion documents from 33,000 sources of 
reference (see http //wwtiv_lexis-nexis. co uk). which can be accessed through the web. 
LexisNexis offers several products. Universities in the UK which subscribe to LexisNexis 
(among them Oxford, the Open University, Leicester, Exeter, Bath, Sterling - but not the 
University of London) generally subscribe to a service called `LexisNexis Executive' 
which gives access to news coverage from approximately 12,000 international, national 
and local publications. The data used in this thesis was derived from a trial version 
(available for one week). All the articles from British newspapers bearing the keyword 
`euthanasia' in headline or text were selected (see also page 118)5. The table below 
shows the range of British newspapers and the number of articles (news reports, feature 
articles, editorial and commentaries) acquired through this procedure. The number in 
brackets is the number of articles that dealt with case stories which were subject to closer 
analysis in this thesis. 
Numbers of British Newspaper Articles derived from LexisNexis for the 12-month period 
from November 1998 - October 1999: number of all articles with the keyword 
`euthanasia' present in the headline or body of text (number of articles specifically 
dealing with cases): 
5 This selection was compared to articles selected on the basis of the keywords `assisted suicide': it was 
found that the great majority of the articles with the keyword `assisted suicide' also held the keyword 
`euthanasia', whereas the collection of articles with the keyword `euthanasia' alone was a lot larger. In 
consequence, I decided to use the articles bearing the keyword `euthanasia' as my main data set. This was 
after English-language newspaper coverage from around the world (US-American, Australian, Singaporean 
and so on) was screened out - incidentally, this selection process already led to the first finding on the 
British newspaper coverage of the issue of euthanasia, when compared with the American coverage: 
whereas America concentrates on a discussion of `assisted suicide', very rarely using the term `euthanasia', 
in Britain the term `euthanasia' is the preferred one. It has to be noted, though, that the term and concept of 
`assisted suicide' seems to be becoming increasingly popular in Britain as well, at least since the BMA 




The Times 44 (21) 
Sunday Times 5 (2) 
Financial Times 12 (5) 
The Independent 40 (11) 
The Guardian 19 (13) 
The Observer 4 (2) 
The Daily Telegraph 7 (1) 
Sunday Telegraph 2 (1) 
The Evening Standard 10 (8) 
Daily Mail 20(13) 
Mail on Sunday 8(l) 
The Mirror 18(13) 
Rest of England: 
Western Daily Press (Bristol) 11(4) 
Bristol Evening Post 7 (3) 
Bath Chronicle 3 (1) 
Western Morning News (Plymouth) 5 (5) 
Evening Herald (Plymouth) 3 (1) 
Herald Express (Torquay) 3 (3) 
Birmingham Post 20 (13) 
Birmingham Evening Mail 5 (1) 
Coventry Evening Telegraph 3 (0) 
Leicester Mercury 1 (0) 
Manchester Guardian Weekly 2 (0) 
Nottingham Evening Post 1 (0) 
The Journal (Newcastle) 20 (9) 
Evening Chronicle (Newcastle) 5 (4) 
The Northern Echo (Darlington) 3 (2) 
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Scotland: 
The Scotsman (Edinburgh) 7 (4) 
Scotland on Sunday (Edinburgh) 2 (0) 
Evening News (Edinburgh) 2 (0) 
The Herald (Glasgow) 16 (6) 
The Sunday Herald (Glasgow) 4 (2) 
Daily Record (Glasgow) 14 (4) 
Northern Ireland: 
Belfast Telegraph 2 (0) 
Belfast News Letter 4(l) 
All Newspaper Articles 360 (133) 
LexisNexis aims to be exhaustive in so far as it gives access to the complete range of all 
newspapers available. This proposition was tested by comparing the list of British 
newspaper sources of LexisNexis (which can be found in the Appendix) to a list of 
British national newspapers, available from the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC) 
[http: //www. abc. org. uk], as well as the Top UK Regional Mornings Ranked by 
Circulation, the Top UK Regional Evenings Ranked by Circulation, and the Top UK 
Regional Sundays Ranked by Circulation, complied by The Newspaper Society 
[http: //www. newspapersoc. org. uk]. 
It was found that out of a total of 29 national newspapers, 3 were not available in 
LexisNexis: 
I. The Star - Republic of Ireland (not a British newspaper) 
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2. Sunday People 
3. Sunday Sport 
Of 18 `Top UK Regional Mornings Ranked by Circulation', 6 were not available on 
LexisNexis: 
1. Dundee Courier & Advertiser 
2. Norwich - Eastern Daily Press 
3. Newcastle-upon-Tyne Journal 
4. Ipswich - East Anglia Daily Times 
5. Ulster - News Letter 
6. Paisley Daily Express 
Of 20 `Top Regional Evenings Ranked by Circulation', 4 were not available on 
LexisNexis: 
1. West Midlands Express & Star 
2. Shropshire Star 
3. Sheffield Star 
4. Portsmouth - The News & Sports Mail 
Of 10 `Top Regional Sundays Ranked by Circulation', 3 were not available on 
LexisNexis: 
1. Sunday Post - Scotland 
2. Newcastle-upon-Tyne - Sunday Sun 
3. Sunday World - Northern Ireland Edition 
On the other hand, 26 out of the 29 British national newspapers were available in 
LexisNexis, as well as 35 out of 48 of the Top Ranking (by Circulation) British regional 
newspapers - which is the large majority. Also, LexisNexis gives access to more regional 
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newspapers than the `Top Ranking' ones, as the source list below shows. The data used 
in this thesis includes 5 regional newspapers that do not appear on the `Top Ranking' 
lists: 
1. Bath Chronicle 
2. Evening Herald, Plymouth 
3. Herald Express, Torquay 
4. Manchester Guardian Weekly 
5. Belfast News Letter 
It can be concluded that although LexisNexis does not hold all British newspapers, it 
gives access to such a wide coverage of national and regional newspapers, including the 
most well-known and influential titles, and the majority of those with the highest 
circulation, that a sample of British newspapers articles derived from LexisNexis for a 
12-month period can be regarded to be adequately representational of British newspaper 
coverage for that period. 
Carrying out the analysis: analytical tools 
As has been pointed out earlier, the actual analysis of the data did not adhere to one 
specific mode of discourse analysis. Rather, the approach taken here is eclectic, using the 
insights of different methods developed for analysing texts and making use of them in 
thinking about the data. Apart from straightforward content analysis, the analysis of texts 
is invariably an exercise in qualitative research. It can be argued that in qualitative 
research, the role of the researcher comes to the fore in a more obvious way than is the 
case in quantitative research, where construction of the data and subsequent analysis 
depends upon the articulation of standardised research procedures and techniques. The 
first premise of qualitative research is that the researcher is part of the same social world 
that she is trying to describe. An honest engagement with any element of this social world 
must always involve the constant questioning of one's own assumptions and beliefs. 
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In his article `Methodology and scholarship in understanding ideological explanation' 
(1988), Michael Billig discusses the difference between what he calls `traditional 
scholarship' and `methodology'. Methodology, he says, `attempts to standardise the 
practice of the social sciences and eliminate quirkiness. [... ] the methodological 
procedures [... ] can be followed by anyone with sufficient training' (Billig 1988, p. 200). 
In traditional scholarship, on the other hand, 
`it was taken for granted by the traditional scholar that one should read as widely as 
possible, and in as many languages as possible. Through wide reading, breadth and 
depth of knowledge would be gained, as well as the ability to make connections 
between seemingly disparate phenomena. The learned scholar would be able to 
interpret individual texts with an acuity not available to those of restricted reading' 
(Billig 1988, p. 200). 
For Billig, the wide reading, thinking and making connections, the historical knowledge 
and sensitivity, of traditional scholarship are the prerequisite to be able to do good 
qualitative research, which in his case means good discourse or rhetorical analysis. 
Without it, social science methodology too easily falls back onto common-sense terms as 
the jumping-off points for the real analysis, forgetting to investigate those common-sense 
notions in the first place6. 
I agree entirely with Billig, and accordingly from the beginning of the research 
process, I have read and watched everything that I could find on the topic of euthanasia: 
from academic articles of all different disciplines to novels dealing with the topic (for 
example Aidan Chambers' `Postcards from No Man's Land' (1999) and Ann 
Widdecombe's `The Clematis Tree' (2000)); from an episode of Peak Practice on 
television to the responses to the program on an Internet chat site the following day; from 
the British Medical Journal to resources on the Internet provided by the British Medical 
Association and the Voluntary Euthanasia Campaign (among others); and from German 
and Spanish newspaper articles to German literature and fiction. A short commentary on 
6 See also: Cicourel (1964) 
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an episode of the BBC 1 series `Murder in Mind' can be found in the postscript to Chapter 
(7). 
This background reading, to acquaint myself with the range of representations 
currently available on the topic of euthanasia, forms an indispensable part of what Billig 
calls `scholarship'. The methods employed in this thesis consequently have something in 
common with the tradition of literary analysis, as much as empirical sociological 
analysis. Here I have been influenced by what is called the `linguistic turn' in sociology 
which has introduced methods of literary analysis as an acceptable part of the repertoire 
of sociological analysis. 
Guiding questions 
The texts to be analysed were approached with the following guiding questions in mind: 
" What kind of stories does the press tell about euthanasia? In those stories, how does 
the press construct the concept of euthanasia? What is the concept of euthanasia taken 
to mean and what is it set in relation to? 
" Is there a discernible media discourse on euthanasia? Does the press make evaluations 
and what are they? 
" How is discussion of euthanasia contextualised? What are the recurring issues in 
press discussion of euthanasia? 
0 How does press discourse on euthanasia relate to `expert' discourses? 
These questions structured the actual analysis, which will be described below. 
The analysis 
The data set was available on disc and as paper print-outs. All that was available was 
pure text - additional features of the original newspaper version (the place arrangement 
of the article within the paper and on the page, photographs accompanying the article, 
and so on) were absent. The analysis consequently concentrated on the text. The text was 
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analysed with the help of the computer programme NVivo, which has been designed to 
aid in the analysis of qualitative data. More than just allowing for coding and retrieval, 
NVivo has facilities for coding, linking and searching in flexible ways, for example it is 
possible to search for a combination of words that appear in proximity, within a sentence 
or a paragraph. I mainly used the word/phrase finding facility and the facility to create 
documents juxtaposing sections of different articles that were identified to cover similar 
issues. The actual analysis consisted essentially of three operations: 
1. Basic counting: for example, counting the number of times particular words appeared 
in the texts, such as the term `euthanasia', and also the number of times it appeared 
qualified ('voluntary euthanasia', `involuntary euthanasia', `non-voluntary 
euthanasia') as opposed to unqualified Oust `euthanasia'); likewise with terms like 
`assisted suicide', `mercy', `choice', `kill', etc.; 
2. Lookingfor keywords and phrases as indicators ofdifferent discourses, and exploring 
those discourses: for example, concentrating on the paragraphs in which words like 
`choice', `chosen', `autonomous' appeared and working through representations of 
voluntariness; tracing the use of the terms `mercy' and `love' in the context of the 
stories and reflecting on the portrayal of relationships; looking at the way doctors and 
patients were portrayed (actors versus acted upon); looking for reference to countries 
(`British', `English', `Scottish', `Dutch', `Holland', `Netherlands', etc. ) in context; 
collating the terms and phrases used to describe the acts of `killing' and `letting die'; 
looking for descriptions and explanations of concepts like euthanasia ('Greek' 
definitions, `Nazi' meanings, reference to `history'); and so on; 
3. Looking for and comparing narrative structures: in the texts, who are the actors, who 
are the other people that appear, how are they being portrayed, what event is being 
presented and how, and also: how are these portrayals similar and how do they differ 
between stories, what is recurrently being referred to and what is missing. 
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It must be stressed that the analysis was data-led, it tried to explore what came up from 
the data, rather than imposing categories from outside onto the text. In consequence, the 
empirical chapters in this thesis (Chapters (5) to (8)) are the result of the application of 
those operations to these particular texts, which occurred in several phases: 
a. After a first phase of carrying out the above mentioned three operations on all texts, it 
was found that the articles discussing events - telling stories - where euthanasia 
played a role were more detailed on the issue of euthanasia itself and the sentiments 
around it than those articles where the word `euthanasia' appeared only peripherally 
in a different context (presenting a new book, recording a visit by the Pope, a short 
notice about the proposal of a new policy). It was decided that the articles telling 
stories were thus most fruitful for analysis - thus after a first phase of applying the 
above three operations to all texts, the second phase concentrated on the articles 
telling stories. Firstly, narrative analysis was applied to those articles. This involved, 
among other things, the development of a `truth table' -a technique based on logic 
(as described in Becker (1998)) which makes possible the description of a complete 
universe of interdependent concepts that can then be used to `squeeze more out of our 
data, and find more things to study' (Becker 1998, p. 166). 
b. Out of the second phase, the key concepts that structure the portrayal of euthanasia in 
the media slowly emerged: a description of `voluntary euthanasia' and the `terminal 
illness' discourses were developed by moving between the data and social theory. 
c. A third phrase dealt with other features of the articles that were too important to 
dismiss, thus the reference to other countries and how this anchors the discussion of 
euthanasia in the media was pursued. 
According to Tonkiss, `discourse analysis is a messy method' which has a `resistance to 
any formulaic rules of method' (Tonkiss 1998, p. 250/251). She also states that there are 
certain useful techniques in relation to sorting, coding and analysing data; such as, tracing 
key words and themes in the texts, looking for variation in and between texts, reading 
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from emphasis and detail, as well as attending to silences (Tonkiss 1998). All of those 
techniques were employed when I analysed my data, starting with the themes of the story, 
the key words `choice' and `terminal illness', and reference to other countries. There was 
a continuous movement between theory and the texts which is typical of discourse 
analysis. The empirical chapters are the result of this kind of engagement with my data. 
An introduction to the chapters that follow 
This section introduces the subsequent chapters of the thesis. Chapters (4) and (5) 
establish the context of the analysis with overviews of how the concept of `euthanasia' is 
used in both in expert and press discourse, while chapters (6), (7) and (8) analyse press 
discourse more closely. 
Chapter (4) looks at `expert discourse' on euthanasia. In the present chapter I have 
dealt with the concept of discourse, explaining that I use it to mean a set way of 
conceptualising, thinking or talking about a particular issue, process or state. The term 
`discourse' therefore can relate to set ways of thinking or talking connected with a 
particular social group or profession ('expert discourse', `medical discourse'), or to ways 
of thinking or talking shared more widely within a society or era (for example the 
discourse of individualism that structures social life on many levels). `Expert discourse' 
really is an amalgam of diverse discourses connected to various professions and academic 
disciplines. I have grouped them together for the purpose of this thesis, because they 
make up the visible and authoritative part of public discourse on euthanasia. It is visible 
because it is publicly available in books and articles; and it is influential not only because 
of the power our society attaches to the opinions of experts, but also and even more so 
because many of those experts are in positions to influence praxis with their opinions. 
Also, their opinions are often seen as more than mere opinions, they are expected to be 
closer to the truth about a particular subject - even though a closer proximity or deeper 
insight into a problem does not mean that diverse opinions melt into one single truth. This 
can be seen in expert discourse on euthanasia, where doctors and philosophers have 
different views of what the concept of euthanasia refers to, its status and legitimacy, but 
even among doctors and among philosophers there is no agreement, because some start 
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from different premises than others. The purpose of this chapter on `expert discourse' is 
then to give an overview of the current state of expert debate on the topic. 
The term `expert discourse' is consciously chosen in contradistinction to the term 
`media discourse' or `press discourse'. This, again, relates to something I mentioned 
earlier in relation to the value of comparison and the notion of constructive 
constructionism. We have seen that it is problematic to compare media discourse to 
`reality'. Reality is always a particular reality. The comparison then would be between a 
constructed media discourse and a `constructed reality' (for example, constructed by 
expert discourse). The topic is euthanasia. The practice of euthanasia is hidden from 
public view, and it can only be accessed through the public discourse there is on it -a 
large part of which happens to be what I will call `expert discourse'. It makes sense 
therefore to compare how the media present euthanasia against how experts talk about 
euthanasia. The comparison is `constructed', because there really are no wholly separate 
realms of `experts' and of `media'. Experts make use of the media and are being quoted 
(and sometimes even constructed as `experts' in the first place) by the media. The media 
rely heavily on expert understandings. However, that is only one dynamic that shapes 
media discourse. The diversity of opinion among experts also means that the media can 
choose whose opinion they want to endorse. The media clearly have other objectives than 
to represent expert discourse faithfully'. Thus, expert discourse plays a part in media 
discourse, but expert discourse and media discourse can analytically be conceptualised as 
independent elements of a more general public discourse on a particular topic, in this 
case, euthanasia'. I should stress again that I am well aware that the concept of `expert 
'A lot of research has been done into the media reporting of scientific issues, which has shown that `the 
evidence presented in the media [... ] is often problematic. In the field of medical reporting, it frequently 
fails to accurately represent the original research designs, or findings or to clarify the limitations or 
qualifications of research. [... ]' (Clarke 1999, p. 114). It is obvious that journalists and scientists inhabit 
what can be called different realms of discourse that follow different institutionalised rules and practices: 
`While scientists are socialised to qualify their findings, journalists may see qualifications as protective 
coloration. Furthermore, readability in the eyes of the journalist may be oversimplification to the scientist. 
Indeed, many accusations of inaccuracy are traceable to reporters' efforts to present complex material in a 
readable and appealing style' (Nelkin 1995, p. 166). This may seem to clash with the point made on p. 49 - 
of journalists adopting the frame of scientists. However, it is perfectly possible for a journalist to take his or 
her cues from the way scientists frame their topic, at the same time as simplifying the point. 
' Billig et a] in the book `Ideological dilemmas' (1988) make a distinction between `lived ideology' and 
`intellectual ideology'. `Lived ideology' seeks to describe the social patterning of everyday thinking, it 
includes what passes for common sense within a society. They say: `It may be said that ordinary people 
living in a particular society partake in the general cultural patterns of that society, and their thinking is 
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discourse' is a concept created for a particular purpose: that is, as a point of comparison, 
playing the part of a `reality' outside media discourse, one which media discourse on 
euthanasia can be set in relation to. This represents an attempt at constructing a 
comparison that will yield understandings that are found in the difference between things 
that are related, as opposed to findings that apparently float in the void of extreme 
constructionism, unrelated to anything. 
Apart from providing a comparative context for media discourse on euthanasia, 
chapter (4) also stands independently as a reflection on the current state of expert debate 
on euthanasia. It is an exercise in `sorting things out', firstly, by showing differences in 
the way euthanasia is conceptualised by experts; the arguments over what the concept 
does and does not refer to, and how the practice is to be evaluated. Secondly, I have tried 
to show how the divergent concepts and what follows from them (treatment versus care, 
extraordinary versus ordinary treatment) can be brought into relation with each other to 
form a coherent framework, by showing the problems and contradictions with different 
conceptualisations. In my view, it is impossible simply to describe a state of debate. 
`Sorting things out' is always done with some kind of ordering mechanism in mind, 
which might as well be made explicit. 
The following chapter, chapter (5), explores press discourse on euthanasia in the form 
of the stories that are told in newspapers. The 328 articles that comprise my data, selected 
as described above, can be divided into 42 different story lines. 13 of those are what I call 
`case stories', stories about individual cases that centre upon euthanasia (as opposed to 
reports about legal or policy developments in relation to euthanasia, etc. ). It is these case 
stories that my analysis concentrates on, in this as well as the following chapters. We 
have seen, above, that stories are important in news reporting, and hence narrative 
analysis could yield important insights. The method of narrative analysis I applied did not 
look at the detailed narrative structure of individual articles in themselves, or compare 
how the same story is developed differently in diverse articles of different newspapers 
shaped by these patterns' (Billig et al 1988, p. 28). `Intellectual ideology', on the other hand, refers to 
systems of political, religious or philosophical thinking and is the product of intellectual and professional 
thinkers. Using these concepts, expert discourse would clearly be an instance of `intellectual ideology'. 
Media discourse would have to be conceptualised as somewhere between 'lived ideology' and `intellectual 
ideology', for it formalises (in writing) particular ideas that have their origin both in expert discourse and 
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(for example, tabloid versus broadsheet). I had a particular interest in exploring how the 
concept of euthanasia was constructed in those articles, and I used narrative analysis as a 
tool to summarise the plots of the stories in terms of the dimensions that related to 
euthanasia - the portrayal of the action, the actors, and so on. In this I have followed 
Alasuutari who has already been quoted above: 
`To study the structural features of stories by creating plot summaries and by 
summarising those summaries is helpful in the comparison of texts which may often 
be of extensive length. It is a means to discover both uniting and separating features. 
[... ] In this way narrative analysis is helpful in locating the differences and 
similarities between different stories' (Alasuutari 1995, p. 74/75). 
For me, then, as for Alasuutari, narrative analysis does not lead to an end result in itself, 
rather, it leads to a better understanding of the research material one is dealing with. To 
summarise plots is to re-present what is there in a different format, more easily 
analysable. The analysis not only describes, but rather makes an argument. The articles 
themselves give the impression they are dealing with media representations of `real' 
events outside the texts. These are not only represented in a particular (media) way, but 
also can be misrepresented. The articles purport to deal with real events that have really 
happened, although the way the media presents them also plays a part in how their reality 
is understood. The observation that all the stories in this data set are presenting conflict is 
important, because it alerts us to the silences in media accounts where there might be no 
(open) conflict. 
In summary, it can be said that chapters (4) and (5) are offering overviews of the use 
of the concept of `euthanasia' as it is debated in expert discourse and presented in press 
discourse. They address the questions of the meaning of euthanasia, how it is applied, and 
what it represents. 
Chapter (6) looks more closely at the largest case in the data set, the Dr Moor case. 
The quasi-medical concept of the `double effect' features prominently in the press 
lay discourse. Media discourse thus may influence (and be influenced by) `lived ideology', but it cannot be 
equated with it. 
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discourse in relation to this particular case. It straddles the boundary between killing and 
not killing, between intentional and unintentional killing. This is the critical and contested 
issue in this particular case. 
Chapter (7) develops the main argument by presenting the discourses that structure the 
press coverage of euthanasia stories as a whole. Here, `discourses' are understood to be 
set ways of thinking and talking about euthanasia that can be abstracted from the press 
coverage of the news stories presented in terms of euthanasia. Here, I argue that press 
representations of euthanasia are structured around a major discourse, which I call 
`terminal illness discourse', and a minor discourse, the `voluntary euthanasia discourse'. 
The issues that those discourses address centre around the notions of agency and 
responsibility. I shall draw on current discussions of agency in social theory to make 
analytical sense of the discourses present in the press. The research reported in this 
chapter thus represents an exercise in discourse analysis. The aim is to begin to see 
structures, recurrences of particular elements, and significant absences. `Seeing' these 
things only became possible after reading, re-reading, reflecting and then coming back to 
the data, until - slowly -a pattern emerged. 
Chapter (8) is also the result of an intense engagement with the data - in its own terms 
rather than in terms derived from outside the texts (pace chapter (5)). It emerged that a 
major feature of press discussion on euthanasia is the construction of the issue (as a 
problem) in its temporal and especially spatial dimensions. As did the previous chapter, 
chapter (8) draws upon current social theory, this time theories of globalisation. The 
starting point of the chapter is the finding of an interesting discrepancy between the 
immense importance of the `national' in reporting and discussing euthanasia in the press, 
and the emphasis upon the `global' in social theory. Theorists of globalisation would, for 
example, hold that the media today represents a significant globalising influence 
(something which, as we will see, can be contested). What this chapter provides is a 
critical inquiry into both the construction of the `national' in press discourse on 
euthanasia and the construction of the `global' in globalisation theory, in order to reflect 
on how the issue of euthanasia is being represented in the press and beyond. This last 
chapter opens an issue that goes beyond the confines of this thesis: how the greater 
changes taking place in societies across the globe might reshape contemporary ideas 
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about euthanasia considerably in the near or not so near future. All that can be shown at 
this point is whatever the global changes that social theorists are dealing with, press 
discourse has not caught up with them. Press discourse, at least on euthanasia, is 
presenting the issue in terms that are domestic and familiar (the national context) - which 
has implications for cultural representations on euthanasia beyond the media, which can 
be expected to change just as slowly. 
The concluding chapter (9) summarises the main points that have come out of this 
investigation, and concludes with final comments on shortcomings and suggestions for 
further research. 
Conclusion 
The present chapter has provided the methodological background to a study of euthanasia 
in the media which employs a version of qualitative research closer to literary analysis 
than to traditional sociological empiricism (meaning that the exploration of categories 
and themes in the texts represents the central aim of the thesis). Different methodologies 
for studying texts were presented in terms of their insights relevant to this study. A 
section on methods has discussed the sample and the analytical tools made use of in the 
research. This final part introduced the following chapters as they stand as a whole; the 
next chapter will continue with a discussion of `expert' representations of euthanasia. 
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Chapter (4) - `Expert' Representations of `Euthanasia' 
Introduction 
The term `representation' refers to the ways that human beings have developed for telling 
others what they think they know (Becker 2000) - `representation' as a concept thus 
combines the construction and the communication of knowledge. This is often done 
through language, but by no means exclusively or always. `Representation' can for 
example be or include the visual, as is increasingly recognised by the practitioners of 
visual sociology. In this study, my interest is in the representation of `euthanasia', that is I 
am concerned with the construction and communication of the ideas and practices that 
are talked about under the heading of `euthanasia'. I am concerned with language only, 
excluding the range of visual representations of `euthanasia' that exist for example in 
documentary and other films, having chosen to look at newspaper articles. This choice 
was influenced by considerations of time and space limitations, rather than any inherent 
valuation of representation via language as opposed to pictures. 
Selective literature review 
There exists a relatively large amount of literature on euthanasia, partly because different 
disciplines are interested in the topic from their specific point of view; partly because it is 
an issue that people tend to feel quite passionate about - one way or the other. Also, 
euthanasia represents an issue that has so far defied a satisfactory resolution, and many 
people feel they have something to contribute. 
What follows is a selective literature review, presenting books and articles that deal 
with euthanasia in different ways. In that sense, it tries to show the different types of 
literature that are available on the topic of euthanasia. 
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Euthanasia in different countries and cultures 
First, there is the literature that deals with the particular situation in diverse countries. 
There is a large literature that deals specifically with euthanasia in the Netherlands, both 
by Dutch and foreign commentators. Some of them explicitly condemn the situation in 
that country, where the practice of euthanasia has progressively been decriminalised over 
the last couple of decades (Fenigsen, 1989; Zykicz, 1995). In contrast to that, there have 
been a number of careful, large-scale studies into the practice of euthanasia in the 
Netherlands (van der Maas et al, 1991 and 1996; Pijnenborg et al, 1994), trying to assess 
the situation. Pool (2000) has carried out a participant observational study in a Dutch 
hospital, looking at euthanasia as a part of terminal care. 
There is an equally large number of books and articles on the USA, which has 
addressed the few attempts at legalising physician-assisted suicide in different states in 
the 1990s. Some contributions consist of polemics for (Dority, 1996; Hallock, 1996) or 
against (Nuland, 1998; Smith, 1994) the legalisation of euthanasia, or physician-assisted 
suicide. The cost of dying, and specifically the costs of PAS are issues that are being 
discussed for the American context (Scitovsky, 1984; Fung, 1993; Felder, 1996). Baffin 
(1992 and 1994) looks at the situation in other countries (Netherlands, Germany) to see 
whether their experience is helpful for the American case. Spragins (1999)' has written a 
metaphorical analysis of the American debate on physician-assisted suicide. 
Australia's Northern Territory saw the legalisation of euthanasia for a short period of 
time in 1995: Ryan (1996) discusses the Northern Territory Rights of the Terminally Ill 
Act. 
' Intitially I thought Spragins' work would be directly relevant to this thesis, considering that she looked at 
metaphors in the American PAS debate, and I am also concerned with language of the euthanasia debate. 
However, her metaphorical analysis turned out to be restricted to the rhetorical aspects of the American 
PAS debate as represented in the published works of three American physicians: Jack Kevorkian, C. Everett 
Koop and Timothy Quill. She drew out the diverse metaphors that their respective arguments are based 
upon (for example, the physician as lesser deity, as judge, business man or warrior; medicine as primitive 
religious cult and doctors as mad scientists; treatment as war, as ritualistic torture; and so on) and 
subsequently proceeded to develop her own argument promoting the metaphor `treatment as a crusade 
against disease' as the most beneficial tool to anchor the debate on PAS, as it did not antagonise physicians 
and patients, but worked to bring them together in a `crusade' (not as impersonal and aggressive as `war') 
against `disease' (singled out as the enemy, rather than physicians and patients turning onto one another). A 
metaphorical analysis of the euthanasia debate in the press might well have been possible, but I decided 
against following that route as other issues appeared to emerge more readily from my data. 
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It is also possible to find literature on countries and cultures that are not obviously in 
the process of thinking about legalisation of euthanasia: Berger and Berger (ed) (1990) 
contains contributions on Indian, Japanese, African and Islamic views on euthanasia. 
Not all books deal with the contemporary situation. There are also investigations into 
the history of euthanasia: Emanuel (1994) looks at the history of the euthanasia debates in 
the US and GB. There is particular interest in the history of euthanasia in Germany: 
Burleigh's book `Death and Deliverance' (1994) gives an account of the euthanasia 
programmes of the Nazis. Other articles deal with the relevance of the Nazis' practice of 
euthanasia for contemporary euthanasia debates (Glock, 1994; Cavanaugh, 1997). 
Leichentritt et al (1999) have looked at Holocaust survivors' perspectives on the 
contemporary euthanasia debate (in Israel). Hörster (1998) has written about the place of 
euthanasia in the secular state for contemporary Germany. 
Philosophical and ethical issues around euthanasia 
Secondly, there is the literature that deals with the phenomenon of euthanasia relatively 
abstracted from particular situations. There are books that lay out the ethical and 
philosophical arguments around euthanasia (Campbell and Collinson (1992) generally on 
euthanasia, McLean and Britton (1997) on physician-assisted suicide - although both are 
written for the British context), as well as many articles on the ethics of euthanasia (for 
example Wilkinson, 1990; van der Wal, 1993; Winkler, 1995). Those articles introduce 
definitions, and often argue a case (Wilkinson against active, voluntary euthanasia; van 
der Wal against the unrequested termination of life, with the provision that in extreme 
cases it could be justified). Billing and Block's article `Slow euthanasia' (1996) equally 
introduces a particular definition to make an argument (defining pain-relief that may have 
the side effect of hastening death as a form of euthanasia). Deigh (1998) writes about the 
differences between physician-assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia. 
Dunnett (1999) is a collection of expositions by various (British) personalities (for 
example Baroness Warnock, Cardinal Winning, Sir Ludovic Kennedy) on their views for 
or against euthanasia, aimed at the more general, less academic market. 
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Euthanasia is discussed in Spiers (1997), as one aspect of the more general problem of 
making moral choices in healthcare. 
Euthanasia is also an issue in the hospice literature, which expounds a philosophy of 
how to treat dying patients - involving the rejection of euthanasia (Saunders, 1979,1980, 
and 1992; Saunders and Baines, 1993; Foley, 1997). Logue (1994 and 1995) argues the 
case for euthanasia in direct reaction to this hospice philosophy. Other commentators on 
contemporary palliative care include euthanasia in their discussion, arguing that it is an 
issue that must be addressed (Clark and Seymour, 1999; Clark et al, 1997). 
The social dimension of euthanasia 
Thirdly, there are investigations into and commentaries on the meaning of euthanasia for 
different social groups. There are articles about the incidence of euthanasia among 
homosexual men with AIDS (Bindels et al, 1996, in the Netherlands), the experiences of 
and implications for the elderly (Lester, 1994; Kelner, 1995), and the implications for 
women (Logue, 1991; Wolf, 1996 - see also Parks, 2000, on `why gender matters in the 
euthanasia debate'). Emanuel et al (1996) look at the experiences and attitudes of 
oncology patients, oncologists, and the public. Surveys of attitudes exist for anything 
from the Dutch public (see van der Maas et al, 1995, on changes in Dutch opinions on 
active euthanasia over time), to Canadian MDs (Sawyer, 1994), Australian doctors 
(Waddell et al, 1996), Norwegian physicians (Fordo et al, 1997) and British NHS doctors 
(Ward and Tate, 1994). 
Seale (1997) offers a review of studies into the social and ethical aspects of 
euthanasia, providing yet more references than are mentioned here. They include 
references to studies that ask questions like why people want to die earlier (Seale and 
Addington-Hall, 1994), the paradoxical trends in public opinion in relation to voluntary 
euthanasia and issues of awareness of dying (Williams, 1989), and the sociological 
perspectives on euthanasia (Howarth and Jeffreys, 1996). 
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Personal and fictional accounts 
Lastly, there is what I will call the more personal and fictional literature. The personal 
literature involves accounts of real cases of euthanasia by people who were involved with 
them (Humphry, 19872; see also Staberoh, 1998, for an account of the last phase of the 
life of a disabled child, where euthanasia is explicitly rejected). Also, there are doctors 
reflecting on euthanasia, for example Keizer (1997), a Dutch nursing home doctor writing 
about his experiences; or Peck (1997), who from a very personal perspective discusses 
euthanasia, and develops an understanding of it which is in line with his other more 
esoteric books (for example `The road less travelled', 1990) (see also Jung, 1995). 
`Postcards from No Man's Land' by Chambers (1999) is a novel set in the Netherlands 
which involves an elderly woman choosing euthanasia; while `The Clematis Tree' by 
Widdecombe (2000) is the fictional account of a family's life with a disabled son at the 
time that a euthanasia bill is brought before the British parliament. 
This hugely diverse literature is not easily summarised. What can be said about all the 
books and articles on euthanasia mentioned here is that they have to start from a 
definition of what euthanasia is. Some make this the explicit topic of their discussion, 
others strategically employ (consciously or not) one particular definition of euthanasia 
while making an argument. There are two books which I have not mentioned in any of 
the categories above because they cut across at least the first three categories. They both 
are edited collections that bring together contributions by different authors variously 
dealing with the ethical, medical and legal aspects of euthanasia (Keown (ed), 1998, 
mainly for Britain; Emanuel (ed), 1998, mainly for the USA). 
Situatine the Keown book 
To be able to say anything meaningful about the contemporary euthanasia debates, one 
both has to focus, and look at a variety of points of view and arguments. In an attempt to 
do both, I have decided to take a closer look at one single book (my focus: `Euthanasia 
2 As one of the founders of the Hemlock Society in the USA campaigning for voluntary euthanasia, 
Humphry has also written a `how to' hook on what he calls `self-deliverance' (Humphry (1991)). 
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examined', 1998, by Keown (ed), choosing the British rather than the American 
collection), but which consists of eighteen contributions by experts in their diverse fields, 
coming to the topic of euthanasia from different perspectives - providing me with a 
variety of arguments. This book forms the basis for the discussion in this chapter. 
John Keown is the editor of the collection `Euthanasia examined - ethical, clinical and 
legal perspectives' (1998). He is presented as a lecturer in the law and ethics of medicine 
in the Faculty of Law of the University of Cambridge, as well as a Fellow and Tutor at 
Queens' College, Cambridge. In the book, he has written the Introduction and later on 
(not until Chapter 16 out of 18) a chapter entitled: `Euthanasia in the Netherlands: sliding 
down the slippery slope? '. His Introduction is a brief and informative 5 pages long, while 
the chapter criticises the Dutch Remmelink Survey and Report by reinterpreting their data 
through his own definition of euthanasia, rather than in terms of theirs. It appears that his 
personal stance is to be critical of euthanasia, however he makes it clear in the 
Introduction that the aim of the book is to `bring together papers by some of the world's 
leading experts in ethics, medicine and law, to inform anyone interested in the debate. It 
is intended for the reader seeking rational debate rather than ranting polemic and is aimed 
at both experts and lay people. It should be readily intelligible to the general reader: no 
expertise in ethics, law or medicine is either assumed or required' (Keown 1998, p3). In 
fact, he sees rational debate by experts in direct contradistinction to the sensationalist 
media, writing: `How regrettable, then, that the debate is often characterised not by cool 
reason but by hot air, often fanned by a sensationalistic mass media which seeks, 
typically by way of an exclusive and manipulative focus on the `human interest' angle, to 
generate emotion and disagreement rather than reflection and consensus' (ibid. ). We are 
told that `the genesis of the idea for this book was a national conference on euthanasia 
held at the University of Leicester in October 1991. Five of the chapters are updated 
versions of papers delivered at the conference. The remaining papers have been specially 
commissioned for this volume' (ibid. ). The book was first published in 1995, then 
updated and published again in 1998. It was written by professors of ethics and bioethics, 
theology and neurosurgery, as well as professors and practitioners of law, clinicians and 
one voluntary euthanasia activist (the only woman among this whole range of eminent 
men). It would be impossible to detect a general tendency in any way either in favour or 
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against euthanasia (although it is sometimes possible to derive from the contributors' 
texts where individual contributors stand). The book has been chosen for detailed 
analysis, because it is both representative of expert discourse on `euthanasia' in general 
(spanning diverse disciplines and covering a range of subjects from advance directives to 
withdrawing treatment in vegetative patients), and unique in bringing together the 
arguments that were discussed in relation to `euthanasia' at the time: 1998, which is very 
close to the time that the newspaper data (Nov. 1998 - Oct. 1999) stems from. The book 
can thus be understood to be an artefact which has been produced at a particular time for 
a particular purpose, and yet it is precisely those attributes which make it so interesting as 
a background reading to a study of media representations of euthanasia. 
In this chapter, I intend to map out the different ways of defining euthanasia that 
characterise the contemporary euthanasia debates with the help of this book. As Howard 
Becker says: `on the most superficial inspection, almost any factual question about 
society displays a strong moral dimension, which accounts for the ferocious battles that 
so often occur over what seem to be minor matters of technical interpretation' (Becker 
2000). Euthanasia is a subject which is extremely morally laden, which becomes apparent 
on the first inspection of the articles. The articles are arguments about the morality and/or 
the management of euthanasia. Arguments about morality enhance their persuasive effort 
with reference to `facts' (that experts in other disciplines, for example sociology, have 
established through empirical investigation), whereas arguments about the management 
of the practice are based in ideas about morality and invoke selected `facts' to increase 
credibility. As there are no social scientists recognised as experts in their own right by 
this book that seeks to give an overview over the debate of this `one of the most pressing 
and profound issues confronting the modern world' (Keown 1998, p. 1), I will make 
reference at the end of this chapter to the work that has been done in establishing the 
`facts' about the practice by empirical studies, for example by sociologists (here moral 
ideas are of course influential in both research design and evaluation/theorising). Clive 
Seale's article `Social and ethical aspects of euthanasia: a review' (1997) provides an 
excellent summary of those studies. 
What follows is an attempt at representing `expert' representations of `euthanasia'. I 
will discuss their representation of `euthanasia' through the categories that they use in 
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determining what to include in or exclude from the concept. I am aware that my 
representation of others' representations is constrained by the same conditions as 
representation in general: it is always constructed and situated and coming from a 
particular point of view. My particular point of view is a secular one, I am lacking a 
strong opinion on the morality or practicality of allowing the practices that are variously 
described as euthanasia. Sociology produces `situated knowledge' (Doyle McCarthy 
1995). In this case, I am trying to make an argument about the multiplicity of arguments 
that experts make with respect to euthanasia. In that, I have to be selective and can only 
represent parts and never the whole of their arguments. As said before, expert discourse 
feeds into media discourse. An understanding of expert discourse will therefore be 
helpful as a preliminary to the study of media representations of euthanasia, keeping in 
mind the guiding question (see Chapter (3)) which asks how press discourse relates to 
expert discourses. As we will see, two representations derived from expert discourse (the 
representation of euthanasia as a medical issue, and the representation of euthanasia as 
being concerned with the concepts of mercy and autonomy) will actually be influential in 
developing the hypotheses which will provide me with points of entry in the newspaper 
data. The remaining part of this chapter will present `expert' representations of 
`euthanasia' through a reading of the Keown book. 
Euthanasia as part of medical care 
The introduction by John Keown to the book `Euthanasia examined' begins with the 
following sentence: 
`Euthanasia - the intentional killing of a patient, by act or omission, as part of his or 
her medical care - is, without doubt, one of the most pressing and profound issues 
confronting the modern world' (Keown 1998a, p. 1). 
The first thing to be noted about this abstract is that the practice of euthanasia is firmly 
set into and restricted to the medical context. This is a very important point. Euthanasia is 
something done to a patient as part of his or her medical care. Done by whom? 
Presumably by the doctor or some other health professional. This shows clearly the 
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medicalisation of euthanasia. The discussion of euthanasia performed by family or 
friends or people in other relationships to the person killed is thereby excluded. This sets 
the tone for the whole book - the contributions concentrate primarily on what exactly it is 
that doctors do, what they should do and what they should not do. Because euthanasia is 
perceived in the context of medical care and doctors, questions arise as to whether 
euthanasia can be conceived of as something like a form of treatment, or whether it is 
something else altogether. Controversies arise over boundaries and categories. What are 
the categories, what are the boundaries between them, what follows from establishing 
particular categories and boundaries? 
Acts and omissions 
What is it that doctors do? A second part of the above definition points to the central 
controversy running through the whole book: that is the question of euthanasia by act 
(which could be the injection with a poison) or omission (not doing something, 
withholding or withdrawing vital life-saving treatment). Keown puts forward an inclusive 
definition - for him, euthanasia can be performed both by act and by omission. As long 
as the act or the omission is done with the intention of killing, it constitutes euthanasia. 
Not all the writers in the book follow him in this assessment. For others like Boyd or 
Jennett, who follow the Dutch definition of euthanasia as the `purposeful acting to 
terminate life by someone other than the person concerned upon request of the latter' 
(Boyd 1998, p. 77), euthanasia by omission does not exists. The Walton Report expresses 
a similar view: 
'11. [... ] Our terms of reference address not only euthanasia but also a number of 
other difficult issues, where similar implications arise. 
12. The first part of our terms of reference raises the issue of when it is appropriate 
to discontinue, or not to initiate, medical treatment. Different considerations 
inevitably arise in the care of patients who are legally competent and of sound mind 
and in the case of those who are unable for whatever reason to express their wishes 
about treatment and are thus incapable of giving valid consent. 
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13. The second part raises the issue of euthanasia as commonly understood, meaning 
a deliberate intervention undertaken with the express intention of ending life. This 
presents the crucial question of whether deliberate killing can ever be justified by the 
wish of the person killed or by the intention to be merciful. 
[... ] 
20. The word euthanasia originally meant nothing more than gentle and easy death. 
In the context of our enquiry, however, we use it to mean a deliberate intervention 
undertaken with the express intention of ending a life to relieve intractable suffering. 
21. The term passive euthanasia is often used to describe the withdrawal or 
withholding of some treatment necessary for the continuation of the patient's life. 
We consider this term to be misleading [... ]. We therefore speak of withdrawing or 
not initiating treatment or of a treatment-limiting decision' (Walton Report 1998, 
p. 98/99). 
In the Walton Report, euthanasia and treatment-limiting decisions are dealt with as two 
separate issues (though both as part of medical care). Treatment-limiting decisions might 
be `difficult issues, where similar implications arise' (see above), but they are not just 
grouped together as euthanasia by omission, or passive euthanasia, with active 
euthanasia, or euthanasia by act. 
We now have two opposing viewpoints: one holds that all acts and omissions with the 
intention to kill are to be called euthanasia and talked about as one single issue, the other 
one implies that all acts with intention to kill are to be called euthanasia, whereas 
omissions are not to be considered as constituting euthanasia, regardless of intention, and 
therefore have to be discussed as a separate issue. The philosopher Boyle takes up this 
issue: 
It seems clear that withdrawing life-sustaining treatments can be a way of killing 
people, particularly when they are deliberately withdrawn for the sake of ending the 
patient's life (Boyle 1992: 35-37). Some have denied this, but at the high price of 
attributing to the distinction between intentional actions and omissions with identical 
intentions a moral significance with no rational foundation (Finnis 1993: 331-333). 
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There surely is a rational basis for distinguishing some decisions to withdraw life- 
sustaining treatments from actions (and omissions) chosen for the sake of ending life. 
But this does not justify attributing moral significance to the mere behavioural 
difference between actions and omissions, or between killing and letting die just as 
such (Grisez & Boyle 1979: 414-419) (Boyle 1998, p. 197). 
This third viewpoint holds that instead of only two there are three categories: euthanasia 
by act, euthanasia by omission, and omissions that do not constitute euthanasia. The key 
concept in distinguishing between the latter two is intention. 
The concept of intention 
Even if there was agreement over the establishment of those categories and terms, that 
does not mean that there is no dispute over the assignment of cases to the categories. The 
term `intention' is agreed to be the key concept that assigns cases to the different 
categories, but the meaning of the concept is not universally agreed. Accordingly, 
different people could assign the same case to different categories in the shared 
classification system. Keown in his chapter about `Euthanasia in the Netherlands' 
discusses the Remmelink study, which was carried out by a commission set up by the 
Dutch government to investigate the `extent and nature of medical euthanasia practice'. 
The survey `embrace[d] all medical decisions affecting the end of life so that euthanasia 
could be seen within that broader context' (hence the umbrella term `medical decisions 
concerning the end of life') (Keown 1998b, p. 266). In asking doctors about their action, 
they asked not simply whether they intended to kill the patient or not, but asked for a 
more complex description of their state of mind: 
`The authors of the Survey distinguish the following states of mind: 
[acting with] the explicit purpose of hastening the end of life; 
[acting] partly with the purpose of hastening the end of life; 
[acting while] taking into account the probability that the end of life will be hastened. 
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They explain that the first category, unlike the third, applied where the patient's 
death was the intended outcome of the action. The second category was used because 
sometimes an act was performed with a particular aim (such as pain relief) but the 
side effect (such as death) was `not unwelcome'. The authors felt that such an effect 
should be categorised as intentional because to count as unintentional a death `should 
not in fact have been desired'. The category related to a situation in which the `death 
of the patient was not foremost in the physician's mind but neither was death 
unwelcome' and was regarded by the author as a `type' of intention (Keown 1998b, 
p. 271). 
Keown does not agree with this definition of intention, as `their apparent understanding 
of the concept of `purpose' [or intent] in fact leave[s] the matter unclear' (Keown 1998b, 
p. 272) - meaning the authors of the Remmelink study would assign cases to the category 
of intentional killing that he would not - and the other authors of `Euthanasia examined' 
seem to be in agreement with him. The clear idea that they all accept is that intention is 
the `purpose', the one reason for carrying out the action. This seems straightforward 
enough. However, taking a closer look it becomes obvious that there are two different 
models of what intentions are that sit together uneasily, implied but never clarified: are 
intentions motives that arise inside the individual and can be discovered and described by 
him- or herself through introspection? This idea comes to the fore in this quote from 
Fisher: 
`When we ask about intentions we are getting to the heart of our moral character: 
who we are and what we are about. The difference between intending-and-causing 
and foreseeing-but-not-intending is not always easy to discern, and people's 
intentions are often as confused as their motives are mixed. But for the most part 
what is intentional is not in doubt, and various questions and what-if tests can be 
used to clarify intentions' (Fisher 1998, p. 324). 
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Or can intention easily be read by the external observers of an action, belonging more to 
the action than the actor? An example is the idea that to inject a person with a poison like 
potassium chloride automatically implies the intention of killing, even though the actor 
could argue that his motivation was ultimately to relieve suffering, not to kill (Dr. 
Kevorkian uses this argument - see Chapter (5) for his case). Both models get applied. 
The concept of intention leads us into the tricky area of `meanings'. Weber was already 
struggling with the same issue of meaning as something objective and/or subjective when 
developing his concept of the `ideal type': 
The theoretical concepts of sociology are ideal types, not only from the objective 
point of view, but also in their application to subjective processes. In the great 
majority of cases actual action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or 
actual unconsciousness of its subjective meaning. The actor is more likely to `be 
aware' of it in a vague sense that he is to `know' what he is doing or be explicitly 
self-conscious about it. In most cases his action is governed by impulse or habit. 
Only occasionally and, in the uniform action of large numbers often only in the case 
of a few individuals, is the subjective meaning of the action, whether rational or 
irrational, brought clearly into consciousness. The ideal type of meaningful action 
where the meaning is fully conscious and explicit is a marginal case' (Weber 1964, 
p. 111/112). 
Weber's `ideal type' goes in the right direction of bringing the two models of meaning 
(or intention) together. However, it relies on the construction of a concept that is rather 
difficult to square with empirical reality, because of Weber's explicit insistence on its 
abstract nature. In a sense, he relies on the ideal typical meaning/intent as described by 
the sociologist, interpreted by reading from the action, to be more real than the 
meaning/intention as voiced by the actor, when probed for it. This puts too little emphasis 
on the fact that the sociologist is part of his social field and constructs his ideal type from 
within that field. 
C. Wright Mills has a slightly different approach to the topic. He starts from the 
solidity of motives as opposed to the vagueness of meaning or intention. He says: 
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`Motives are words' (Mills 1963, p. 441). The issue is not intention as read from actions, 
but (more narrowly) motives about their actions voiced by the actors. In his words: 
`As over against the inferential conception of motives as subjective `springs' of 
action, motives may be considered as typical vocabularies having ascertainable 
functions in delimited social situations [... ]. The differing reasons men give for their 
actions are not themselves without reasons' (Mills 1963, p. 439/440). 
In other words: individuals can explain their motives to themselves and others only by 
reference to socially existing and acceptable vocabularies of motive. Meaning, or 
intention, also and especially on the individual level, is an inherently social concept. 
We can see that the subjective (from within) and objective (from without) conception of 
intention are inherently linked and related, and that different sociologists have developed 
theories of how exactly that relation has to be thought. 
The authors of the Remmelink study conceive of intention as states of minds of 
individuals. The authors of `Euthanasia examined' switch between conceiving of 
intentions as relatively stable attributes of particular actions (the action of injecting 
potassium chloride gets linked with the intention to kill, not the intention to relieve 
suffering - this is implied for example in the contribution from Gormally) and as 
individual states of mind (see the contribution from Fisher on intentions as arising within 
a person). The tension is not resolved, not stated or explicitly recognised. There is 
certainly no attempt to resolve this tension, as in Weber and Mills. 
Intended and foreseen consequences of action 
So far, euthanasia is defined as an action (act and/or omission) resulting in death, and the 
criteria for calling this action euthanasia is intention to kill. This is the narrow definition 
of euthanasia that all contributors to Keown agree with (at least with respect to intention). 
However, some writers attempt to broaden this definition to include not only actions that 
intend death but all actions that bring about death. We are now getting into a discussion 
about whether there are acts that kill but do not constitute euthanasia. This would add a 
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fourth category to our three categories of euthanasia by act, euthanasia by omission and 
omissions that are not euthanasia. There is one act in particular that is discussed in 
relation to those issues: the injection of pain killing drugs like morphine or diamorphine. 
The concept of the `double effect' first of all implies a belief that drugs given with the 
intention of pain relief can sometimes hasten the death of the patient (although hospice 
doctors like Twycross (1998, p. 162) hold that the knowledge of experts in pain relief has 
extended so far that this need not be the case nowadays). Among those who believe in the 
potential of pain-relieving drugs to hasten death as a side-effect, there is disagreement as 
to whether there is a difference between intending and foreseeing death. Finnis believes 
that there is definite distinction: 
`Intention is a tough, sophisticated and serviceable concept, well worthy of its central 
role in moral deliberation, analysis and judgement, because it picks out the central 
realities of deliberation and choice: the linking of means and ends in a plan or 
proposal-for-action adopted by choice in preference to alternative proposals 
(including: to do nothing). What one intends is what one chooses, whether as end or 
as means [... ]. The distinctions between what is intended as a means or an end and 
what is excepted as a side-effect do not depend upon whether the side-effect is 
desired or undesired, welcomed or accepted with reluctance. Provided that one in no 
way adjusts one's plan so as to make them more likely, side-effects may be 
welcomed as a `bonus' without being intended' (Finnis 1998a, p. 26/27). 
In contrast, Harris argues that 
`it is more plausible to think of our moral responsibility as covering what we 
knowingly and voluntarily bring about [... ]. What makes causing the death morally 
permissible either intentionally or knowingly, is whether or not the person should 
die, not whether or not their death should be intended or merely foreseen as a 
consequence [... ]. If someone should die in these circumstances then their death 
should neither be intended nor brought about voluntarily though not intentionally. If 
they should not die, if causing their death would be unfair and unreasonable or even 
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downright wicked, then it would be equally wrong to bring it about intentionally or 
voluntarily (Harris 1998b, p. 38/39) 
In Harris' view, all actions that result in death constitute killing, or constitute euthanasia. 
For that, he does not need to rely on the view that death needs to be at least partly 
intended, as the Remmelink authors hold and as Finnis seems to imply that Harris did 
when he argues that desire is not the same as intention. He argues that the knowledge that 
death might happen as a result of a proposed action is enough for the action to be 
unacceptable. But what do we know? It seems that some of those controversies could be 
solved if people agreed whether, in relation to pain relief, we are talking about death as a 
rare side-effect that could happen, or as a foreseen consequence that must happen. Harris' 
argument surely relies on the latter - if he would hold it also to be correct if the former 
applied, he would effectively be saying that every action that could conceivably lead to a 
death was unacceptable, including for example most surgical interventions or 
vaccinations. To those that believe in and accept the validity of the `double effect', the 
giving of pain-relieving drugs is associated with an intention to relieve suffering, not to 
kill. Here, a particular intention becomes linked to a particular action. A vocabulary of 
motive for a particular social situation is being established. Yet, if one holds that pain- 
relieving drugs can also kill, there must still be room for possibility that a(n) (over-)dose 
of pain-relieving drugs could to be given with the intention to kill. People like Harris who 
attack the concept of the `double effect' are really attacking the fact that the giving of 
pain-relieving drugs seems to become completely and blankly dissociated from any 
intention to kill. However, as we have seen, Harris goes a lot further than this in his 
statement that foreseen consequences are no different from intended consequences, and 
that therefore deaths resulting from them are to be seen as deaths from euthanasia. 
Treatment and care 
Earlier it was noted that some writers defend the existence of a category of omissions that 
are not done with the intent to kill, and thus do not constitute euthanasia. In this section I 
will look more closely at how this category is argued about in relation to medical 
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treatment and care. Omissions generally refer to the withholding or withdrawing of 
medical treatment. The first question then is whether it is ever justified to withhold or 
withdraw medical treatment. Gormally argues that it is, starting from 
`[... ]a clear understanding of the limited purpose of medicine. The purpose of 
medicine is the restoration and maintenance of health (or of some approximation to 
health) or the palliation of symptoms [... ]. One implication of this understanding of 
the purpose of medicine is that if a living human body has been so severely damaged 
that it no longer makes sense to speak of a continuing capacity to share in human 
goods other than life itself, then what is integral to what we value in health is no 
longer achievable. But once the good of health, so understood, ceases to be 
achievable doctors are under no obligation to employ medical treatment with a view 
simply to prolonging life. Prolongation of life is not an independent goal of 
medicine; it makes sense as long as one can sustain a degree of organic well- 
functioning sufficient to allow for some sharing, however minimal, in other human 
goods' (Gormally 1998, p. 117). 
Fisher agrees: 
`Thus traditional medical ethics and Catholic morality counsel against over-treatment 
as well as under-treatment, and allow that some treatments will be withheld or 
withdrawn for good therapeutic reasons: their continued use may be futile or they 
may impose such a burden (in terms of pain, indignity, disruption, confinement, risk, 
cost, etc. ) that those concerned judge it disproportionate to the benefit gained' 
(Fisher 1998, p. 323). 
Those two quotes clearly establish the existence of a category of `futile treatment'. They 
hold that it is possible to distinguish futile treatment as treatment that only prolongs life 
from treatment that does more than that. The existence of the category does not seem to 
be in dispute. The problem is however the assignment of cases into the two categories. Is 
it possible in practice to distinguish between `futile treatment, that is treatment which was 
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unlikely or incapable of achieving its normal therapeutic purpose', and `the withdrawal of 
treatment which was preserving `futile' lives, that is, lives which were not thought to be 
worth preserving' (Keown 1998b, p. 277)? The category of `futile treatment' relies on 
technical knowledge about treatments and their effect in general and in particular 
patients. The category of `futile lives' depends on value judgements and can in principle 
be extended without limits. The withdrawal of treatment is sometimes argued around the 
`best interests' of the patient. This concept refers to the person rather than the treatment, 
and the confusion that this creates can be seen in relation to the Bland case, where courts 
had to decide whether to discontinue tube-feeding from a patient in PVS: `it was held 
both that death was appropriate because Tony Bland was no longer capable of possessing 
any interests at all, and that death was in his best interests' (Harris 1998a, p. 18). The 
meaning of the term `best interests' understood as an `objective' technical term referring 
to what is in a medical sense the best for the patient shades very easily into a subjective 
judgement about the person's life. 
So far it has been established that the experts agree that there are limits to the duty to 
provide medical treatment. What about care? Finnis makes this point in relation to people 
in a Persistent Vegetative State, 
`the care to be provided to them need not, I think, be more than is provided (save in 
times of most desperate emergency) to anyone and everyone for whom one has any 
respect and responsibility: the food, water and cleaning that one can provide at 
home' (Finnis 1998a, p. 33). 
This seems to establish a clear difference between medical treatment and care. Medical 
treatment can sometimes be withheld or withdrawn, ordinary care cannot. However, 
Harris quarrels with Finnis about the basis on which the decision between medical 
treatment and care has been made. Harris, as we have seen, holds that we are responsible 
for all the foreseen consequences of our actions, and if we know that they might lead to 
death, we shouldn't do them (unless we have decided that the person should die). 
Accordingly Harris picks up on what Finnis has said to ask: 
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`Would it be legitimate to give such home `care' to someone with a condition in 
which he would die at home but make a full recovery to normal functioning (my 
personhood) in `hospital'? Certainly to choose the home care is not to treat that 
individual as the equal of someone treated in hospital. Finnis would admit that such a 
choice would be unfair and unreasonable. I say it would be unfair and unreasonable 
because it would be to choose to kill the patient [... ]. It is also surely self-deception 
if `fair-minded people' think they are not killing someone when they deliberately 
choose a regime of treatment which they know will result in the patient's death, 
where there is an alternative which will keep the patient alive' (Harris 1998b, p. 43). 
Harris holds that patients should always be kept alive - until and unless a decision has 
been made that they should die. In the case of the PVS patient, when he or she comes 
home from hospital to receive care, instead of medical treatment in hospital, effectively 
the decision has been made that this person should die. It is not that Harris argues that 
one should never make any decisions that lead to the death of a patient; what he argues is 
that any decision that leads to death, if there would have been something one could have 
done to prevent this death, constitutes killing. He thus expands the concept of killing to 
such an extent that Finnis accuses him by saying that what he does is effectively `to 
include decisions by Parliament not to increase the health budget by the sums that would 
be required to save every life that could be saved - i. e. all decisions to spend money on 
something other than life-saving. On this basis, he can freely and quite misleadingly 
denounce `the government's euthanasia programme" (Finnis 1998b, p. 53). By not 
making a distinction between actions that kill, actions that might have death as a side- 
effect and actions that might make it possible for death to occur, Harris waters down the 
concept of euthanasia to such an extent that it is difficult to see how it could still usefully 
serve any purpose. However, it does show us that the concept of euthanasia can be 
applied very narrowly referring to a few very specific circumstances as well as very 
broadly, encompassing any actions that can in some way be linked to the death of a 
person. 
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The Bland case 
So far, the discussion has concentrated exclusively on the dos and don'ts concerning 
doctors providing medical treatment. I will now look at a particular case in order to 
clarify and bring together the diverse concepts discussed so far and show the struggle 
over categories and boundaries with respect to the case. 
First of all, however, I want to show in a diagram what a plausible classification 
system encompassing all that has been said so far could look like: 
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We have the categories of extraordinary (futile) medical treatment, ordinary medical 
treatment, ordinary care and active euthanasia. As we have seen, the distinction between 
extraordinary and ordinary medical treatment is not accepted by everyone. The first three 
categories refer to treatment or care that has a certain function that does not involve 
killing. Active euthanasia does not have a function apart from killing. It is generally 
accepted that care cannot just be discontinued. There is an obligation to house, clothe and 
feed people one has responsibility for. Those who make a distinction between 
extraordinary and ordinary medical treatment hold that the first can be discontinued, the 
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second cannot. Those that do not make a distinction, and only differentiate between 
medical treatment and care, either hold that medical treatment can never be withdrawn or 
withheld (extending to what others would call extraordinary medical treatment), or argue 
that there are circumstances in which medical treatment can be withheld or withdrawn 
(extending to what others call the category of ordinary medical treatment)3. Whether the 
diverse actions constitute killing, or good medical practice, passive or active euthanasia 
consequently depends on how one thinks about those categories of treatment and care. 
The case I would like to turn to now is the case of Anthony Bland. Bland had been in 
a Persistent Vegetative State for several years when in 1992 his parents went to court to 
request that tube-feeding be discontinued. Patients in PVS breathe independently and 
with tube-feeding and ordinary care they can survive sometimes for decades, without 
ever regaining consciousness. The judges all agreed that tube-feeding is medical 
treatment and can be withheld. The Bland case is discussed at several instances in 
`Euthanasia examined', and the interpretations of the judgement differ according to the 
views of the authors. Here I only want to show the controversies that the decision of the 
judges aroused in terms of the diagram. 
Tube-feeding or the giving of nutrition and hydration by tube can be considered as 
either extraordinary treatment, ordinary treatment or ordinary care. People who think and 
talk about tube-feeding as the provision of `food' and `drink', hold that it constitutes 
ordinary care which can never be withheld from another human being. To do so would be 
killing, or passive euthanasia. If one thinks that tube-feeding (the artificial provision of 
nutrition and hydration) only prolongs life, with no other purpose, one could think of it as 
extraordinary medical treatment which can be withdrawn, without constituting killing or 
euthanasia. The judges however did not talk about extraordinary versus ordinary 
treatment, they talked about `medical treatment' versus care. That means that their 
decision could be (and has been) interpreted as allowing the withdrawal of ordinary 
treatment (for example by Harris: `their decision was in effect one of permitting non- 
voluntary euthanasia' (Harris 1998a, p. 18)), which means that they effectively legalised 
3A distinction could be made between withholding and withdrawing treatment -I have not included it in 
my discussion or the diagram for the reason that it does not seem relevant here and is hardly ever referred 
to, at least in this Britain. It is sometimes said that withholding is emotionally easier than withdrawing, but 
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an act of passive euthanasia, or deliberate killing. The judges themselves denied that, 
probably thinking about `extraordinary medical treatment' but talking about `medical 
treatment' in general. This has led to a situation in which people disagree whether the law 
has changed since the Bland case or not, regarding passive euthanasia. As we have seen 
earlier, the Walton Report (written by the House of Lords Select Committee on Medical 
Ethics which was established in reaction to the ruling on the Bland case) holds that the 
withdrawal of medical treatment does not constitute euthanasia by omission, or passive 
euthanasia. It should become clear now that a division of the category `medical 
treatment' into `extraordinary' and `ordinary treatment' could go a long way to solving 
the above controversies (in terms of the establishment of logical categories, if not in the 
assignment of cases to categories). To assign the Bland case to the category of 
extraordinary treatment would make it possible, in the light of the judgement, to still 
defend the notion that doctors have a duty to provide and not to discontinue ordinary 
treatment. 
What is the `central case' of euthanasia? 
Until now, the discussion, or at least the line I have explored, is that euthanasia, active or 
passive, is something that doctors should not do. The judges in the Bland case hold the 
same view when they allow Tony Bland to die but do not call it euthanasia. The people 
who disagree with the outcome of the Bland case call it a case of euthanasia, implying 
that euthanasia is wrong and should not be allowed by law. However, there is a third 
category of people who argue that the Bland case has effectively legalised a form of 
euthanasia, and they welcome that. These are people who do not necessarily hold that 
euthanasia is something that doctors should never do. 
Let us go back to some definitions: 
`As I shall define the term, euthanasia is the implementation of a decision that a 
particular individual's life will come to an end before it need do so -a decision that a 
that if one allows withholding and not withdrawing, there is the danger that treatment regimes that could 
lead to positive results might never be tried. 
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life will end when it could be prolonged. This decision may involve direct 
interventions (active euthanasia) or withholding of life-prolonging measures (passive 
euthanasia). If the decision coincides with the individual's wishes and he or she has 
consciously and expressly approved of the decision, I will call this voluntary 
euthanasia. Where the individual concerned does not know about the decision and 
has not consciously and expressly approved it in advance, I will call this non- 
voluntary euthanasia even where he or she is believed or presumed to be in accord. I 
shall not, for the most part, be concerned with involuntary euthanasia or murder 
where the individual is presumed or known to wish to go on living' (Harris 1998a, 
p. 6/7). 
`A standard definition of `euthanasia' is `the intentional putting to death of a person 
with an incurable or painful disease'. It is common to refer to euthanasia carried out 
by an act as `active' euthanasia and euthanasia by omission as `passive' euthanasia. 
A common further sub-division is between `voluntary', `non-voluntary' and 
`involuntary' euthanasia, which refer respectively to euthanasia at the patient's 
request, where the patient is incompetent, and where the patient is competent but has 
made no request' (Keown 1998b, p. 263). 
`23. The state of mind of the person whose death might be brought about by an act of 
euthanasia, as we have defined it, is of course significant. Voluntary euthanasia 
occurs when the patient's death is brought about at his or her own request. Non- 
voluntary euthanasia may be used to describe the killing of a patient who does not 
have the capacity to understand what euthanasia means and cannot therefore form a 
request or withhold consent. Involuntary euthanasia has been used to describe the 
killing of a patient who is competent to request or consent to the act, but does not do 
so' (Walton Report 1998, p. 100). 
We have dealt with the first part of the definition of the concept of euthanasia, involving 
the question of acts and omissions. The question of acts and omissions is important from 
the doctor's point of view in terms of what is considered to be the boundaries of good 
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medical practice that he or she should aspire to deliver - and also from the patient's point 
of view in the sense of how he or she can generally be expected to be treated. Here, the 
doctor is the agent and the patient the passive receiver. A further extension to the 
definition of the concept makes room for the possibility of the patient assuming a more 
active role in his treatment. The introduction of the patient perspective forces us to amend 
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The introduction of the new component to the definition of the concept of euthanasia - 
the patient - begs the question of whether actions that doctors generally should not 
perform become permissible if the patient asks for them. 
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One could start by saying that only a patient who is competent can be active. If he or she 
wishes for euthanasia, the action would be called `voluntary euthanasia'. If he or she does 
not want to be killed, that would constitute `involuntary euthanasia'. An incompetent 
person cannot make a decision: to kill him or her would be to perform `non-voluntary 
euthanasia'. However, there is some discussion in the Keown book and beyond as to how 
an incompetent person could take some active part in their treatment through an advance 
directive or living will, where they could spell out their wishes when still competent, to 
apply in the case of them becoming incompetent, which in principle could include asking 
for euthanasia. There are a range of controversies around this concept that I will not spell 
out here and now (see Hornett and his chapter on advance directives in Keown 1998). 
Only one thing is important to remember at this stage: active euthanasia in all senses is 
illegal and under British law constitutes murder. In practice, advance directives are not 
legal documents that bind doctors to follow them, but are currently seen as guidelines 
only that help doctors in their decision-making through knowledge of the wishes of the 
individual. Advance directives can only reject treatment, not ask for treatment - just as 
competent people can reject any treatment for any reason (even for what could be judged 
irrational or non-existent reasons, even if this rejection leads to death (Hornett 1998, 
p. 299 and p. 304)), but cannot ask for particular treatment, especially not illegal actions 
like euthanasia. 
This subdivision into voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia is common 
currency. All the writers in Keown use those categories, but the status of the boundaries 
between them is heavily contested. There are essentially two positions. One holds that 
voluntary euthanasia is something radically different from non-voluntary and involuntary 
euthanasia, because it is done on request of the patient. The request of the patient, patient 
autonomy and respect for that autonomy are central to this argument. It is the argument 
put forward by the voluntary euthanasia movement, a movement that has grown in 
strength over the last decade, has growing public support and is represented in Britain by 
the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (VES and VESS of Scotland). Jean Davies of the VES 
represents their agenda in a chapter in `Euthanasia examined': 
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`As its name implies, the voluntary euthanasia movement is not concerned with 
involuntary euthanasia. The arguments supporting the former are very different from 
those that would justify the latter. Legislation proposed by those who want the 
choice of voluntary euthanasia to be available would sharply distinguish between 
them and confine itself entirely to medical help to die given at the patient's 
considered and enduring request' (Davies 1998, p. 84). 
The VES is not concerned with non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. Unlike 
medical and legal philosophers who start their thinking about euthanasia from the 
position of the doctor and have to consider the whole universe of treatment, the VES as a 
lobby and pressure group speaking for the rights of the patient only need to press their 
particular point. They want people to be able to have a choice in when and how to die, 
and forms of euthanasia that don't involve patient choice are simply not their concern. 
They press for the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia and are convinced that the practice 
of other forms of euthanasia, still being illegal, still being crimes, need not and would not 
follow. The central concern of voluntary euthanasia is the request, which is absent from 
non-voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. In the Netherlands, where euthanasia has gone 
through a process of decriminalisation for the last 20 years and finally been legalised in 
November 2000, the word `euthanasia' actually means `voluntary euthanasia' in our 
terms: 
`Dutch definitions of `euthanasia' are, typically, markedly narrower, such as `the 
purposeful acting to terminate life by someone other than the person concerned upon 
request of the latter'. It will be apparent that this is narrower than the usual definition 
in two respects: it is limited to cases of active killing where there is a request by the 
patient. In short, the Dutch definition corresponds to what is normally called `active, 
voluntary euthanasia' (Keown 1998b, p. 263). 
So it is `normal' in Britain to group together through language actions of killing on 
request and killing without knowledge of or against somebody's wishes, calling them all 
`euthanasia' and differentiating between them only through a qualifying adjective, thus 
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representing the perceived kinship between the concepts - whereas in the Netherlands the 
language embodies the perception that `euthanasia' and other actions by doctors on 
patients that lead to the latters' death are something different. 
Language is important in that it shapes our thinking about the world and the concepts 
embodied in language engender associations and separations between different entities - 
which may be different in different languages4. If different actions are all called 
`euthanasia', they must have something in common. We have seen that the first position 
holds that there is a strict boundary between voluntary euthanasia and other kinds of 
euthanasia. The second position argues that the different forms of euthanasia have 
something in common that is so central that the boundaries between them are weak or 
almost non-existent. Finnis for example defends this latter position: 
`So I define the central case of euthanasia as the adopting and carrying out of a 
proposal that, as part of the medical care given someone, his or her life be terminated 
on the ground that it would be better for him or her (or at least no harm) if that were 
done `(Finnis 1998a, p. 24). 
4 Margaret Pabst Baffin has looked at language in relation to physician -assisted suicide. She makes the 
interesting point of how different cultural attitudes to assisted suicide in Germany as compared to the 
Anglo-American world can be found in the German language and law, as compared to the English. For one 
thing, suicide was decriminalised in Germany in 1751, while it remained an offence in England until 1961. 
This in itself can be argued to have arisen out of a cultural acceptance of suicide unknown to the Anglo- 
American world, as can be derived from the fact that while the English language knows one term, `suicide', 
German knows at least four, one of which - `Freitod', literally `free death' - is a positive term: `free from 
connotations of either moral wrongness or pathology [... ] it is associated with voluntary individual choice 
and the expression of basic, strongly held personal values or ideals, especially those running counter to 
conventional societal norms, and suggest the triumph of personal integrity in the face of threat or shame. 
Freitod has an archaic flavour, often associated with Romanticism, and would not generally be used in 
ordinary conversation; however, it is readily recognisable to most German speakers' (Battin 1994, p. 261). 
As Baffin continues, `the only English terms for suicide that do not have negative connotations carry either 
pronounced religious associations or the implication that the suicide serves the interest of some other 
person or cause: these are terms like self-sacrifice or martyrdom. The very concept of Freitod -a notion 
without religious, altruistic overtones and without negative moral or psychological implications, but that 
celebrates the voluntary choice of death as a personal expression of principaled idealism - is, in short, 
linguistically unfamiliar to English speakers' (Battin 1994, p. 263). However, Freitod is only one version of 
suicide - the most common term, `Selbstmord' (literally `self-murder'), refers to a tragic act, associated 
with despair, anger and depression, and Germany puts much effort into suicide prevention to reduce the 
occurrence of those tragic acts. This shows how language is instrumental in reflecting and shaping our 
thinking about the world. 
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The argument runs as follows: the doctor is the one who does the killing. He or she can 
never be conceptualised as a medical automaton but has to be seen as a moral agent with 
his or her own reasons for doing or not doing things. So even if it is the patient who 
requests to be killed, the doctor must at least make the patient's judgement her own that 
the patient would be better off dead, or that his life was no longer worth living, in order to 
carry out the action. This judgement becomes the doctor's judgement, if it was not her 
own judgement in the first place. Even if this judgement is seen as benign because 
merciful in particular cases, there is nevertheless no reason why the doctor cannot extend 
that judgement to incompetent people or people who could ask for euthanasia but do not. 
Finnis argues that in principle there is no difference between the different forms of 
euthanasia, and that accordingly voluntary euthanasia should not be allowed, indeed that 
no form of euthanasia should be allowed. One should never kill a person out of respect 
for their life (he distinguishes his position from the argument of the slippery slope which 
holds that a conceptual difference can be made between voluntary and other forms of 
euthanasia in principle, but that if voluntary euthanasia became legal, in practice killing 
would be extended to other patients who cannot or do not ask). 
Voluntary euthanasia 
The case of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society on the other hand rests on patient 
autonomy: 
`Today, most people do aspire to make their own choices about education, career, 
marriage and lifestyle. They see no reason why they should not at the end of life 
choose a quicker death with less suffering if that blessing seems likely to be denied 
to them' (Davies 1998, p. 87). 
Yale Kamisar, who writes about the United States, argues that there at least, autonomy 
has become the main argument, above and beyond pain and suffering: 
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`Autonomy, not pain or its merciful alleviation, is the principal and even sole 
justifying argument offered by modern proponents. Opponents who argue [... ] that 
modern methods of pain control can virtually eliminate the category of `intractable' 
pain are correct enough, but they miss the mark: the right to choose death, not the 
presence of pain, is now the issue' (Kamisar 1989, p. 236). 
As many opponents of the practice of voluntary euthanasia tend to point out, individual 
autonomy has limits. Finnis puts it this way: `autonomy is indeed a great good. But its 
exercise should be consistent with the rights of others and with all the other requirements 
of humane and decent behaviour' (Finnis 1998c, p. 70). However, the recognition of this 
fact is not lost on the proponents of voluntary euthanasia either, as can be seen from the 
language they use: patients should be allowed to request euthanasia. They should not be 
enabled to demand from the doctor to be killed (this might be a tactical concession, but it 
is nevertheless the convention). The basic principle that justifies voluntary euthanasia in 
their view is patient autonomy, but they recognise that autonomy has its limits. This 
means that they also recognise that ultimately it will be the doctor (it could also be a 
court) who decides whether to honour the request. This leads us back straight to Finnis 
who holds that ultimately euthanasia comes down to the judgement of the doctor. 
The problem for the Voluntary Euthanasia Society, and others who think about the 
legalisation of voluntary euthanasia, is that they have to establish certain categories of 
patients whose requests are generally seen as valid ones (and which in principle would be 
honoured), as well as criteria that specify which ones among those individual requests 
will be granted - if the judgement should not be the doctor's alone. Kenneth Boyd for 
example is thinking along those lines: 
`[... ] there are at least three groups for whom voluntary euthanasia may be justified. 
They are (1) those, not necessarily near death, but who are totally paralysed and 
respirator dependent; (2) others, within weeks or months of death, who have either 
extreme difficulty in breathing or other very distressing symptoms, not necessarily 
painful, which cannot be relieved; and (3), more controversial, people with dementia, 
some insight, and who have explicitly requested euthanasia if these circumstances 
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should arise. No less disturbing, to complicate this picture, are all the people whose 
needs and wishes could be met without euthanasia but are not, because of a lack of 
resources, time or skill' (Boyd 1998, p. 77). 
Boyd tries to establish categories of people who may ask for euthanasia. Whether their 
individual requests will be granted is another matter. Boyd does not establish formal 
criteria for this latter judgement, for he holds that `a new set of ethically and intellectually 
consistent rules' is, I think, probably asking too much from human nature' (Boyd 1998, 
p. 80). What he does instead is to propose to improve the communication between doctor 
and patient, and to resolve the matter in conversation: 
`At those times when a request for euthanasia may be morally justified, the closest we 
can get to determining whether it is morally justified is the kind of conversation 
where, in Derrida's terms, one addresses `oneself to the other in the language of the 
other', or to repeat Simone Well's words, `each of one of them, without ceasing to 
think in the first person, really understands what the other also thinks in the first 
person" (Boyd 1998, p. 79). 
Boyd's three groups of people for whom euthanasia, as he says, may be justified are quite 
specialised and narrow. This need not necessarily be so. Some argue that euthanasia for 
terminally ill people may be justified, but not for people with chronic illnesses. Or, 
euthanasia for some chronic conditions may be justified but not for others. Or, people 
with severe physical disabilities may be included or excluded. There is no definite time 
boundary between conditions that are terminal or not terminal, and no congruence 
between the subjective and objective perception of suffering. Any groups that are set up 
have to be set up by convention, which cannot claim to rest on inviolable objective facts. 
Boyd holds that the judgement whether euthanasia is justified in the individual case rests 
on an in-depth conversation between doctor and patient, maybe involving others like 
relatives or friends, which should lead to consensus on the issue. The general first step in 
assessing the individual case is the assessment of the competence of the patient: only a 
person who is judged to be competent can make a valid request. Here, we are only 
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concerned with voluntary euthanasia, that is patients who are conscious and can make a 
request. But even a patient who makes a request can be judged to be unable to really 
understand what he or she is asking. This patient would be judged to be incompetent, and 
automatically not eligible for euthanasia. In a competent patient, the assessment then may 
be extended to: 
`The methodical exploration of underlying issues in patients [leading to the request 
of euthanasia]: 
- adequacy of pain and symptom management; 
- the psychological status of the patient, with particular reference to depression; 
- the context and meaning of the request to the patient. 
Psychological well-being is impossible if the patient is troubled by severe physical 
symptoms. Satisfactory symptom control is of paramount importance. No patient 
should be forced to request euthanasia because of unrelieved pain or other distressing 
symptoms such as vomiting or shortness of breath. Methods exist to control such 
symptoms, either completely or to a great extent [... ]' (Twycross 1998, p. 146/147). 
If the majority of those symptoms (physical or psychological) can be recognised and 
managed, and the social context be looked into and improved, will there be any reason 
left that would justify granting a request for euthanasia (if that request continues to 
persist)? Probably not, and this is no coincidence, for the quote above comes from a text 
of a hospice doctor, Dr. Twycross. The hospice philosophy is built on the idea that 
euthanasia is unnecessary, because pain and other symptoms that accompany terminal 
illnesses can today be adequately controlled or at least managed. The `double effect' 
which allows the giving of pain-relieving substances, even taking into account that this 
might hasten death slightly, makes hospice practices possible. The ideal of hospice is to 
allow people to die, refraining from interventions that only prolong life and without 
hastening death in any direct active way (as opposed to what some may call the indirect 
way covered by the `double effect'). There are supposedly always alternatives to 
euthanasia when suffering is not physical but psychological, spiritual or social, due to 
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feeling of isolation, fear or anxiety. In the exceptional cases where physical pain is 
excruciatingly bad and cannot be relieved, sedation is preferred to euthanasia. 
To sum up, even proponents of voluntary euthanasia do not believe that everybody 
should be allowed to request euthanasia and that every single request should be granted. 
Their starting point is the autonomy of the individual patient, accepting that this 
autonomy is limited. They accept that doctors should have the power to make the 
assessment as to whether euthanasia is justified in the individual case. But some doctors 
argue that there are no reasons any more that justify euthanasia, regardless of whether 
patients still hold on to their wish to die after all attempts to convince them otherwise or 
not. We have come full circle. If it is down to the doctor's judgement whether euthanasia 
is justified, this judgement rests on the doctor's opinion about whether the patient would 
be better off dead. There is not much left of autonomy and self-determined dying. 
As we can see, it is incredibly difficult to set up some rules around voluntary euthanasia. 
The autonomy of patients and the ultimate decision resting with the doctor are not 
compatible. The struggle over whether there is a solution to that problem is ongoing. 
One possible solution to the problem that is being promoted is physician-assisted suicide. 
Dieter Giesen defines the difference between active euthanasia and assisted suicide from 
the point of view of the law as follows: 
`The difference between active euthanasia and aiding in a terminally ill patient's 
suicide is essentially that between perpetrators and accessories. In the former case 
the doctor determines the eventual course of action, whereas in the latter case he 
merely assists the patient to realise his autonomous decision to end his life. It must 
be emphasised, however, that while suicide may be looked upon as an act of self- 
determination and autonomy, active euthanasia cannot. Thus, in almost all legal 
systems, while active euthanasia remains a punishable offence, suicide has generally 
been decriminalised, although there remain strong ethical and public policy 
considerations against its permissibility' (Giesen 1998, p. 206). 
In Britain, suicide has been decriminalised but assisted suicide is illegal and can carry a 
prison sentence for up to 14 years. In Germany however, there is no law covering assisted 
suicide. 
Physician-assisted suicide is primarily being debated in the US, where there is a strong 
emphasis on autonomy in terms of a `right to die', which has been interpreted in all kinds 
of ways with reference to the American Constitution. There have been several court cases 
and the rulings have been contradictory, from establishing to denying the existence of 
such a `right'. Yale Kamisar takes up this issue in his chapter in `Euthanasia examined'. 
He argues that: 
`Assisted suicide falls somewhere between the termination of life support and active 
voluntary euthanasia [... ]. Active voluntary euthanasia occurs when a person other 
than the one who dies performs the last act - the one that actually brings about death. 
Assisted suicide takes place when another person provides assistance but the 
suicidant commits the last act herself. Although the two practices differ with respect 
to who performs the `last act', they are similar in that each involves the active 
intervention of another person to promote or bring about death' (Kamisar 1998, 
p. 228/229). 
While Giesen establishes a definite boundary between active euthanasia and assisted 
suicide, understood in terms of the autonomy of the patient, Kamisar argues against such 
a boundary. For him, concentrating on the actions of the doctor rather than the patient 
perspective, it is not clear that there is a real difference between the two actions, for `each 
involves the active intervention of another to promote or bring about death' (see above). 
His argument relies on his view that the `real' boundary that should not be crossed is the 
one between acts and omission. We can see that just as with euthanasia, there is no 
agreement over physician-assisted suicide. 
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Non-voluntary euthanasia 
Non-voluntary euthanasia is defined as euthanasia performed on a patient who is 
incompetent. Competence, however, is a judgement by a doctor made about the state of 
mind of another person. A person who is unconscious is incompetent, whether 
temporarily (while in a coma) or permanently (as is assumed for people in PVS). A 
person who is conscious and can voice a request can be judged to be incompetent 
according to ideas about whether he or she really is capable of understanding her 
decision, again that could be a permanent state (in mentally handicapped people) or a 
temporary one (in mentally ill people during a psychotic episode or people with dementia 
who still have flashes of insight into their condition). It seems that the case for voluntary 
euthanasia would exclude non-voluntary euthanasia. However, as we have seen in 
relation to advance directives, attempts are made to extend the autonomy of people who 
were previously competent to the time when they might have become incompetent. 
Voluntary euthanasia thus might expand to some incompetent people. Sometimes even 
claims by relatives or friends as to their knowledge of the patient and what he or she 
would have wanted can be seen to be enough to expand the concept of voluntary 
euthanasia to incompetent patients. 
Generally, however, proponents for voluntary euthanasia are not concerned with non- 
voluntary euthanasia. They might hold that it is an important issue that one has to think 
about, but nothing to do with euthanasia (in the Dutch sense and as the Dutch argue). 
Opponents might hold that the proponents' view of non-voluntary euthanasia may be a 
clue as to their `real motives', for if they are in favour of non-voluntary euthanasia, they 
can only be so based on a judgement that there exist people who would be better off dead. 
This judgement can extend even to competent people who do not want to die (involuntary 
euthanasia). That would prove the case of the opponents, at least in their own terms. 
Thinking about non-voluntary euthanasia, everything applies that has applied to the 
discussion as euthanasia as part of medical care - different authors have different ideas as 
to what counts as euthanasia. They also have different ideas as to what is acceptable. One 
question was whether ordinary care can be withdrawn - does that constitute (passive) 
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euthanasia, and if it does, is it acceptable? Another question is whether compassion can 
ever justify the active killing of an incompetent person. 
Harris is arguing that non-voluntary euthanasia may be justified in some cases. He 
bases his whole argument on the distinction between persons and non-persons. Persons 
who are competent can be killed in accordance with their wishes (voluntary euthanasia) 
and against their wishes (involuntary euthanasia). He argues that voluntary euthanasia 
may be justified, and that involuntary euthanasia can never be justified. Persons can also 
be incompetent and receive non-voluntary euthanasia. Non-persons are never competent 
and can receive non-voluntary euthanasia. He makes a distinction in that he holds that 
non-voluntary euthanasia in persons is never justified, whereas in non-persons it can be 
justified but does not have to be (according to the balance of benefits for the non-person 
with the burdens for the persons caring for him or her). His argument hinges on the 
definition of what a person is: `a person is a creature capable of valuing its own 
existence' (Harris 1998a, p. 9) - `here of course the term `person' is used to denote a 
particular sort of individual identified by its capacities or powers rather than by its 
species membership. On this account persons will constitute a large category of beings, 
including most humans from an early age, and perhaps also some animals' (Harris 1998a, 
p. 8). The concept of `person' has been immensely criticised as a concept that comprised 
both more (including some animals) and less (excluding some humans) creatures than the 
concept of humanity. The majority of other writers draw the boundaries around humanity 
rather than around personhood. The problem with drawing boundaries within humanity is 
to establish several categories of human beings, persons and non-persons, but from the 
establishment of those categories it does not follow which human beings with which 
attributes will be assigned to each category. This is the main criticism with that concept, 
that the meaning of the category of non-person can be expanded very easily. Harris 
argues that demented people are generally belonging to the category of persons, while 
Finnis sees them as fitting easily into the category of non-persons. According to Harris, 
the kinds of human beings that fit into his category of non-persons are very limited. It 
includes people in PVS - thus he argues that non-voluntary euthanasia can sometimes be 
justified for people in PVS. We have seen earlier that Harris classifies all decisions that 
might lead to death as euthanasia. We have also seen that if one made a distinction 
114 
between extraordinary treatment and ordinary treatment, it is possible to make decisions 
of treatment withdrawal that allow people in PVS to die, without having to cross the line 
to performing non-voluntary euthanasia. There seems to me to be a lot less potential 
danger for people in making distinctions between types of treatment than between types 
of people. It might seem insubstantial what we call decisions that lead to death, whether 
we call them euthanasia or treatment-limiting decisions, as long as they remain the same 
actions with the same results. However, I must argue that one has to look at the whole 
interlocking system of classification of words and their meanings and their relation to 
actions, to be able to make a logical case for or against the performance of certain 
actions. Doctors who perform those actions have different ideas about what they 
represent. So do patients. It is vital to gain an overview of the whole system. I have 
attempted in this chapter so far to describe the system by showing where conflict over 
categories and boundaries arises. At the same time, by sorting out the categories, in order 
to make sense of them in a logical way, I can also be said to have created a particular 
classification system which is partial to a certain point of view. A representation of 
representations cannot be completely value-free. However, I have tried to be as factual as 
possible. 
The `facts' 
I have said in the introduction that I would say something about the `facts' that the 
writers of `Euthanasia examined' make reference to in arguing their cases. By `facts' I 
mean bits of knowledge about the real, material world - about the prevalence of ideas and 
practices. Those `facts' are established - created rather than found - by empirical studies. 
Clive Seale's article `Social and ethical aspects of euthanasia: a review' (1997) gives an 
overview of the kinds of questions have been asked by empirical studies in relation to 
euthanasia. The main question, that has been asked repeatedly over many years and in 
many Anglo-European countries is: what do people think about euthanasia? The 
respective studies have established that a large majority of the population is in favour of 
euthanasia, and that support has been rising over the last decades. Also, a slightly smaller 
proportion (but generally still a majority) of doctors is in favour of euthanasia. This `fact' 
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justifies talking about the issue as `without doubt, one of the most pressing and profound 
issues confronting the modem world', as Keown said in his introduction (see above), for 
the high support for euthanasia as uncovered in opinion polls clashes markedly with the 
illegal nature of the practice. Other questions asked go on from here: why is there such 
big support for euthanasia and why has there been a rise over time? What characteristics 
distinguish people who are in favour from people who are against the practice? How 
many people who are themselves ill or suffering are in favour of euthanasia? What are 
the reasons that lead people to request euthanasia? How many requests do doctors get and 
how many requests do they honour by carrying out the practice? How many doctors 
and/or nurses have been involved in practicing euthanasia? The numbers and proportions 
resulting from those studies are the `facts' that, carefully selected and juxtaposed, are 
used by writers with a range of views to support their diverse arguments. The `facts' are, 
however, not always accepted uncritically. In particular the Remmelink Survey and 
Report in the Netherlands in 1991 has aroused huge controversies as to the terms 
employed and consequently the meaning of the findings (see Keown 1998b, who 
develops a critique of both the Remmelink Survey and the Report). `Facts' about the 
reality of euthanasia as established by social surveys and studies represent an important 
part of the expert debate on euthanasia. References to social surveys are ever present in 
the articles brought together in the Keown book - even if the Keown book does not 
recognise social scientists explicitly as `experts' on euthanasia (judging by its selection of 
authors that does not include any social scientist). 
Conclusion 
This chapter started with a brief selective review of the literature available on euthanasia. 
This literature was divided into four categories: (1) the management and legally oriented 
literature on euthanasia in different countries; (2) philosophical and ethical literature; (3) 
literature concentrating on the social dimension of euthanasia; and lastly (4) personal and 
fictional accounts. This was done in the awareness that these categories overlap and that 
it is often not easy to assign a particular article or book to one particular category. 
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Therefore, this typology represents only one attempt of several possible ones at 
organising the literature. 
One book, `Euthanasia examined' by Keown (1998) brings together 18 articles on the 
ethical, clinical and legal perspectives' of euthanasia and thus cuts across the first three 
categories. Excluding personal and fictional accounts, the Keown book can be regarded 
as representative of the current state of `expert' debate on euthanasia ('experts' denoting 
a category of people that are - and are widely regarded to be - knowledgeable about the 
different aspects of euthanasia on the basis of their professional involvement with 
euthanasia, as opposed to laypeople who are personally involved). The description in this 
chapter of the state of expert debates on euthanasia was consequently based on the 
material provided by the eighteen contributions to `Euthanasia examined' and organised 
principally around definitions. 
This chapter has established that `euthanasia' is represented by `experts' as a major 
issue of public concern, for society as a whole and doctors and patients in particular, for it 
is seen as first and foremost a medical issue. What exactly constitutes `euthanasia' in 
practice is a matter of dispute, depending on the acceptance of certain categories and the 
ways of drawing the boundaries between them, as well as the conceptualisation of those 
boundaries as strong, weak or even non-existent. Some of those concepts and categories 
we will come across again in the newspaper data. 
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Chapter (5) - Stories about Conflict - Setting the Scene. 
Introduction 
The analysis presented in chapter (4) shows that people can mean different things when 
they say `euthanasia'. They might talk about the active killing of terminally or not 
terminally ill people, with and/or without their request. They might refer to the 
withholding of extraordinary or ordinary treatment or care from incompetent and/or 
competent people. They might include the assisting of a suicide in not necessarily 
physically ill people. They might argue for or against one or another. They set the 
boundaries around the concept of `euthanasia' in different ways. This is no different in 
`expert' than in lay discourse (although expert discourse may be more detailed and 
precise), which gives me a starting point for this chapter: `Euthanasia' is a concept that 
can be employed to refer to different things. It is a matter of empirical analysis to 
discover the range of ideas and practices that it is being used to refer to. I proposed to 
conduct an analysis of stories that have appeared in British newspapers over the course of 
one year (November 1998 to October 1999), the articles being selected on the basis of the 
presence of the word `euthanasia' somewhere in their text. There are 328 articles, and 41 
different story-lines. Confronted with such a wealth of text, it is impossible to `just 
describe' what the stories contain. With the view of imposing some sort of order, some 
analytical categories have to be devised with reference to which the stories can be 
`described' in terms of an overall structured scheme. 
`Case stories' and `other reports' 
Before I explain how I arrived at the categories of that scheme, I have to make some 
general comments about the data. I have said that I am interested in discovering the range 
of ideas and practices that the word `euthanasia' is used to refer to. With that goal in 
mind, it makes sense to divide the articles into two kinds: `case stories' and `other 
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reports' ('other reports' being a residual category of every kind of story that cannot be 
described as a `case story'). `Case stories' are the stories that refer to individual cases in 
which `euthanasia' is an issue; they are stories of conflict that result in police 
investigation or court proceedings. A hypothesis that cannot be tested in this study is that 
similar cases, in which the parties involved are not in conflict, never make it into the 
press. The existence of such cases cannot be proved here but can be assumed on the basis 
of the results of surveys like the one by Tate and Ward (1994) of British doctors that 
established that patients do make requests for euthanasia (in this survey, half of the 
doctors had been asked by a patient to take active steps to hasten death) and that doctors 
do comply with some of those requests (a third of the doctors asked had complied with a 
patient's request). This suggests an incidence of euthanasia much higher than would be 
derived from the press coverage on the topic. This has to be kept in mind in order to 
remember that we are dealing with a certain construction of reality, including one where 
events are not `naturally' newsworthy. Rather: 
`Things are newsworthy because they represent the changefulness, the 
unpredictability and the conflictual nature of the world. But such events cannot be 
allowed to remain in the limbo of the `random' - they must be brought within the 
horizon of the `meaningful'. This bringing of events within the realm of meanings 
means, in essence, referring unusual and unexpected events to the `maps of meaning' 
which already form the basis of our cultural knowledge, into which the social world 
is already `mapped'. The social identification, classification and contextual] sati on of 
news events in terms of these background frames of reference is the fundamental 
process by which the media make the world they report on intelligible to readers and 
viewers. This process of `making an event intelligible' is a social process - 
constituted by a number of specific journalistic practices, which embody (often only 
implicitly) crucial assumptions about what society is and how it works' (Hall et al 
1996, p. 425). 
On the basis of this understanding of the social construction of news, it is the `case 
stories' that interest me most in this chapter. The `case stories' as news stories are stories 
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as well as news. Stories are always narratives, relating a temporal sequence of events. 
Narrative analysis, for example Propp's work on fairytales (see Silverman 1993 and 
Alasuutari 1995) looks at individual stories as variants of a `macrotale'. This `macrotale' 
represents the structure in terms of the function of different characters, underlying the 
massive detail and complexity of the individual stories. In this chapter, I will conduct a 
loose version of narrative analysis, in the sense that I will look at elements of the 
individual stories in order to locate the differences and similarities between the stories. 
Thus, the `case stories' allow me to study the variations of certain dimensions of each 
case in terms of their relation to the term `euthanasia'. My residual category, all `other 
reports', refers to reports of studies undertaken with respect to public or professional 
opinions on `euthanasia', reports of developments in the legal arena that have a bearing 
on `euthanasia' in this and other countries, stories about individuals who have something 
to say either in relation to the promotion or the rejection of the idea and practice of 
`euthanasia', reports about soap operas, a play, a book that somehow deals with 
`euthanasia', etcetera. 
Main stories and minor stories 
A further division between the stories can be made, which has as its only purpose to give 
the reader an idea of the relative importance of stories in terms of their coverage. This is 
the loose division of stories into `main stories' and `minor stories'. `Main stories' run in 
all or most newspapers, sometimes over weeks or months. Apart from the news reports, 
they inspire other articles that comment on or discuss certain issues seen as arising from 
the story in more detail. `Minor stories' have much less coverage, sometimes as little as 
one article in one newspaper. Some stories fall in between those two categories, so the 
division is not completely accurate. For my purposes, a minor story is treated in the same 
way as a major story. Nevertheless, for the sake of giving the reader an image of the data 
archive: there are 13 `case stories', of which 6 are considered `main stories' and 7 `minor 
stories'. The `other reports' altogether contain 28 stories, of which 5 can be classed as 
`main stories' and 23 as `minor stories'. This suggests that although there are numerically 
less `case stories' than `other reports', more of the `case stories' are run in more 
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newspapers and over a longer period of time. Indeed, the biggest story of that year is a 
`case story' (the Dr. Moor case), which on its own makes up almost one-sixth of the 
whole data archive (for a more detailed analysis of the Dr. Moor case, see Chapter (6)) 
Analysis of the case stories 
My analysis in this chapter concentrates on the `case stories'. As I said before, these are 
stories about conflict. 11 stories are reported court cases and two refer to police 
investigations. What they have in common is that they all involve the term `euthanasia'. 
Apart from that, they differ in almost every other way. For example, the majority of 
stories involve dead bodies, but in five cases there is no corpse. To be able to summarise 
the content of the stories, it is essential to identify which are the meaningful dimensions 
that are present in all the stories and along which the stories differ. There are five 
dimensions around which the similarities and differences between the stories can be said 
to revolve. These dimensions seem to be particularly apt - other readers may have 
identified others: 
1. Attributes of the receiver of the action (terminal illness, competence, self- 
determination) 
2. the action (completed, attempted or proposed; killing or withholding/withdrawing 
`treatment' or other) 
3. the actor (who has/is to perform the action? ) 
4. the social location of the conflict (doctor and relatives against the state, doctor against 
relatives and state, relatives against doctor and state and other constellations) 
5. the nature of the conflict (for example: has s/he done the killing [killing is not right], 
does the action constitute killing or not [implies that, as long as it is not killing, it is 
right], is the killing justified or not [killing could be right]) 
It has to be kept in mind that the purpose of drawing up this analytic scheme is to provide 
entry into the data in order to describe a coherent picture of the content of a large number 
of texts. The questions of `who? ' (who is the actor? who is the receiver? ) have 
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unambiguous answers provided in the texts, whereas other dimensions like the nature of 
the `action' and the `attributes of the receiver' are presented in ambiguous ways and 
sometimes as being contentious. As we have seen in chapter (4), there are disputes among 
experts as to the categories into which to fit a particular action. Similarly, there is no 
agreement over the categorisation of people and their suitability for certain action to be 
performed on them. These issues are also reflected in the newspaper data. My analytical 
scheme should make it possible to see the controversies and write about them as findings. 
I will start with a discussion of the `attributes of the receiver of the action'. 
The attributes of the receiver of the action 
First of all, we live in a society in which, in principle, all deaths need to be accounted for. 
The legal classification of death is a complete classification system, meaning that all 
deaths fall in one or another of its categories. The main legal categories are `natural 
causes', `accidental death', `death by misadventure', `suicide', `murder', `manslaughter', 
and `not known'. However, only a few of those categories fall under a criminal 
classification: murder and manslaughter. Murder is thus a legal and a criminal category. 
Murder is defined as one person killing another person intentionally. As the law stands, 
this includes `euthanasia', which involves one person killing or assisting in the death of 
another person intentionally. Thus, `euthanasia' is not a separate legal or criminal 
category under the law. To make `euthanasia' visible as a separate category within that 
system, it has to be differentiated from `murder' somehow. This conceptual work is being 
done by persons and organisations with an interest in making this distinction. In the UK, 
it is mainly the Voluntary Euthanasia Society. I will borrow their criteria of the 
conditions that they believe define `voluntary euthanasia', as opposed to `murder'. These 
criteria are consistent with the criteria put forward by other interested parties, including 
the criteria enshrined in the law in Holland, where `euthanasia' has just been legalised 
(November 2000). Those criteria relate to attributes of the receiver of the action. I 
deliberately do not say `patient', and will make clear why this is so later on in the 
discussion. The concepts I have derived from those criteria are what I will call: `terminal 
illness', `competence' and `self-determination'. I will use those concepts as if they were 
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unproblematic, even though I am well aware that they are not. They are concepts defined 
by the same professionals who have the power to assign a person into one or the other 
category. `Self-determination' is slightly different from the other two. It refers to whether 
the action is carried out as a result of an autonomous decision by the receiver, or a 
decision by the actor or other champion of the action (it is irrelevant at the moment 
whether that decision was made in relation to `best interests' of the receiver or other 
interests of the actor/the person proposing the act). Just like `terminal illness' and 
competence', `self-determination' has to be seen as a fluid concept (how ill is terminally 
ill, how competent is competent enough, how much self-determination is real self- 
determination? ) which becomes momentarily solid only when those how questions have 
been answered in relation to some putative threshold. For my purposes, it does not matter 
where that break-off point is. I will only look in the newspaper articles for whether the 
receiver of the action is said to be terminally ill or not, competent or not, and with 
relation to the action, self-determined or other-determined. 
In order to further clarify my thinking, I will make a `truth table". This truth table 
starts from the definition of `voluntary euthanasia' as having to involve the informed 
request (sic - not `demand' or `consent') of a competent, terminally ill person. The table 
will show that if we want to single out `voluntary euthanasia' from murder on the basis of 
this definition, we will have to deal with all the other cases that are defined by the 
variables terminal illness, competence and self-determination. 
' In the chapter entitled `Logic' in his book `Tricks of the trade' (1998), Howard Becker demonstrates the 
usefulness of truth tables to sociological analysis. 
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Truth table based on the definition of `voluntary euthanasia' as involving a terminally ill, 
competent and self-determined person 
Terminal illness Competence Self- Description of possible 
determination cases 
1 + + + Voluntary euthanasia 
2 + + - Involuntary euthanasia = 
Murder 
3 + - - Non-voluntary euthanasia 
4 + - + Euthanasia on basis of 
living will 
5 - + + Voluntary Euthanasia? for 
chronically ill person 
6 - + - Murder 
7 - - - (Non-voluntary) 
Euthanasia? for PVS, 
Alzheimer patient without 
living will 
8 - - + Euthanasia? for PVS, 
Alzheimer patient with 
living will 
This truth table shows all the possible variations of what is conventionally called 
`murder', as differentiated in terms of the presence or absence of the variables `terminal 
illness', `competence' and `self-determination'. It immediately shows the difficulties with 
assigning cases to the categories. Case (1) would be the case that typifies what has come 
to mean `voluntary euthanasia'. Case (5) is similarly voluntary, but can it be called 
`euthanasia' in the absence of terminal illness? However, how is terminal illness defined? 
Applying a very narrow definition of someone in the terminal phase of illness (that is, the 
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dying process has started), puts anybody with a chronic degenerative disease, people with 
a prognosis of six months to live, and people with or without minor health complaints 
(like the old man who was tired of life and helped to die by a physician in Holland - who 
was not convicted of ignoring the guidelines (Frankfurter Rundschau, 1.12.2000)) into 
the same category. Cases (4) and (6) make use of a convention to allow formerly 
competent, now incompetent people to exercise self-determination: living wills that 
specify in advance the kind of treatment (and could specify the wish for euthanasia, but 
don't at present) a person anticipates he or she would want if becoming incompetent. 
Again everything depends of the definition of terminal illness and its opposite - 
somebody not terminally ill and judged not competent could be a person in a coma or 
PVS as well as a person with Alzheimer's disease. This typology cannot distinguish 
between those cases. Cases (3) and (8) refer to the treatment/killing of incompetent 
people, for example on the basis of their `best interests' or for other reasons? This is 
being discussed both for terminally ill incompetent people and people in PVS or coma. It 
is not discussed in relation to mentally handicapped people, although they could fall 
equally into this category. Cases (2) and (7) refer to murder in its narrower sense, here 
defined as carried out on a competent person not wanting to be killed, the criterion of 
terminal illness thus becomes unimportant. It will be clear now why I did not want to talk 
about `patients' as this table introduces an exhaustive classification for every action that 
formerly would fall into the category of murder, including not only talking about 
`patients'- people with illnesses who are in a social relationship with (a) health 
professional(s) - but also about more or less healthy people who cannot be said to be 
patients. 
We can see from this brief discussion that the table is only useful as a first step into 
the mass of data. It is one way of classifying. There could be others that could, for 
example, introduce more divisions rather than the simple presence or absence of terminal 
illness. As it has been drawn up for my particular analytic purposes, it does not matter. 
Newspapers talk about the presence or absence of terminal illness (or conflict over the 
assignment of the person to one or the other category), and that is what I will be able to 
capture with this classification. 
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Killing or not killing 
The table was drawn up to differentiate between different cases of murder, that is one 
person deliberately killing another person. As I have said before, there are different 
opinions about what constitutes `killing'. Some constellations of the presence or absence 
of the three factors refer to situations in which it is possible to perform actions that can be 
called something other than `killing' that result in or have an influence on a person's 
death. In less abstract terms: if somebody is kept alive by a machine, that machine can be 
turned off and the patient dies. This event is conceptualised by different people as 
constituting an act of killing, or an act of withdrawing treatment constituting something 
other than killing, or even an omission which has nothing to do with the death (death 
being conceived as the direct result of the underlying illness). I suggest that the above 
table, even though it has been drawn up with respect to murder, is still useful in those 
cases. For my purposes I want to extend it to apply to those cases. This of course 
complicates things further. To recapitulate: the above table describes all the categories 
possible, differentiated with respect to my three variables: `terminal illness', 
`competence' and `self-determination'. All of them together describe the totality of cases 
that otherwise come under the legal and criminal category of murder. Extending that table 
to cases where the act of `killing' is contentious, means moving into a `grey area', where 
from a legal and criminal perspective it is not certain any more whether we are talking 
about murder or not. 
To repeat: I will look at the 13 identified cases with the aim of finding out about the 
attributes of the receiver of the action, the action itself, the actor, the social location of the 
conflict and the nature of that conflict. 
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The Case Stories 
[1 ] Dr. Kevorkian - an American court case 
In November 1998, Dr. Kevorkian is charged with murder after a video tape had been 
shown on a TV documentary program in the USA where he is seen injecting a terminally- 
ill person who subsequently dies. He claims that his intention in making the tape public 
was to challenge the authorities to finally clarify the law on assisted suicide - he had been 
involved in assisted suicide cases before and was taken to court for it, yet he was never 
sent to prison, nor did the cases affect any change in the law. He stands trial in December, 
appears in court and is convicted of murder in March 1999. In April he is imprisoned for 
10 to 25 years. In June, the film `Appointment with Dr. Death' about Dr. Kevorkian is 
shown on British television. 
1. attributes of the receiver of the action: terminally ill with Lou Gehrig's disease (in 
Britain usually called ALS, or Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis), signed forms 
consenting to assisted death (competent and self-determined) 
2. the action: completed, injection with a fatal dose of potassium chloride 
3. the actor: Dr. Kevorkian, a known euthanasia advocate 
4. the social location of conflict: doctor (with relatives) against the state 
5. the nature of the conflict: as there is no doubt there was a killing, the court has to 
decide whether he intended to murder Mr. Youk - the media ask: is Kevorkian an 
`angel of mercy' or the `instrument of murder' (Western Morning News, 15 June 
1999), was he right or wrong in killing? 
In terms of the attributes of the receiver, we have a case (1) (see Truth Table) in terms of 
my earlier scheme; the man was killed, that means it could be called a case of voluntary 
euthanasia. It was performed by a doctor. The case centres around the weirdness of the 
man - the perverted doctor: 
he is the kind of man who gives killing people a bad name. ' (Independent, 29 Nov 
1998). `An American jury has refused to accept the eccentric Dr. Jack Kevorkian as the 
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acceptable face of euthanasia' (The Observer, 28 March 1999) - these striking quotes 
imply that not euthanasia itself is bad, but this particular advocate of it. 
[2] `Backdoor euthanasia' -a police investigation 
In January 1999, an investigation by police and health authorities into about fifty cases of 
so-called `backdoor euthanasia' in hospitals around Britain is reported. Junior nurses and 
relatives have been raising the alarm, alleging that doctors and senior nurses have been 
withdrawing food and water from patients who are claimed not to have been terminally 
ill. In September, the same investigation makes it into the press again, reporting that 
hospital staff may indeed be facing serious allegations. 
1. attributes of the receivers of the action: mainly elderly, minor complaints not 
terminally ill, not self-determined, how competent? 
2. The action: completed, withdrawal of nutrition and hydration 
3. The actors: hospital doctors, senior nurses 
4. The social location of the conflict: doctors and senior nurses against junior nurses and 
relatives 
5. The nature of the conflict: good medical practice, serious professional misconduct or 
murder? 
The papers write that the receivers were not terminally ill and death was not self- 
determined, but it is not made clear whether the victims were competent, or made 
incompetent only by the withholding of nutrition and hydration. We have a case (6) or 
case (7) (see Truth Table), that is straightforward murder (if competent). On the other 
hand, it could be euthanasia of a demented person, which falls outside the usually 
discussed cases of `euthanasia' involving terminal illness ((1) to (4)). Is withholding food 
and nutrition murder, or is it good medical practice because to force-feed would amount 
to torture? Are we dealing with `backdoor euthanasia' or `giving nature a helping hand' 
(Times, 18 January 1999)? 
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[31 The attempted killing of a man by his wife 
In February 1999, a female member of the Voluntary Euthanasia Society is granted bail 
after admitting to having attempted to murder her husband. She gave him pills and tried 
to smother him with a pillow, when he fell out of bed. She was afraid he had hurt himself 
in the fall and called the ambulance men, to whom she told everything. Her husband has 
been ill for years with a form of dementia and is also a member of the VES. In March she 
appears in court and is sentenced to two years probation. 
1. attributes of the receiver of the action: not terminally ill, not competent due to severe 
dementia, he has made a living will so is he self-determined or not? 
2. The action: attempted, overdose of pills and smothering with a pillow 
3. The actor: Vicky Wood, the wife, a member of the VES 
4. The social location of the conflict: relative against the state 
5. The nature of the conflict: in court: is she guilty of murder or manslaughter? Ours ide 
of court: did she do right or wrong? 
We have a case (7) or (8), depending on whether the patient is considered to be self- 
determined. Because of the absence of terminal illness, the case falls outside the usually 
discussed euthanasia cases involving terminal illness, (1) to (4). It is suggested it would 
have been better to have kept quiet about what she did: `Had Mrs. Wood not been so 
`damagingly honest', no one would have known of the murder attempt on her husband of 
21 years, the court was told' (Daily Mail, 30 March 1999). 
[41 Dr. Tylor -a case of `backdoor euthanasia'? 
March 1999 - The hospital doctor, Dr. Tylor, is standing trial for ordering nursing staff to 
let a stroke victim starve to death. 
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1. attributes of the receiver of the action: not terminally ill (but repeated strokes, 
Parkinson's, dementia), not self-determined, how competent (she communicated by 
squeezing the nurse's hand)? 
2. The action: completed, withholding nutrition and hydration 
3. The actor: Dr. Tylor, hospital doctor 
4. The social location of the conflict: nurse against doctor and relatives 
5. The nature of the conflict: good medical practice, professional misconduct or 
murder? 
This case can be seen as one instance of the general allegations of `backdoor euthanasia' 
in British hospitals. However in this case, the relatives were on the doctor's side, indeed 
he holds that they approached him and suggested that he should do something. It is the 
nurse who claims Dr. Tylor `suggested euthanasia' (Times, 17 March 1999). Again we 
have a case (6) or (7), hinging on the judgement of competence. 
[5] The biggest case - Dr. Moor and the `double effect' 
In April 1999, Dr. Moor is arrested for the alleged murder of a cancer patient and tried in 
court after publicly airing his views on euthanasia and claiming to have helped terminally 
ill people to die. In May, the jury unanimously accepts the defense of the double effect 
and decides that the fact that he has injected the patient with diamorphine does not mean 
that he is guilty of murder. He is freed. 
1. attributes of the receiver: terminally ill with cancer, not self-determined, not 
competent (could only scream) 
2. the action: completed, injection (overdose? ) of diamorphine 
3. the actor: Dr Moor, GP 
4. the social location of the conflict: doctor (with relatives) against the state 
5. the nature of the conflict: in court: pain relief or intention to kill? Outside of court: 
was he right in giving an overdose, if he did so, or wrong? 
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This would be a case (3), or non-voluntary euthanasia, if the dose of diamorphine was so 
high to only have been intended to kill the patient. Because of problems with the 
toxicological evidence, it could never be proved whether there has been an overdose or 
not. The defense rested on the idea that pain relief with morphine is always risky and can 
lead to slightly premature death, however as long as the intention is to relieve pain and 
not to kill, this is acceptable (the double effect). The jury made their decision on the 
assumption that Dr. Moor's intention was to relieve pain, not to kill. 
Most papers quote the judge describing Dr. Moor's statement in support of euthanasia 
as `silly remarks to the press' (for example Independent, 12 May 1999), suggesting that 
he brought the trial onto himself, and as in the case of Vicky Wood, suggesting he ought 
to have kept quiet. 
(See Chapter (6) for more detail on the Dr Moor case). 
[61 Rescuing her son 
Also in April 1999, a mother claims that a hospital has acted illegally when doctors 
decided - against her wishes and without going to court - to give her 12-year old severely 
disabled, and, according to the doctors, dying, son the painkiller diamorphine that is 
known to hasten death. There had been a physical fight between relatives and doctors at 
the hospital when the relatives tried to bring the boy back to life. The boy lives. She lost 
her battle in High Court. 
1. attributes of the receiver of the action: profoundly disabled, terminally ill? Not 
competent and not self-determined 
2. the action: attempted, giving of painkiller diamorphine 
3. the actor: hospital doctors 
4. the social location of the conflict: relatives against doctors 
5. the nature of the conflict: did the doctors act illegally? Good medical practice or 
serious professional misconduct? 
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We have here a case (3) - non-voluntary euthanasia, or a case (7), depending on whether 
the boy is considered to be terminally ill. The fact that six months later he is still alive 
suggests that he was not terminally ill, at least not in the stage of dying. Here, the 
relatives have a strong interest in keeping the boy alive, while the doctors describe the 
actions of the relatives to resuscitate as torture. `They administered the strong painkiller 
diamorphine to ease his suffering and allow him to die a peaceful and dignified death', 
whereas `Mrs. Glass, 38, believed her son's life was worth saving and with the other 
relatives kept him alive by refusing to let him slip into unconsciousness' (Daily Mail, 23 
April 1999). 
71 Austrian Nazi doctor on trial for euthanasia killings 
April 1999 - in Austria, a doctor is standing trial accused of involvement in the Nazi 
euthanasia murders of disabled children. His post-war reputation had been built on 
research conducted largely after the war (and until recently) on the preserved brains of 
the children killed in his clinic. 
1. attributes of the receivers of the action: mentally and physically disabled children, not 
terminally ill, not self-determined, how competent? 
2. The action: completed, killing by poison 
3. The actor: Dr. Gross 
4. The social location of the conflict: doctor (and Nazi state) against today's state 
5. The nature of the conflict: agreement in court and outside: murder 
The victims were `deaf, dumb or blind, suffered from Down's syndrome or epilepsy, had 
a cleft palate or harelip, or were simply `problem children" (Sunday Times, 18 April 
1999). From today's point of view, those children were probably competent. Therefore, 
we have a straightforward case (6), or murder. However, if there were children so 
mentally disabled to not be considered competent, we might have cases of (7), in terms of 
my scheme, similar, for example, to euthanasia for an Alzheimer patient. This possibility 
is however ignored, probably to strengthen the distance between today and Nazi times. 
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Dr. Gross is quoted as saying: `they were children so mentally backward that they were 
physically paralysed. You couldn't expect them to function in society. (Sunday Times, 18 
April 1999). The quote exemplifies this distance: it is suggested that today, our focus is 
supposedly solely on the individual and his or her best interests, whereas Nazi Germany 
looked at the individual from the perspective of the interests of society (again, 
supposedly). The effect is to suggest that everything is so different today that things like 
those killings could never happen in today's world. The mother/son case, also involving a 
disabled child, could be seen as a possible challenge to that belief. 
[8] The French nurse 
In June 1999, a French nurse admitting to having killed terminally ill patients is charged 
with murder in a case that has sparked fierce nationwide debate on euthanasia in France. 
1. attributes of the receiver of the action: many terminally ill patients, we know nothing 
of their competence or self-determination 
2. the action: completed, morphine injections 
3. the actor: hospital nurse 
4. the social location of the conflict: nurse against state (and apparently some relatives) 
5. the nature of the conflict: in court: did she kill or not? Outside of court: is she a `serial 
killer' or a `Madonna of euthanasia' (Times, 16 June 1999)? 
We know very little about these cases, only that they involve terminally ill people. They 
might be any cases from (1) to (4), voluntary euthanasia, involuntary euthanasia, non- 
voluntary euthanasia or even euthanasia on the basis of a living will (if we counted an 
understanding between nurse and patient - before the latter had become incompetent - as 
equivalent to a living will). However, it is said that some relatives are suing, which 
suggests the most likely scenario of non-voluntary euthanasia of terminally ill, 
incompetent and not self-determined patients - case (3). 
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F91 Persistant Vegetative State patient 
In July 1999, it is reported that a Scottish Court of Session judge will be asked to give 
doctors permission to stop feeding a woman who has suffered brain damage during the 
birth of her child three years before and has been in PVS since. 
1. attributes of the receiver of the action: not terminally ill but in persistant vegetatives 
state, therefore incompetent and not self-determined 
2. the action: proposed, withdrawal of nutrition and hydration 
3. the actor: doctors (according to wishes of the family) 
4. the social location of the conflict: relatives (with doctors) apply at the state for 
examination of whether any state interest would be violated by letting the woman die 
5. the nature of the conflict: is the withdrawal of feeding illegal or not? It is not asked 
whether the action would constitute killing or not, only whether the action would be 
in line with the law 
No mention is made of a known wish of the patient. This action is proposed on the basis 
of the wishes of the family who `want her to be allowed to die with dignity' (The Herald, 
5 July 1999), therefore we are dealing with a case (7). It is said that the Lord Advocate 
`had earlier ruled that doctors would not be prosecuted if they stopped treating patients in 
Persistant Vegetative State' (ibid. ). 
[101 Coma woman 
August 1999 -A husband as launched a legal battle to allow his wife to die. She has been 
in a coma for six months after a stroke at the age of 42. She has some brain activity which 
puts her outside of the legal precedent set by the 1992 Bland case (PVS), in which the 
court ruled that the withdrawal of tube-feeding would not be illegal. 
1. attributes of the receiver of the action: not terminally ill, in coma after stroke, 
incompetent, self-determined? 
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2. The action: withdrawal of nutrition and hydration 
3. The actors: doctors (according to wishes of the family/the patient herself? ) 
4. The social location of the conflict: relatives (husband) (with doctors) apply to the 
state (see PVS case) 
5. The nature of the conflict: is the withdrawal of fluids illegal or not? Again it is not 
asked whether it constitutes killing or not. 
The family says that the patient had mentioned in the past that she wouldn't want to go 
on living if in a coma. That would make this a case (8) - if the statement is accepted as a 
living will. If not, it is a case (7). There is some apparent confusion about whose wishes 
we are actually dealing with, exemplified in the quote from the mother: "Seeing Lorraine 
like this has made me even more sure that voluntary euthanasia should be legalised', she 
said. `If I could give her an injection now, I would" (Daily Mail, 26 August 1999). It 
does not seem to occur to her that what she proposes to do would be non-voluntary, not 
voluntary euthanasia. I will come back to this. It is also said that `doctors say if he [the 
husband] wins it would be a significant step on the road to legalised euthanasia' (ibid. ), 
making no qualification as to what kind of euthanasia. 
[111 The grandson 
Also in August 1999, a grandson who had switched off his grandmother's life-support 
machine to end her suffering is not convicted for attempted murder. He had barricaded 
himself into the hospital room with her to achieve this, fending off doctors and nurses 
who eventually broke the barricade down and carried out emergency treatment on the 
grandmother. The grandmother who has heart disease is alive. 
1. attributes of the receiver of the action: assumed to be incompetent, not self- 
determined, terminally ill? Severely ill with heart disease 
2. the action: attempted, switch off life-support 
3. the actor: Mr. Karapetian, grandson 
4. the social location of the conflict: grandson against doctors and state 
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5. the nature of the conflict: in court: was it attempted murder? Outside court: murder or 
mercy? Did he do right or wrong? 
The grandson was under the impression that his grandmother was dying and that keeping 
her alive on life-support was torture. Mr. Karapetian is quoted as saying: `I felt that 
everyone was torturing my grandmother for their own selfish reasons. She was being 
made to suffer by not being allowed a natural and peaceful death' (Evening Standard, 10 
August 1999). That would make this a case (3), of non-voluntary euthanasia, or a case (7) 
if she were not considered terminally ill. 
What the grandson did is called a `euthanasia attempt' (Evening Standard, 20 August 
1999), and there is no qualification of whether switching off life-support is any different 
from killing. 
F121 Death of a woman with a leg ulcer -another example of `backdoor euthanasia'? 
September 1999- the bereaved daughter of a woman admitted to hospital with a leg ulcer 
wants her body to be exhumed after a `leading expert' (Dr. Irwin, the Vice-chairman of 
the VES) concluded that she was the victim of involuntary euthanasia. 
1. attributes of the receiver of the action: elderly lady with leg ulcer, not terminally ill, 
probably competent (until starved), not self-determined 
2. the action: completed, according to medical notes: DNR and diamorphine 
3. the actor: hospital (doctors, nurses? ) 
4. the social location of the conflict: relative against hospital 
5. the nature of the conflict: involuntary euthanasia = murder, or good medical practice? 
It is interesting that the `expert' is a leading advocate for voluntary euthanasia - in this 
case he is revealed as a fierce opponent of involuntary euthanasia. Dr. Irwin is quoted as 
saying: `I believe that involuntary euthanasia was performed on Mrs. Gibbings. 
Involuntary euthanasia can be defined as ending someone's life who could consent but 
does not. Such an action is indistinguishable from criminal homicide and the claim that 
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the motive for killing is in `the best interest' of the patient is irrelevant' (Times, 30 
September 1999). We have a case (6), or straightforward case of murder. 
[131 Dr. Shipman, the mass murderer 
In October 1999, Dr. Shipman is brought before court for having murdered 15 women 
who were not terminally ill by giving them lethal injections. 
1. attributes of the receivers of the action: not terminally ill, not self-determined, 
competent 
2. the action: completed, lethal injections of mophine or diamorphine 
3, the actor: Dr. Shipman, GP 
4. the social location of the conflict: doctor against relatives and state 
5. the nature of the conflict: agreement in court and outside: murder of the most 
horrendous kind, by a trusted doctor 
This is a straight forward case (6) of competent people being killed against their will - 
unambiguously murder. The only reason why it appears under the heading of euthanasia 
is that it has been performed by a doctor. He is another instance of the perverted doctor, 
who `enjoyed killing' -'he was exercising the ultimate power of controlling life and 
death and repeated it so often he must have found the drama of taking life to his taste' 
(Guardian, 12 October 1999). Because a doctor is involved, the papers feel they must 
make it clear that `there is not question in this case of euthanasia or mercy killing. None 
of the deceased were terminally ill' (Daily Record, 12 Oct 1999). This quote links 
euthanasia to terminal illness rather than, for example, the question of whether the 
deceased wanted to be killed. 
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Similarities and Differences 
In the following I will attempt to bring out the similarities and differences that make up 
the 13 cases - each one with its own wealth of individual characteristics - based on the 
short descriptions above. I will structure my summary along the five dimensions - the 
attributes of the receiver of the action, the action, the actor, the social location of conflict 
and the nature of that conflict. 
1. Attributes of the receiver of the action 
The cases differ in one obvious way in terms of the receiver: in some, the receiver is one 
individual whose circumstances are well known, in others several or many people are 
involved on the receiving end, and here we are much less clear what their individual and 
common characteristics are. Concentrating for the moment on the attributes of the 
receiver, regardless of exactly what form the action with regard to him, her or them takes, 
shows us that only in half the cases does the receiver fall unambiguously into one 
category in my scheme. This is the case, for example, in the Dr. Kevorkian [1] 
(terminally ill, competent, self-determined) or the Dr. Moor case [5] (terminally ill, 
incompetent, not self-determined). In these cases, the conflict centres around the nature 
of the action. Does their action constitute murder? In the other half of the cases, the 
newspapers are not clear on the issues, or leave so much room for interpretation that the 
receivers could be consigned to two categories. In those cases (for example the case of 
Vicky Wood [3], the mother/son case [6], or `backdoor euthanasia'[2]) it seems that the 
nature of the conflict is even more complex, as the question is not only to the nature of 
the action, but in addition revolves around disagreements between several parties as to 
the interpretation of the attributes of the receiver. In the case of Vicky [3], it hinges on 
self-determination: her husband had told her many times that he wanted her to help him 
die, before he became incompetent - does that mean her action was (via the living will 
solution) in some way self-determined by him? In the mother/son case [6], the 
disagreement is over whether the son was dying, or terminally ill. The doctors thought so, 
the relatives didn't. In the cases of `backdoor euthanasia' [2], we do not know about the 
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competence of the receivers involved. The interpretation of the actions of the doctors 
would hinge to some extent on the question of competence. However, as I have already 
said in the introductory part to this chapter, competence hinges, just like the concepts of 
terminal illness and self-determination, on its definition. There are liminal cases where 
the definitions appear unambiguous - where a person is without the signs of any known 
illness, he or she has to be considered healthy; where the person decides to die and carries 
out the action him- or herself, there is no mistaking; where the person is conscious and 
able to hold whatever is considered a rational conversation, the person is evidently 
competent. On the other hand, where a person had entered the dying phase, this is 
visually obvious; or where a person is in a deep coma or what is called the Persistent 
Vegetative State, he or she is unable to enter into any kind of communication and must 
thus be considered incompetent and incapable of self-determination. However, with the 
coma [10] and PVS [9] cases, there is the possibility of change overtime (and person can 
surface from both conditions to a differing extent). The vast majority of people would fall 
somewhere along a continuum between those extremes. Discounting for a moment the 
common cold and other minor ailments, with reference to more severe illnesses there are 
differences in how well their prognosis is known, how accurate the diagnosis and 
prognosis is in the individual patient, and to what extent they are considered to be chronic 
or degenerative conditions. 
What are the conditions we are dealing with in the 13 cases? There are instances of 
Lou Gehrig's disease (or ALS), a progressive and eventually fatal muscle disease; elderly 
people with minor complaints; one with a leg ulcer; people with dementia; strokes; 
cancer; disabled children; PVS; coma; heart disease. Three are said to be terminally ill, 
two maybe and eight not. Only one of those, the person with Lou Gehrig's disease (or 
ALS) [1 ], complies roughly to the type of patient that, according to the Voluntary 
Euthanasia Society, should be offered the possibility of voluntary euthanasia, being 
competent and self-determined. He is said to be `terminally ill', obviously not 
immediately dying but apparently ill enough to be expected to die of his illness very 
soon. Dr. Moor's cancer patient [5] comes close, he is terminally ill but apparently 
incompetent and not self-determined. In fact, almost all the other cases involve people 
who are not self-determined - in the extreme cases of coma [10] and PVS [9], the 
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patients are deeply unconscious as well as incompetent. The rest of the patients appear all 
to have been judged incompetent - even if there is conflict about that in some cases - 
including the disturbing case of the Austrian doctor [7], where we do not know how 
competent we would have judged his victims to be in today's terms, knowing only that 
some of them were mentally ill. It is possible that in the cases of `backdoor euthanasia', 
the medical practice of the health professionals involved (starvation and dehydration) 
only made the patients incompetent. Only in the case of Dr. Shipman [13], the judgement 
is unanimous that his patients were competent, which makes him a straightforward 
murderer. 
Considering that the majority of receivers are dead, and before that were judged 
incompetent, it is not surprising to find that they hardly play a role in the newspaper 
articles. They are all but absent. The `stars' of the articles are the people who are brought 
before court, in the case of Drs. Kevorkian [I], Moor [5] or Shipman [13] arousing 
admiration or grisly fascination. Here are some of the headlines: 
Dr. Moor: `Murder charge doctor could have killed 300, court told' (Birmingham 
Post, 17 April 1999) 
Dr. Shipman: `Doctor killed 15 old ladies for fun. Court hears how GP murdered 
patients because `he enjoyed it" (Daily Record, 12 April 1999) 
Dr. Kevorkian: `Doctor condems `cruel' jury's verdict of murder. The conviction of 
`Dr Death' prompts calls for euthanasia review' (Observer, 28 March 1999) 
Dr. Moor again: `Tightrope all doctors walk' - GP cleared of murdering patient tells 
of risks in caring for dying' (Journal, 12 May 1999) 
In the cases of family fighting to let their relative die or live, there is a sympathetic tone 
in the articles, as the following quote from an article on the coma case [10], where a 
husband wants his wife to be allowed to die, exemplifies: 
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`I'm in a state of limbo. I can't go forward in my personal life as Lorraine would 
want me to' [... ] He says he does not believe there is any hope of her recovering. Yet 
he cannot grieve and his wife cannot be at peace' (Daily Mail, 26 August 1999) 
Here, sympathy centres around the relative (as the subject), the patient herself figures 
generally as the object of the subject's actions and emotions. 
I suggested in the beginning of the chapter that it is probable that the stories involving 
euthanasia that get into the papers are stories of conflict. From the above it seems that 
most conflict arises when people are not in a position any more to make up their own 
minds, others decide to do it for them, and then several others clash in their ideas as to 
what should be done. Cases like the Dr. Moor case [5], the Dr. Kevorkian case [I] and 
the case of Vicky Wood [3] are all exceptional in their own way. The comments in the 
press regarding Dr. Moor [5] and Vicky [3] that suggest that they would have done better 
to have kept quiet about what they did makes one wonder how often people do keep 
quiet. Dr. Kevorkian equally got into the news because instead of just doing what he did, 
he had to talk about it publicly (having further motives apart from helping the man to die 
in itself). In those three cases there was agreement between the people immediately 
involved. It became a problem only when it became known to the state, which considered 
its interests (potentially) violated. 
2. The action 
In 11 cases, the action was completed. In three of those, the receivers survived (the 
mother/son [6], the grandson case [11] and the Vicky case [3]), in nine cases the 
receiver/s are dead. In the remaining two cases, the action is proposed. In the cases of a 
coma [10] and a PVS [9] patient (both women), the relatives apply to court to allow the 
attending doctors to discontinue nutrition and hydration to allow the patients to die. 
Where the action has already happened, it consisted in the giving of morphine or 
diamorphine (five times, one survivor), the injection with another poison (twice, both 
dead), the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration (in two cases), switching off of life- 
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support machine (once, survived) and giving pills and smothering with a pillow (once, 
survived). 
Giving morphine, injecting a poison like potassium chloride and the withdrawal of 
nutrition and hydration were all done by doctors. The switching off of life-support and 
the pills and pillow were done by relatives. Morphine or diamorphine are involved in 
very different scenarios. The most important one is the Dr. Moor case [5]. His whole 
defense rested on the idea that the pain killer diamorphine is essential for the control of 
pain in terminally ill people, but can also hasten their death (the double effect). Because 
there was no way to prove how much diamorphine he had given, it was assumed and 
accepted by the jury that he had given no overdose but a dose just high enough to serve 
his intention of pain relief. At the same time the dose was judged high enough to have 
hastened death, which however was considered not to be his intention and therefore not 
seen as an offense. But Dr. Shipman [13] had also given morphine and diamorphine, and 
there was no question that he had killed with overdoses of those substances. The French 
nurse [8] used morphine; the medical notes of the woman with a leg ulcer [12] read that 
she was given a dose of diamorphine suspected to be high enough to kill somebody who 
was not on morphine before; and the disabled son who was rescued by his relatives [6] 
was given diamorphine to allow him a peaceful death. Hospice doctors (see for example 
Twycross in Keown 1998) hold that morphine is essential in terminal pain relief but that 
there is a difference between a dose that relieves pain and one that kills, and that they 
know it. Also, they argue that there is a difference in how much morphine a body used to 
it can support and one who gets a one-off injection. Because morphine is used in pain 
relief, it is accessible to doctors and giving it is not immediately suspicious, but rather 
what doctors normally do. It is very difficult to judge what has happened when there is a 
health professional giving morphine and a dead body: all hinges on the intention of the 
doctor or nurse, but also on their knowledge of pain control and the correct dosage. In the 
mother/son case [6] for example, the son is still alive six months after being given 
diamorphine to allow him a peaceful death. If he had died, quite obviously it would have 
been the diamorphine that killed him. We do not know whether that result would have 
been down to the intention or the ignorance of the doctors involved. 
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The injection with a poison like potassium chloride is much less ambiguous. 
Potassium chloride can only be given with the intention to kill. It does not have any 
healing properties. Dr. Kevorkian [1] wanted to help somebody to die. He killed him with 
an injection of poison. He wanted that to be clear, and he made a point of saying that. The 
Austrian doctor [7] who allegedly poisoned disabled children fifty years ago had no 
reason to hide the fact that he killed in the political and social context of Nazi ideology. 
The withdrawal of nutrition and hydration is, as I said, something that doctors do. The 
removal of nutrition and hydration ultimately leads to death. That would constitute 
killing. However, dying people often refrain from eating and drinking, since this can 
come naturally. As long as their mouths are kept moist, they do not experience any 
discomfort. Sometimes, to keep a person, who is already dying, alive by giving them 
nutrition can be considered to be bad medical practice (see for example Dunlop et al 
(1995), or Ellersham et al (1995)). Therefore, to stop giving nutrition and hydration is not 
necessarily killing. But it could be - again it hinges on the intention and the knowledge of 
the doctor. 
`Nutrition' and `hydration' sounds different from `food' and `drink'. Food and drink is 
emotionally charged, food and drink are part of the basic care human beings give to and 
expect from each other. Nutrition and hydration - tube-feeding - can be conceptualised 
as medical treatment that can be withdrawn. In the newspaper articles, this distinction 
between food/drink and nutrition/hydration is not quite as straightforward. The words 
used in the PVS case [9]: `permission to stop feeding' (Herald, 5 July 1999), and in the 
coma case [10]: `to withhold fluids' (Daily Mail, 26 April 1999), might appear to be 
closer to food/drink than to nutrition/hydration. Nevertheless, in both cases this is 
presented as a sensible option (see below). In other places, the usage of words linked to 
food/drink more explicitly serve the purpose of appealing to the emotions, like in the 
Times article from the 6 January 1999 on `backdoor euthanasia' [2], where it is said in 
relation to patients that `doctors [... ] left them to die from thirst'. Also, consider the 
following quote: 
Gillian Craig, a retired consultant geriatrician from Northampton, has told the Royal 
College of Physicians that water and food are basic human needs that should not be 
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regarded as treatment that a doctor may give or withhold. `Sadly there are times 
when sedation without hydration seems tantamount to euthanasia. This strengthens 
the hand of those who are pressing to legalise physician-assisted suicide. Good 
palliative medicine is a major defense against euthanasia, but please heed my 
warning. Sedation without hydration has enormous potential for misuse. I would like 
to see this regime consigned to the dustbin of history. Attention to hydration is not 
merely an option, it should be a basic part of good medicine" (Times, 6 January 
1999 - my italics). 
Here, the words `food' and `water' perform their emotional task, whereas the use of the 
word `hydration' is employed by the doctor/expert, who is quoted as supporting the 
position expressed previously by using the words `food and water'. Thus, the word 
`hydration' does not automatically go with the view that it is medical treatment that can 
be withdrawn. Rather, the use of the technical term `hydration', when used by an 
`expert', lends authority to a particular position, whatever that position is, as well as the 
person uttering it. 
In the following quote, another `expert' is quoted using technical terms: 
`Michael Wilks, chairman of the BMA's ethics committee, said: `The case is a very 
important reminder of how we need guidelines for doctors on these very difficult 
clinical issues. In previous advice we have said that oral nutrition and hydration are 
part of basic care rather than treatment and should never be withdrawn. That is, to us, 
fundamental'. Guidelines on the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition 
through intravenous drips are expected to offer greater safeguards to patients and 
doctors' (Times, 26 March 1999 - my italics). 
`Oral nutrition and hydration' is eating and drinking, `artificial nutrition and hydration' 
refers to tube-feeding. This shows that not only can artificial nutrition and hydration 
(tube-feeding) be called `food and drink'; in the words of an expert, the general activity 
of eating and drinking can become `oral nutrition and hydration'. This leads to 
opaqueness in what exactly is being communicated and can only have the function of 
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stressing the authority of the `expert', whether he or she argues the case in favour or 
against (as we have seen above) the withdrawal of tube-feeding. 
In the case of Dr. Tylor [4], the patient is said to have actually died from starvation 
rather than from her illness, judging from the body that looked emaciated: `A doctor who 
ordered nursing staff to let an 85-year-old stroke victim starve to death [... ] She weighed 
just 3stl2lb and, according to one staff member, looked like a concentration camp victim' 
(Daily Mail, 27 March 1999) - `[... ] looking like a victim of Belsen' (Times, 26 March 
1999). That could hardly be called good medical practice. 
Giving morphine and withdrawing nutrition and hydration are things doctors do in 
their normal medical practice. When there arises conflict about their practice, it has to be 
decided whether what they did was good medical practice, bad medical 
practice/professional misconduct, or murder. The question is: did they do it, but also: 
what is it they did? And should whatever they did be considered to be right or wrong? 
In five cases, killing is uncontentious. It is generally accepted that Dr. Kevorkian [I], Dr. 
Shipman [13], the Austrian doctor [7], Vicky [3] and the grandson [11] intended to kill. 
Two of those cases are constructed as horrendous (the murderers Shipman [13] and the 
Austrian doctor [7]), whereas the three cases that involve mercy (Kevorkian [1], Vicky 
[3] and the grandson [11]) are ambiguous. In the other cases it is not so clear whether the 
action is or should be seen as a deliberate killing - mainly because the intention of the 
actors is not (yet) known, but also because of the question of the difference between good 
medical practice that could have death as a side-effect as opposed to intentional killing. 
In the two cases where relatives apply to the state to discontinue giving nutrition and 
hydration to patients in PVS [9] and in a coma [10], there is hardly any sense in the 
newspaper articles at all that this could constitute killing. Indeed, the article in the Herald 
from the 5 July 1999 on the PVS case [9] even makes only one single reference to dying, 
in its headline: `Court bid for brain-damaged woman to `die with dignity". The rest of 
the article talks about `permission to stop feeding' and `the action' - no more reference to 
dying, let alone killing. Similarly, the Daily Mail article (26 August 1999) on the coma 
case [10] talks about `allow[ing] to die', never kill. 
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3. The actor 
In the majority of cases (nine), the actors are health professionals - doctors or nurses. In 
most cases the individuals involved are well known, in others, like the `backdoor 
euthanasia' cases [2], an institution, the hospital, is construed to be acting, in the form of 
some of its doctors and nurses. Adding the two cases where relatives apply in conjunction 
with doctors to be allowed to discontinue nutrition and hydration, there are eleven cases 
involving health professionals. In half of those cases, the relatives are the driving force, 
or with or behind the doctor, in the other half, doctors act or have acted against the 
relatives' wishes. In only two cases, the actors are relatives - one at home, involving no 
health professionals until the arrival of the ambulance men, the other taking place in the 
institutional space of the hospital. 
The images of the doctor actors in the press are ranging from deep sympathy to deep 
contempt: the celebration of the doctor acting with the best of intentions in a hazardous 
world; or the utter revulsion at what I call the perverted doctor, a doctor who violates the 
trust that is put into him as a doctor and who acts just like doctors should never, ever act, 
violating the code of ethics of the profession. Both are played out in the Dr. Moor case 
[5], with the press at first concentrating on the 300 deaths that he might have effected 
over the course of his career, based on comments by himself and some calculations by the 
press, playing on the mass murderer theme - until he became converted into the hero 
figure, doing the right thing - giving pain relief, which unfortunately has its side effects, 
outside the control of the doctor - it might hasten death (see headlines above). In the case 
of Dr. Shipman [13], there are no mediating circumstances, he is the perverted doctor par 
excellence, killing as he allegedly did for power and his own pleasure. The Austrian 
doctor [7] is the perverse doctor set in another time and place, safely distanced from 
today's world by explaining his actions in terms of his time and circumstances, reassuring 
us that our world is not like that; but at the same time he stands as a warning to what is 
possible, and has actually happened. 
Dr. Kevorkian [I] is the perverted doctor of a slightly different kind. Whereas the 
doctors I have just dealt with are all accepted by their collegues and others to be doctors, 
Dr. Kevorkian is seen as so perverted in his whole person that there are actually attempts 
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to deny his status as a doctor. There are reports about his fall-out with the American 
medical profession (see for example the Sunday Telegraph, 21 March 1999), that he does 
not actually hold a licence to practice medicine anywhere in the United States 
(Independent, 29 November 1998) but he is denying that, holding that he is a medical 
doctor and that he acts out of his duty as a medical doctor. His fall-out with the American 
medical profession is reported to be based on his `strange' fascination with death, among 
other things Kevorkian is reported to propose `for death-row prisoners to commit suicide 
and for their organs to be removed in the minutes while they slipped from life into death' 
(The Scotsman, 17 April 1999). In one word, he is regarded to be so `odd' (ibid. ) and 
removed from `normal' ideas of `normal' medical doctors that they simply cannot 
tolerate him within their ranks. This boundary between what is `strange' and what is 
`normal' within medical practice is of course only determined by what medical 
practitioners do in their general practice and accept as `normal medical practice', which 
in America can include without too many problems the fact that medical practitioners 
attend at executions. Starting from that fact, Dr. Kevorkian's idea does not necessarily 
seem very irrational. A medical profession which sees a radical difference between the 
two practices can only maintain that boundary by expelling Kevorkian from their ranks - 
thereby discrediting his ideas - hardly by rational arguments. Dr. Kevorkian's strange 
fascination with death is echoed in reports on the French nurse [8], quoting a `psychiatric 
report which said the nurse had a `morbid fascination' with death and disease' (Times, 16 
June 1999). Again, deviations from socially held ideas about what is normal in relation to 
death and emotions are put forward as explanations for practices that themselves are seen 
as deviations from the norm. All this suggests that there are deeply engrained ideas about 
what constitutes normal behaviour in relation to death, and especially so by doctors. 
4. The social location of the conflict 
The social location of the conflict refers to the protagonists on the case stories among 
whom conflict arises, and is therefore quickly summarised (answering a straightforward 
'who'-question). We have already seen above where conflict arises: it arises either over 
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the nature of the action, or over the attributes of the receiver and the relevance of those 
with regard to the action. 
There are almost as many different constellations of the social location of conflict as 
there are cases: doctor (with relatives) against the state, doctors and senior nurses against 
junior nurses and relatives, relatives against the state, relatives against doctors, doctors 
and relatives against the state, doctor (and Nazi state) against today's state, nurse against 
relatives and state, relatives (with doctor) against the state, relatives against doctors and 
state, etc. The state is present in two ways: once taken to court, the state functions as an 
arbiter between different interested parties. When an interest of the state (the protection 
of the life of its citizens) is violated, the state becomes an interested party itself. Again we 
can see that health professionals are involved in most cases. The main lines of conflict are 
between health professionals and relatives, between health professionals themselves, 
between health professionals and the state and between relatives and the state. 
5. The nature of the conflict 
The nature of the conflict has already partly been discussed in some of the sections 
above. In court, the conflict revolves around whether something illegal has occurred. 
Outside court, questions are asked (represented in the articles as quotes from interested 
parties or arguments made directly by the journalist author of the articles) whether what 
the accused is alleged or found to have done should actually be illegal. In several cases, 
where we know the result of the court cases, the courts show leniency in their sentencing, 
reflecting discussions going on outside court as to the rightness of the action (for example 
in the case of Vicky Wood [3], or even Dr. Moor [5], it is known or strongly suggested 
that something illegal has gone on but there are doubt as to whether those kind of acts 
actually should be illegal). 
Conflict arises over the nature of the action and over the attributes of the receiver of 
the action - most of this has been covered in sections 1. and 2. above and only has to be 
quickly summarised at this point. There are conflicts about the nature of the action - in 
the case of doctors and nurses, there are disagreements as to what the boundaries are 
between good or normal medical practice, bad medical practice or professional 
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misconduct, and deliberate killing (since Bland a separate category - see PVS case [9]) 
and murder. With respect to relatives, there are not so many uncertainties as regards their 
actions: it is quite clear what constitutes (an attempt at) killing. It is striking that in the 
case of the grandson, switching off a life-support machine is quite clearly seen by the 
newspapers as a `euthanasia attempt', whereas the same action is already part of what is 
considered `normal medical practice' and could be seen quite differently if performed by 
a doctor (BMA 2000). 
Also there are conflicts as to the attributes of the receiver of the action. That can only 
mean that the same actions are seen differently if they are carried out on different people. 
This again suggests that distinctions are made between the treatment of different groups 
of people: the same treatment with respect to terminally ill people is ethically evaluated 
in a different way than if they were not terminally ill (see Chapter (7) on more about the 
way the press uses `terminal illness' to justify euthanasia). The data suggests the 
possibility that this is also the case with respect to the judged competence of people, and 




To sum up: `euthanasia' in newspaper articles is invoked when doctors are involved in 
actions effecting, resulting in, or leading to death, no matter if or how ill the target person 
is. It is usually invoked by quoting someone who says something to the effect that this 
action `amounts to euthanasia' - and often someone else denying that charge (for 
example: `Placing elderly or terminally-ill patients under such restricted water regimes is 
a common practice to prevent them choking, but staff say the practice is being abused by 
some medics in what amounts to unofficial euthanasia'(Evening Standard, 6 January 
1999)). 
Sometimes there is unanimous agreement that the action differs from what is 
considered `normal' medical practice, sometimes there is disagreement, between health 
professionals and relatives, or doctors and nurses, as to where the boundaries lie between 
good medical practice, professional misconduct or deliberate killing. Of course, doctors 
are not supposed to be involved in deliberate killing at all. However, the fact that what is 
considered to be good medical practice is shifting; this becomes clear in the PVS case [9]. 
Here, relatives apply with the support of their doctor to the state to ask to be allowed to 
discontinue feeding, intending death. Killing (that is not what it is called, although it 
could be) is seen as the business of the state, but the courts in their decision-making are 
relying heavily on the testimony of doctors as to what they consider to be good medical 
practice (see Tassano 1995, p. 37). In the PVS case [9], acts that intend death come to be 
seen as good medical practice. In the coma case [10], this is (as yet? ) more contentious. 
In other cases, it is clear that a deliberate killing has been carried out by doctors. Here, 
`euthanasia' is invoked appealing to leniency if the person was very ill and the doctor is 
seen to act out of motives of mercy; or, as in the Shipman case [13], the point is made 
that his killings did not constitute `euthanasia', even though they were carried out by a 
doctor (which in fact makes them even crueler murders, as they are carried out by a 
trusted doctor). There is definitely a graded scale of acceptability as to the different 
action: euthanasia lies somewhere between good medical practice and murder. 
The cases of `euthanasia' involving relatives are euthanasia attempts gone awry, 
involving desperate measures. In the case of Vicky [3], pills are not working, the attempt 
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to smother with a pillow leads to a fall, the apparent paradox of wanting to kill but not 
wanting to hurt, finally calling the ambulance and making it public. Or in the case of Mr. 
Karapetian, the grandson [11 ]: barricading himself into the hospital room with his 
grandmother, fending off doctors and nurses, to do what he thought was the right thing. 
One can suspect that it is the drama of those cases that make them newsworthy, as 
opposed to more quiet attempts that work out as intended. 
The case of the mother and relatives [6] bringing their disabled son back to life against 
the judgement of his doctors as to what in their view constitutes good medical practice is 
also dramatic (involving a physical fight with the doctors). In fact, in half the cases 
involving doctors, there is conflict between the doctors and the relatives. In the other half 
of the cases, doctors act on the wishes of relatives or relatives condone the acts of the 
doctors. Here, the conflict shifts to be with the state, holding the monopoly on killing, to 
examine whether any deliberate killing has taken place. 
The purpose of the brief exercise in narrative analysis performed in this chapter is to 
give an overview of the content of the case stories linked to `euthanasia' that have made 
it into the newspapers. This provides us with a context for the in-depth analysis in the 
next chapters. Chapters (7) in particular will look at particular themes that have come out 
of this chapter in rather more detail. One theme is the absence of the patients who are in 
the main incompetent and therefore `acted upon' rather than acting. `Euthanasia' in the 
articles refers therefore rather less to what is usually the object of discussion in the form 
of `voluntary euthanasia', and more to the other, borderline practices situated between 
normal medical practice and killing. Whereas in discussions on voluntary euthanasia, the 
autonomy of the individual is stressed, here interdependence comes to the fore, giving 
rise to conflicts. 
The next chapter will first of all look at the largest case in the sample, the Dr Moor 
case, drawing out the themes of particular relevance to its coverage in the press. 
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Chapter (6) - The Doctor Moor case and euthanasia in the press 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of an in-depth analysis of the Dr Moor case, the largest 
case in the data set analysed for this thesis. The Dr Moor case involved a doctor tried 
before Newcastle Crown Court for the alleged murder of a patient. Taking place in 1999, 
it was reported in national and regional newspapers in April and May of that year. 
The Dr Moor case is the story that got the greatest coverage in British newspapers in 
terms of the number of articles relating to it in the twelve months between November 
1998 and October 1999. This is the time period for which all British newspaper articles 
were retrieved that came up in response to the search terms of `euthanasia' on the 
newspaper search engine Lexis-Nexis. This period was selected on the basis of it 
representing the most recent time period for which articles were accessible through 
Lexis-Nexis at the time of the search. 
The data are 48 articles that I have divided into the following three categories: 
- 13 reports phase [1 ] (16. - 29. April 1999 - the murder trial) 
- 17 reports phase [2] (11. - 16. May 1999 - the outcome of the trial, reactions to the 
outcome) 
- 18 feature articles (12. - 16. May 1999 - substantial reflections on the trial and 
euthanasia in general) 
This division will be helpful as there are some interesting differences in the presentation 
of the case between the original reports of the court case and the reactions to the eventual 
outcome of the case, as well as between the more factual reports and the more topic- 
oriented feature articles. 
One difference is that originally, the focus of the articles is the murder case, with the 
press reporting from the position of the powers that be as represented by the law. Later 
on, after the verdict, the focus shifts to the question of euthanasia, with the press 
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increasingly representing voices of disagreement with court officials who try to ban 
euthanasia discussion from the court case. I will show that this is the case, and I will aim 
to address the question of the significance of that shift. 
As the real issue arising from the Dr Moor case comes to be seen as the problem of 
euthanasia, there is extensive discussion about euthanasia in the phase [2] reports and 
feature articles. The second part of my analysis centers around the question: how is the 
problem of euthanasia dealt with in the press in relation to the Moor case? I will show 
that the press presents the debate in terms of two positions opposing one another in the 
phase [2] reports, but that we do not see that same opposition in the feature reports. 
The shift from the murder case to the problem of euthanasia 
This section will address the question of how and why the press shifts its focus, from 
reporting about a murder case to giving over to the question of euthanasia. 
The best way of determining the focus of a newspaper article is to look at its headline. 
Headlines try to capture the reader's attention, enticing them to read the corresponding 
article. Therefore, headlines try to convey in one short phrase the condensed information 
of what an article is about, in a way that promises that apart from being informative, the 
article will also entertain. In that way, headlines tell the reader something about the focus 
of the article, the one aspect of the story that the editor of a paper judges will be most 
appreciated by the reader. 
Phase [1] reports 
The majority of the headlines of Phase [1 ] reports, the ones that initially give information 
about the murder trial of Dr Moor, center around a number. Typical headlines are: 
`ACCUSED GP `MAY HAVE KILLED 300'; DOCTOR `CONFESSED' IN 
INTERVIEWS ON EUTHANASIA' (The Guardian, 17 April 1999). 
153 
`COURT TOLD GP MAY HAVE KILLED 300 PATIENTS' (The Scotsman, 17 
April 1999). 
'MURDER CHARGE DOCTOR MAY HAVE KILLED 300, COURT TOLD' 
(Birmingham Post, 17 April 1999). 
`MERCY DOC COULD HAVE KILLED 300' (The Mirror, 17 April 1999). 
Phase [I ] reports tell the story of how Dr Moor came to be charged of murder. The 
background to the trial according to the papers is that the doctor had said publicly (in 
newspapers and on television) that he was both supporting and practising euthanasia. 
Consequently, the police investigated and found one patient that Moor had referred to 
indirectly (having said that he had helped two patients to die in the same week) and 
brought him before court. In court, Dr Moor was accused of murdering that cancer patient 
by injecting him with an overdose of diamorphine. The number 300 comes from 
something Dr Moor is presented to have said to an NHS official: `I probably dealt with 
ten a year and have doing so for the last 30 years [... ]' (quote from article in the Western 
Daily Press, 17 April 1999, and others). The headlines suggest that Dr Moor is not a 
simple murderer, allegedly having killed one patient, but that he might be a mass 
murderer. Mass murderers are favourite subjects for newspapers as they satisfy the 
press's penchant for sensationalism. The suggestion of horrendous and abhorrent crimes 
beyond comprehension is what is supposed to make the reader notice and read the article. 
What the articles themselves aim to do is give a `factual' report of the background and 
circumstances of the court case, introducing the reader to a story that will continue in the 
papers as the case continues. The `facts' reported are much the same in all phase [1] 
articles. They focus on the fact that Dr Moor is accused of killing a patient and that he 
denies that charge. They write that he has been charged with murder after he publicly 
`confessed' (quote from the Guardian, above) to practising euthananasia, but that now in 
court he denies ever having practised euthanasia ('I've never killed a patient - Murder 
jury hears doctor gave police a written statement denying he practised euthanasia' - 
Evening Chronicle, 28 April 1999). 
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What is going on here? To understand that, one has to take a look at euthanasia and 
the law. British law forbids the killing of one human being by another. There are several 
categories in law that deal with homicide, for example murder and manslaughter, 
recognising that there can be differences in the circumstances of killings in terms of the 
responsibility of the person who killed. In cases of diminished responsibility on the part 
of the person who killed, the less serious offence of manslaughter is recognised and 
punished. The law as it stands does not recognise euthanasia or mercy killing as a 
separate category, as it could be conceived to be on the basis of the motive for the killing 
- compassion. Cases that could be understood as euthanasia cases are dealt with under 
the laws for murder and manslaughter. In practice, euthanasia cases that are recognised to 
be genuine are often dealt with under the category of the less serious offence of 
manslaughter. 
Therefore, euthanasia killings are dealt with in the same way as other killings. The 
circumstances of the killing are of some interest from the point of view of the law, but 
euthanasia is still killing, and killing is prohibited in British law under all circumstances. 
It can be said that the initial reports of the Dr Moor case present the case from the point 
of view of the law. They mention euthanasia because Moor's public claims to support 
and practice euthanasia are what brought him to court in the first place which is important 
for understanding the background of the case, but it is not interesting in itself. No paper 
talks about euthanasia in other terms than as a different word for the word or the action of 
killing. Effectively, while the category of euthanasia is recognised in language as a 
category by there being a word for it, euthanasia does not exist as a category in law. It 
could be said that in law, the category of euthanasia is distributed out of existence (placed 
into the more general category of killing) in that the word has no legal meaning and the 
practices it relates to are dealt with under the laws for murder and manslaughter. The 
papers treat mercy killing as killing. Not only do they present the accused as a potential 
murderer, but a potential mass murderer. 
As Dr Moor is accused of murder, the defense must show that he is not guilty of what 
he is accused of. The defense is quoted in the papers as alluding to the fact that the doctor 
did not deliberately kill his patient. The quote that appears in most papers is as follows: 
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`Defense barrister Anthony Arlidge QC, told the jury: `Mr Liddell appeared to Dr 
Moor to be terminally ill. He was a very sick man. There was a time he was 
screaming out in agony. A doctor treating someone who is terminally ill is walking a 
tightrope. If he gives a high dose there's a possibility the patient could die. Dr Moor 
did not set out deliberately to kill Mr Liddell, he was at all times trying to do the best 
for his patient as he saw it. He was trying to ease the suffering of someone very, very 
close to death. The Crown accepts that Dr Moor was not a wicked man and that he 
was caring and the question for the jury is was this caring doctor who tended patients 
for many years turned into a murderer. Our case is that he was not" (The Herald, 17 
April 1999 - the same or a very similar - shortened - quote appears in most papers). 
The defense rests on several premises. First, the case is to be understood as resulting from 
a special relationship: the alleged murderer is a doctor and his alleged victim was a 
patient of his, who was terminally ill, who is already on the way to the process of dying, 
and treated by the doctor (for pain? The victim is presented as having been in pain). That 
treatment - the giving of medication - is presented as `walking a tightrope'. Walking a 
tightrope means that one could fall either way, it could turn out good or bad. This 
suggests that doctors have little influence on how a certain dose of medication will affect 
a patient, whether it will have the intended effects (of symptom relief) or result in the 
death of the patient. It presents the doctor treating a terminally ill patient as having the 
best interests of his patient at heart but the results of his treatment as effectively being 
beyond his control. The image of the `tightrope' recurs even in the most shortened 
versions of the quote in other papers; it is its dramatic potential - in its meaning alluding 
to that general condition of humankind, the unpredictability, volatility, precariousness of 
human existence, events beyond our control, the workings of fate - that fits in with the 
entertainment value that newspapers aspire to, achieved through such dramatisation. 
The defense of Dr Moor rests on the principle of the `double effect', although no 
newspaper mentions anything of the double effect in their phase [1 ] reports. It is only in 
phase [2] reports, after Dr Moor has been cleared of murder on the basis of his defense, 
that the `double effect' features. The `double effect' is a concept that originally comes 
from theology, referring to actions that are done with the intention of doing good, but 
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might in themselves bear a risk of leading to a bad outcome. Here, even if it comes to the 
bad outcome, the good intention is judged to be of overriding importance. In medicine, it 
is currently regarded as legitimate for doctors to give their terminally ill patients 
increasing doses of morphine for their pain, even while knowing that such dosages 
increase the risk of death. This is what is referred to in medical ethics as the `double 
effect'. Pain relief has made huge progress over the last few decades. The hospice 
movement has been driving research in that direction. It is easy to forget how until 
recently not enough morphine was given to relieve pain even for a terminally ill patient 
because it was feared that the patient would become addicted. Even now, the reality of 
pain relief for many ill people is very much worse than would be expected looking at the 
knowledge that exists, as doctors are not well enough trained'. Still, doctors who know 
about pain relief would not describe it in terms of `walking a tightrope'. They would 
argue that they are able to judge very well what quantity of morphine would bring about 
symptom relief and in what quantity it would immediately lead to death. In a terminally 
ill patient whose morphine dose has been increased over a long period of time, an 
overdose has to be considerable higher than for someone who has not been exposed to the 
substance. The argument is that in the normal practice of pain relief, on the basis of the 
knowledge that exists today, the death of a dying patient could be brought forward by 
hours or maybe a few days compared to when death would have come if there had been 
no intervention. Death is seen as imminent, ultimately caused by the disease. It is seen as 
strictly separate from euthanasia, where the action of the doctor is seen as the direct cause 
of the death of a patient, even if the disease would have killed him within hours or days 
anyway. As such, pain relief is not seen as problematic. 
To recapitulate: phase [I] reports tell of a doctor who has to stand trial for the murder 
of his patient. His defense argued that there was no murder, that the death of the patient 
was the side-effect of pain-relieving treatment. 
' See Melzack (1990) on doctors' reluctance to prescribe enough morphine due to (unsubstantiated) fears of 
addiction, and Ruddick's (1997) article `Do doctors undertreat pain? ', a question which he answers in the 
affirmative, explaining it with reference to doctors' psychological and conceptual `forgetting' of the reality 
of their patients' pain. 
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Phase [2] reports 
Phase [2] reports respond to the outcome of the court case. Dr Moor was cleared of 
murder. As the papers tell it: the jury found Dr Moor not guilty, siding with the defense 
in their judgement that what Dr Moor had done fell under the category of the double 
effect. They did so without knowledge of the actual dose of diamorphine that Moor had 
given, as the judge had ruled out the toxicological evidence as unreliable (something that 
critics see as crucial to being able to judge whether a massive overdose was given or 
whether normal pain relief was practiced). The reaction of the press to this outcome of 
the case can, again, be determined from the headlines. Some of the headlines of phase [2] 
reports are straightforwardly about the outcome of the case: 
`GP CLEARED OF PATIENT'S MURDER' (Western Morning News, 12 May 
1999). 
`GP CLEARED OF KILLING MAN DYING OF CANCER' (The Scotsman, 12 
May 1999). 
'DOC ACQUITTED OF `KILLING' OF PATIENT' (Belfast News Letter, 12 May 
1999). 
It is interesting to note that in the last two headlines, the very word `killing' is being 
neutralised, by the device of inverted commas and by juxtaposing it with the word 
`dying', implying that you can't really kill someone who is already dying2. 
Other headlines focus on Dr Moor and his actions: 
"TIGHTROPE ALL DOCTORS WALK' - GP CLEARED OF MURDERING 
PATIENT TELLS OF RISKS IN CARING FOR DYING' (The Journal, 12 May 
1999). 
2 This is an example of the `terminal illness discourse' which is identified in Chapter (7) as a major 
discourse structuring the representation of euthanasia in the media. 
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"ALL I TRIED TO DO WAS RELIEVE HIS AGONY, HIS DISTRESS AND 
SUFFERING'; DOCTOR CLEARED OF MURDERING PATIENT' (The 
Guardian, 12 May 1999). 
`I'D DO THE SAME AGAIN, SAYS ACQUITTED GP - DR MOOR TELLS OF 
CLEAR CONSCIENCE' (The Journal, 14 May 1999). 
`THOUSANDS OF DOCTORS `REASSURED BY VERDICT" (The Times, 12 
May 1999). 
As we can see, the tightrope metaphor appears again - the headlines all stress that in 
adverse circumstances, Dr Moor had done all that was in his powers to do for the good of 
his patient, he is at peace with himself and the world. Also, he has only done what other 
doctors are doing, the implication of the outcome of the court case for doctors in general 
being that they can all be secure in the knowledge that they are doing the right thing. An 
additional bonus resulting from the coverage of the court case may be the hope for 
doctors that the public has been educated by the newspapers about the `double effect' and 
sensitised to the difficulties doctors face when caring for the dying, leading to a greater 
understanding of their role and actions. 
Then there are those headlines that talk about euthanasia: 
`EUTHANASIA `VICTORY' AS DEATH DOCTOR IS CLEARED' (Daily Mail, 
12 May 1999). 
`ARGUMENT ON `MERCY KILLINGS' STILL RAGES' (Birmingham Post, 12 
May 1999). 
`VERDICT FUELS EUTHANASIA ROW IN MEDICAL WORLD' (The Herald, 
12 May 1999). 
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`EUTHANASIA DEBATE' (The Journal, 12 May 1999). 
While the other headlines focus on the fact that the man accused of murder was found not 
guilty, that in fact what he had done was good medical practice, these headlines tell 
another story. Indeed, the very notion that here there was a court case that had to 
determine whether a murder had been taken place had been contested throughout the trial. 
The prosecution tried to uphold the normal procedure of determining whether the action 
that had taken place fitted into the particular category of offence - murder, and the 
defense argued within that framework that no murder had taken place by alluding to the 
`double effect'. Other interested parties, however, who got a say in the papers, took to 
questioning the very category of murder and asking whether this category was relevant to 
a case such as this one at all. The category of euthanasia was on the table from the very 
beginning. As I said before, Dr Moor was arrested in the first place after he publicly said 
he practiced euthanasia. From the beginning, the prosecution had to argue against the 
spectre of euthanasia: 
`From the outset, jurors were told that they were not considering the ethics of 
euthanasia. James Goss, QC, prosecuting, said in his opening submission: `This is 
not a trial about the merits of mercy killing. It is a straight forward case of a doctor 
deliberately ending the life of a patient in his care" (Daily Telegraph, 12 May 1999). 
In phase [1] reports, the press presents a murder case that is not about euthanasia. In 
phase [2] reports, after the outcome of the trial, the press concentrates on the problem of 
euthanasia. One could say that from accepting the rules of the law as the legitimate rules 
of the game, the press moved on to questioning those very rules. Seen from the 
perspective of the rules of law, the case had been straightforward: in a murder case, the 
suspect was found not guilty of murder. However, as different parties did not agree on 
what they considered to be murder and what they understood Dr Moor had done, in their 
category system, they necessarily had to interpret the verdict and its message in different 
ways. Instead of taking the rules of law for granted, they questioned their legitimacy, and 
the press gave room to those questions. Phase [2] reports report on the outcome of the 
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case, and then give a lot of room to reactions to the case. Most reports give a voice to the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Campaign who from the beginning had been present at the trial. 
The VES is a pressure group that campaigns for the legalisation of euthanasia. They 
necessarily looked at the case with an interest in assessing what it would mean for their 
cause, including presenting it in such a way that it must be seen as helping their cause. 
Then there is Peggy Norris from the anti-euthanasia pressure group ALERT. She has the 
function in the reports of presenting `the other side'. The question of euthanasia is thus 
presented by the press in such a way that one could either be in favour or against it. I will 
look at this in detail in the second part of this chapter. The British Medical Association 
talks in support of the defense of the `double effect'; Dr Moor repeats that he only tried to 
relieve suffering, and is careful not to talk about euthanasia. 
The press, in their reports on the outcome of the trial, can be shown to interpret the Dr 
Moor case as in essence being a case that is primarily about the issue of euthanasia: 
`The trial of family doctor Dave Moor focused public and expert opinion on the 
emotive and complicated issue of euthanasia' (Birmingham Post, 12 May 1999). 
`The case is thought to be the first of its kind to be brought and has highlighted the 
controversial debate about euthanasia' (Western Morning News, 12 May 1999). 
Everybody is said to be talking about euthanasia; not only the public, people like you and 
me, but the experts, people who know about things, are discussing it. Discussion is 
presented in terms of a `debate'- `controversial', `emotive' -just what the press needs to 
attract readers. The term `debate' is repeated in many articles: papers talk about a 
`nationwide euthanasia debate' (The Journal, 14 May 1999), `a national debate about 
euthanasia' (Daily Telegraph, 12 May 1999), `the interminable debate about euthanasia' 
(Bristol Evening Post, 19 May 1999), `reopened the euthanasia debate' (Birmingham 
Post, 12 May 1999), `the euthanasia debate took off' (Daily Mail, 12 May 1999), `the 
need for a widespread debate' (Western Daily Press, 12 May 1999). This debate includes 
each and every one of us, the whole world in fact: `Everyone of us has our own view on 
euthanasia' (Bristol Evening Post, 13 May 1999) -'EUTHANASIA AND DOCTOR 
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ASSISTED SUICIDE AROUND THE WORLD' (The Guardian, 12 May 1999). In 
effect, the press links the trial to a debate on euthanasia that is presented as having an 
existence independent of the trial as such. The Dr Moor case is used as the springboard to 
present that debate as topical and crucial to our lives here and now. The press highlights a 
need for discussion, hints that there be no easy answers as the debate has been 
longstanding and still not resolved, and promises to give the facts, to inform. 
The press does that mainly through feature articles. These are articles that are not 
primarily about reporting on the court case and its outcome, including presenting 
reactions to it, but those articles that use the Dr Moor case as a reason to discuss issues 
that they present as having been brought into the spotlight by the case. Again, I take the 
headlines to be representative of the focus of the articles. 
Feature articles 
Generally, feature articles focus on euthanasia. They fall into three categories. There are 
those that interpret the outcome of the Dr Moor case as positive for patients and their 
rights, including the right to choose death: 
`TRIUMPH FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE SICK' (The Mirror, 12 May 1999). 
`VICTORY FOR A GP WITH COMPASSION AND COMMON SENSE' 
(Birmingham Post, 13 May 1999). 
Secondly, there are those that interpret the outcome as moving in the direction of giving 
doctors too much power over the life and death of their patients: 
`DOCTORS MUST HELP US TO LIVE... NOT TO DIE' (Sunday Herald, 16 May 
1999). 
`DON'T LET THE LAW GIVE US A LICENCE TO KILL; COMMENTARY' 
(Daily Mail, 12 May 1999). 
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`WHY I WON'T EVER SUPPORT MERCY KILLING; HOSPICE DOCTOR 
ISSUES EUTHANASIA WARNING' (Bristol Evening Post, 13 May 1999). 
And thirdly, the majority of headlines speak of confusion, indecision and disagreement: 
guidelines for doctors on euthanasia are presented as inadequate and in need of renewing, 
the law as inadequate and in need of changing, there is no agreement over the ethics of 
euthanasia, we are confronted with choices we can't deal with, we must therefore be 
interested in other countries: how do they deal with it? 
`BMA REVIEW OF DOCTORS' ETHICS AND EUTHANASIA' (Evening 
Standard, 12 May 1999). 
'HOW MEDICINE OFFERS AGONISING CHOICES' (Northern Echo, 12 May 
1999). 
`WE CAN NO LONGER DUCK EUTHANASIA LEGISLATION' (Independent, 12 
May 1999). 
`LIFE OR DEATH ISSUE NEEDS QUALIFICATION' (Western Daily Press, 12 
May 1999). 
'FOCUS: UNCOMFORTABLE ENDINGS; ASSISTED SUICIDE, MERCY 
KILLING OR MURDER? CAN WE EVER HOPE TO AGREE ON 
EUTHANASIA? ' (Independent, 16 May 1999). 
Discussion of euthanasia in the wake of the Dr Moor case brings together the different 
aspects that are being debated by various groups that have an interest in the subject, like 
doctors who enter situations where euthanasia is potentially an issue, or the VES which 
campaigns for a right to die for terminally ill patients. 
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The next section looks at the different positions on euthanasia that are present in the 
coverage of the Dr Moor case. 
What are the issues to do with euthanasia that are discussed in relation to the Dr Moor 
case, and how does the press present them? 
As we have seen, British law does not recognise euthanasia as a separate category - it 
regards euthanasia to be in the same category as murder, and therefore to be illegal. The 
`double effect' - defined as the potential and unintentional hastening of the 
death of a 
dying patient as a by-product of giving medication for pain relief - is generally 
considered to be legal. The Dr Moor trial reaffirmed everything of the above. Dr Moor 
admitted to having given the medication, the amount of which, however, could not be 
specified as the toxicological evidence was considered to be unreliable and therefore 
unusable by the judge. As it could not be proved that Dr Moor had given a dose 
considered to be high enough to having been deliberately intended to kill, the jury was 
left to speculate and decide on the intention of Dr Moor in giving the medication that 
resulted in the patient's death. They sided with the defense and agreed that the death of 
the cancer patient had come about as a side effect of Dr Moor giving medication for pain 
relief, which is accepted and rationalised as the double effect. Therefore, Dr Moor was 
cleared of murder. 
Positions taken in relation to euthanasia 
This is a particularly interesting trial because it has invited responses that are in effect 
responses to the current state of the law, which is exemplified and reinforced by the 
outcome of the trial - murder (= euthanasia # double effect) is illegal, the double effect 
(: # euthanasia = murder) is legal3. Euthanasia, as a non-category in law and, with 
difficulties, banished from the court room, is nevertheless present in the newspaper 
coverage of the case. Responses to the outcome of the case are structured around an 
`=' reads `is the same as'; `#' reads `is different from'. 
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endorsement of the above boundaries or a questioning of them. There are four ways of 
setting those boundaries. I will set them out schematically and then explain them: 
(1) murder = euthanasia = double effect: killing 
(2) murder = euthanasia: intentional killing 
# double effect: unintentional killing (result of treatment) 
(3) murder: unacceptable form of intentional killing 
" euthanasia: acceptable form of intentional killing (choice and compassion) 
" double effect: unintentional killing (result of treatment) 
(4) murder: unacceptable form of killing 
# euthanasia = double effect: acceptable form of killing (choice and compassion) 
These four positions summarise the four ways of setting the boundaries around the three 
practices. The outcome of all three actions is the same: the death of a person brought 
about by the action of another person. The scheme could become more complex for 
example by including the withdrawal of treatment, for example by switching off a 
ventilator (also an action that can lead to a death that people have different views on), but 
that is not what's being discussed in the Dr Moor case, so I will leave it out. Also, as the 
double effect is defined as a risk of death rather than leading directly to death, it could be 
seen as not fitting in very well into the scheme. However, that very definition of the 
double effect is contested, and the understanding of what constitutes the double effect in 
itself becomes an aspect of the particular boundaries drawn by the different positions. 
Similarly, the concept of euthanasia could be defined more closely - what I mean here is 
basically `some form of euthanasia that could be described as voluntary or maybe non- 
voluntary, but not involuntary'. As we can see, the boundaries are defined by the 
application of different premises: 
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a. killing is wrong 
b. intentional killing is wrong 
c. the unacceptable form of intentional killing is wrong 
Those that see all killing as wrong (position 1) rest their view on the sanctity of life 
(which can be a secular understanding). They hold that is wrong under any circumstances 
to act in such a way as will result in ending the life of another human being. They are 
morally opposed to euthanasia, and see the double effect as problematic because to them 
it is a euphemism for euthanasia, or murder. 
Then there are those that make a distinction on the basis of intention. There are two 
positions here, and they both rest on an acceptance of the double effect as bringing about 
death unintentionally, while murder and euthanasia are distinct for causing death 
intentionally. The position in law (position 2) is that murder and euthanasia, defined as 
intentional killing, are wrong. However, there is another view (position 3) that holds that 
not all intentional killing necessarily has to be wrong. They argue that euthanasia may be 
intentional killing, which nevertheless under certain circumstances could be acceptable 
and need not be wrong. As such, it is clearly distinct from murder, which they see as 
unacceptable intentional killing. 
Lastly, there is the view (position 4) that does not accept the concept of intention as a 
legitimate tool for distinguishing between the different forms of killing. This view rates 
the double effect as equivalent to euthanasia on the grounds that both can be acceptable 
forms of killing, while murder, as an unacceptable form of killing, is considered to be 
wrong. 
Positions taken in relation to euthanasia in the press 
In the press, we do not see the positions spelt out as clearly as in this schematic 
presentation. I will now look at how the press presents the reactions to the outcome of the 
Moor case and the different views in relation to the `double effect' and euthanasia. In 
this, the four positions outlined above will constitute a valuable way of sorting through 
the different views. 
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First of all, it has to be noted that newspaper articles are not giving complex 
overviews over complicated topics. They reduce complexity by presenting an argument 
as having two sides4. Articles are written in a style that sets up the two sides, or they are 
written from one of the two sides. Here are some examples of how the press sets up the 
debate in terms of two sides: 
`The trial has aroused controversy among pressure groups both for and against 
euthanasia [... ]' (The Herald, 12 May 1999). 
`Although the issue of euthanasia or `mercy killing' was not addressed in court, both 
sides in the debate seized upon the ruling' (The Journal, 12 May 1999). 
`Euthanasia [... ] There are few issues in which those on both sides so routinely mire 
themselves in the shifting sands of rhetoric and prejudice' (The Independent, 16 May 
1999). 
`The trouble is that there is little clarity of thinking in the debate. The principle of 
`double effect' separates the intention of an act from its consequences. Advocates of 
`mercy killing' denounce this as a meaningless sophistry, insisting that it is used to 
cover up the fact that many doctors practice euthanasia without declaring it. Yet the 
same distinction is used effectively in courts to distinguish between murder and 
manslaughter. On the other side, those opposed to euthanasia talk about the `sanctity 
of life' as though it were an absolute which, were it so, would rule out the notion of 
self-defense and force us all into pacifism' (The Independent, 16 May 1999). 
The two sides in relation to euthanasia: one could either be in favour of it, or against it, 
which is more implied than specified; it is as if the press finds it too self-evident to even 
mention. This last quote is typical in that it sets up the advocates of euthanasia against the 
4 See Nelkin on the journalists presentation of scientific issues: `The quest for simplicity, drama and brevity 
precludes the complex, nuanced positions that scientists prefer. But the polarised presentation of technical 
disputes also reflects journalists' norms of objectivity - their belief that verity can be established by 
balancing conflictual claims' (Nelkin 1995, p. 166/167). See also Chapter (3). 
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opponents to euthanasia. It does that by defining them through the different reasons they 
have to be opposed to the double effect. Comparing that to our earlier schema, we can see 
that `clarity of thinking' is actually obstructed in the newspaper articles by trying to fit in 
everything into a system of two sides - for and against. This is what Nelkin (1995) 
showed to be the case for the reporting of complex scientific issues, and it seems to hold 
equally for the reporting of complex moral issues. In this respect, media discourse differs 
markedly from expert discourse, which is generally putting forward one particular 
argument while acknowledging the complexity of the matter. 
Feature articles 
Let us take a closer look at the feature articles. They can be divided into three categories. 
There are three that are written from a position that is obviously in favour of (the 
legalisation of) euthanasia. Four are arguing against the legalisation of euthanasia. The 
remaining nine are journalistic pieces trying to set out the problem `objectively'- trying 
to give an account of `both sides'. 
The articles in favour of euthanasia do not mention the `double effect'. They do argue 
in favour of euthanasia, therefore it can be said that they distinguish between acceptable 
and unacceptable forms of killing. In that sense, depending of what they would argue in 
relation to the double effect, they fall into either position (3) or (4) in the scheme outlined 
above. Those articles argue purely from the patient perspective. They show that there 
could be reasons for an individual not to wanting to live any longer, particularly in 
situations where they `would have died anyway'. 
`Yet if a patient whose life has been all but destroyed by a debilitating and painful 
disease explicitly requests to be freed from their suffering, the only humane course 
of action is to comply' (Birmingham Post, 13 May 1999). 
`But just because you are in pain does not mean your life is worth living. Is life in a 
coma worth living? Is life disabled and dribbling worth living? Maybe to some 
people it is. Many people can live life to the full even with a terminal illness... They 
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are right. Doctors cannot go around killing patients. But there are exceptions to every 
rule. If the only way to relieve suffering is to end life then for many people that is the 
right way. Every patient and every doctor should have the right to choose' (The 
Mirror, 12 May 1999). 
In a way, those articles argue from what they perceive and present to be a common-sense 
perspective. It is implied that we can all sympathise that people can get into situations so 
painful and undignified that they do not want to live anymore. If people do not want to 
live any more in those circumstances, help them to die. Give people their choice. It is this 
common-sense sentiment that comes to be problematised by trying to define it in formal 
boundaries. What exact situation is bad enough so that we could allow that person to 
choose death? If the definition includes a certain condition or disability, does that imply a 
judgement about the objective quality of life of a person with that condition/disability? 
Does the attempted quantification of quality of life imply a judgement on the worth of 
life? Are we thereby denying the right to life to people in that category? The common- 
sense view does not have those problems. There need not be formal boundaries to assess 
the situation. It is trusted that common-sense recognises an individual situation that 
would justify euthanasia. The choice is made by the patient, and if those around him help 
him in carrying out his wish, they do so because they can sympathise with him or her. 
The view that euthanasia in those situations should be legal is more implied than spelt 
out. 
The four articles that argue explicitly against the legalisation of euthanasia are all 
taking a very similar view. This is due to the fact that three of them are written by 
medical professionals, one by a nurse and two by hospice doctors - the fourth author 
being unspecified but arguing from the same position. All four strongly endorse the 
double effect. In a sense, it makes their practice possible. Their boundary is the 
intentional killing of patients, which they hold to be unacceptable under all 
circumstances. They say that a lot can be done to ensure that a patient will have a good 
death without killing him or her. They stress that a good nurse or doctor would prevent 
the use of burdensome treatment. Even though they hold that there are a few cases where 
euthanasia could be seen as acceptable, that is not enough to legalise the practice. 
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"There will always be a few cases when everybody agrees it would be much better 
for the patient if they died quickly. The problem is you can't legalise for those few 
cases. Euthanasia is either legal for everyone or no-one" (Bristol Evening Post, 13 
May 1999). 
`In my view such a manner of proceeding should remain illegal: though in a country 
such as ours in which more than half a million people a year die, there will always be 
some heartrending cases in which euthanasia would appear to be merciful, and to 
withhold it callous and uncaring. But it is an old adage that hard cases make bad law, 
and no law can be framed to cover every possible situation completely' (Daily Mail, 
12 May 1999). 
They all expect negative consequences from legalisation - individual abuses through 
pressure and coercion with the result of people being killed against their wishes. They 
invoke the slippery slope which holds that voluntary euthanasia as a collective practice 
would necessarily get extended to the practice of involuntary euthanasia, and that even if 
there were no additional deaths, groups like the elderly would live their life in terror, 
frightened of being killed against their will. The hospice doctors argue that the 
legalisation of euthanasia would divide attention and resources away from the necessary 
improvement of palliative care - they hold that there are other things that need improving 
in the care of the dying, like educating doctors, before one should start thinking about 
euthanasia: 
`My fear is that some doctors - and they are very caring and want to do the right 
thing - don't realise all the options that are available today in modern palliative care. 
They tell themselves that they have no option but to help a patient to die. This is the 
problem which faces caring doctors today. It will become much worse if we have 
legalised euthanasia' (The Journal, 13 May 1999). 
Interestingly, one article talks about the possibility of a stricter law: 
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`Would we really want an even stricter law which forbade doctors to alleviate 
suffering during a patient's last few hours or days? It would be a great shame if a 
perfectly satisfactory legal doctrine were abandoned' (The Journal, 13 May 1999). 
In effect, the four articles arguing against the legalisation of euthanasia all agree with the 
present state of the law. They fall into position (2) as outlined above. It is interesting to 
see that position (1), the strong view that all killing is wrong, including the double effect, 
does not have an independent voice in the feature articles. That is even more interesting 
as in phase [2] reports, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (who are altering between 
positions (3) and (4)) is set up in opposition to the anti-euthanasia group Alert: 
`Peggy Norris, chairwoman of the anti-euthanasia group Alert, said: `I think this is a 
sad day for medicine as it makes the law unclear as to what is allowed. We cannot 
have a half-law when it comes to this" (The Guardian, 12 May 1999). 
`Dr Peggy Norris and her pressure group Alert are totally opposed to all attempts to 
have euthanasia legalised or decriminalised: `It is not simply a matter of law - it is 
an ethical and a moral issue', she said' (The Journal, 12 May 1999). 
Here we come closest to the strong position against all killing (position 1), as the 
outcome of the Moor case and its acceptance of the double effect is seen to make the law 
on killing unclear, suggesting that Alert does not accept the concept of intention to justify 
a division between what they must see as different forms of killing. It seems that in phase 
[2] reports, position (1) is set up against position (3) or (4) for a dramatic effect, while in 
the feature articles the case for legalisation is made by position (3) or (4) and the case 
against by position (2), the defense of the status quo. The strong view on killing (position 
(1)) is all but absent. 
Now we still have to look at the remaining nine feature articles that don't argue from 
one particular position, instead attempting to map out the debate - which, of course, does 
not mean that individual articles might not lean more towards one position than another. 
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The double effect features prominently in the majority of articles. Out of the five articles 
that discuss the `double effect', four present it as being problematic: 
`Powerful pain killing drugs used to alleviate a patient's suffering may, in some 
cases, actually hasten death. This creates a dreadful conflict of interest among 
doctors who have pledged to save life but also feel obliged to give patients a pain- 
free death. It can also open a doctor up to the charge of murder' (The Northern Echo, 
12 May 1999). 
`In the past, that decision could be made discreetly. The law of `double effect' which 
allows doctors to administer as much painkiller as is needed to relieve the suffering 
while ignoring the fact that this dosage would actually kill the patient won't wash 
any longer in a world of negligence actions and pressure groups demanding 
clarification of `hypocrisy" (Independent, 12 May 1999). 
`When does administering drugs to cut back on agony and distress overstep the 
bounds of acceptability and become the intention to hasten the end? And if it does so 
is that so wrong if there is no hope of recovery and the agony is causing such distress 
that both patient and family wish a dignified and speedy end to the suffering? ' 
(Western Daily Press, 12 May 1999). 
`Is the doctor giving diamorphine to relieve pain? Or to shorten life? And can you 
meaningfully separate the two, as the present law purports to do with the principle it 
calls `double effect'? ' (Independent, 16 May 1999). 
The first quote about the `double effect' creating a dreadful conflict of interest among 
doctors is very much at odds with what doctors themselves have said in the articles 
discussed above. For those doctors, the `double effect' is a tool that works well for their 
practice, allowing them to uphold the boundary between killing and not killing. The other 
three quotes effectively question whether separating intention from consequences, as the 
`double effect' does, is legitimate. They argue that what is `really' going on is killing, so 
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we should be open about it. The Independent argues that we cannot have doctors secretly 
killing off patients, while the Western Daily Press puts forward the view that, maybe, 
killing need not always be considered a bad thing, and there would be merit in 
acknowledging this openly. The four articles do not separate the `double effect' as being 
in a completely separate category from euthanasia. However, the fact that the double 
effect is presented as being a confused and not quite satisfactory solution to a 
complicated and confusing problem might partly be a dramatic device, considering that it 
only leads to strong demands in terms of a change in the law in two cases. One, after 
exposing the unsatisfactory nature of the `double effect', actually argues that the law we 
have at the moment `may be as good as we are likely to get' (Independent, 16 May 1999) 
(interestingly, only 4 days earlier the same paper made a strong case in favour of change 
in the law: `The law will have to be clarified and the Government will have to bring in 
new legislation' - Independent, 12 May 1999). It arrives at that conclusion after a 
discussion of the arguments of campaigners for and against euthanasia (position (1) set 
up against position (3) or (4)) and the expected consequences that the legalisation of 
euthanasia would be likely to have, arguing that moral arguments tell us less about what 
would happen than a look at how society actually works. It concludes that with pressures 
coming from many different directions (for examples pressures on budgets in the NHS), 
the practice of legalised euthanasia would be structured by cultural elements such as who 
is valued in our society - and those less valued are better protected by the law as it 
stands. 
The fifth article talking about the `double effect' does so in defense of it. It argues that 
the law is perfectly clear and right, that the euthanasia debate is straightforward and any 
confusion about matters has been generated by `lazy newspaper headlines and the 
Voluntary Euthanasia Society, who has called for the law to be clarified' (Sunday Times, 
16 May 1999). The whole article is a perfect exposition of position (2), accepting that 
euthanasia is murder and the double effect legitimate and useful in medical practice. The 




]the VES immediately spread confusion by saying that Moor had performed 
slow euthanasia'. This was grossly untrue. Euthanasia is intentional killing[... ] By 
acquitting him, the jury effectively `double effect' and the crucial legal principle that 
intention is what matters. In doing so, it presented the VES with a difficulty. The 
society doesn't accept the validity of the double effect and the importance of 
intention. Stating it was `overjoyed' at Moor's acquittal, it repeated its mantra that 
double effect was a `hypocritical situation which had to change'. Yet at the same 
time John Oliver, the society's general secretary, completely contradicted this by 
saying that the defense of double effect was a valid one' (Sunday Times, 16 May 
1999). 
The confusion created by the VES, criticised by this article, is that they are not consistent 
in their position regarding the double effect. They are shown to oscillate between position 
(3) and (4). What both positions have in common is that they believe that there are some 
acceptable forms of killing. The stated aim of the VES is to campaign for the legalisation 
of voluntary euthanasia. Whether they accept the concept of intention crucial to the 
double effect or not is irrelevant to them, as their boundary lies between acceptable and 
unacceptable forms of killing, while it is crucial for people who draw their boundaries at 
intentional killing. Their interest in presenting their position to the `double effect' can 
only really be a tactical move on the way to achieving their goal. They have no problem 
in accepting the validity of the `double effect', but they can just as well make use of it by 
calling it `slow euthanasia', which fits with their view that the real distinction should be 
between euthanasia as acceptable killing and murder as unacceptable killing. In that way, 
they do not really see a difference between giving an injection of painkillers while 
accepting that it could lead to death and giving a lethal injection that necessarily will lead 
to death - especially as in practice, they see the double effect as able to hide instances of 
intentional killing. However, the Sunday Times article is not really interested in the logic 
of the reasoning of the VES, as it objects to its ultimate goal: the legalisation of 
euthanasia. It objects to the way `euthanasia has become presented as a right, dressed up 
in the language of choice and dignity'- `a trump card in a society which so venerates 
personal autonomy'. The reasons given for why this should not justify the legalisation of 
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voluntary euthanasia are firstly, that `good palliative care obviates the distress that fuels 
calls to legalise euthanasia', and secondly, that `voluntary euthanasia is a slippery slope 
to killing without consent'. Actually, we find evidence of the existence of the slippery 
slope in the thinking of the author, because when talking about voluntary euthanasia, she 
makes the conjecture that `doctors and lawyers will increasingly decide whose life has 
any meaning' in relation to incompetent people. Here we have the overstepping of a 
boundary that is crucial for the VES, which is that they campaign for `voluntary' 
euthanasia, involving choice on the part of a competent patient. For the author, however, 
there is no firm boundary between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary euthanasia - 
her strong boundary is between intentional killing and unintentional killing. Any 
intentional killing is wrong, whether it involves a request on the part of a competent 
patient or a person in a Persistent Vegetative State. 
Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated how press coverage of the Dr Moor case has changed over time, 
from concentrating on the aspect of murder to shifting to a discussion of euthanasia. 
The concept of the `double effect', central to the court case, also formed the core of 
press coverage in the 2nd phase articles. The `double effect' represents a practical tool for 
doctors in that it upholds the boundary between `killing' and `not killing', defining 
actions that doctors can do (actions equivalent to `not killing') and cannot do (actions 
equivalent to `killing'). 
This boundary between `killing' and `not killing' appeared as a contested one in the 
press coverage of the Dr Moor case. Killing itself was not universally condemned, rather 
there exist three positions in relation to killing: (1) that killing is always wrong, (2) that 
intentional killing is what is wrong, and (3) the only the unacceptable form of intentional 
killing is wrong. In reports on the Dr Moor case, the position that killing (intentional or 
not) is always wrong appears in contradistinction to the position that there are some 
acceptable forms of intentional killing, thus setting up the issue of euthanasia as the 
opposition between people in favour of killing and people who are against killing. 
However, in more detailed discussion of euthanasia, press discourse all but marginalises 
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the position that killing (intentional or not) is always wrong - here the supporters of the 
moral rightness of some acceptable form of intentional killing are opposed by defenders 
of the status quo which suggests that only intentional killing is wrong (not unintentional 
killing). 
In the next chapter, we will see how press discourse justifies some forms of killing, 
not with reference to intent but by a move to divert responsibility for killing away from 
the human actor. 
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Chapter (7) - Discourses structuring the press coverage of euthanasia 
cases: the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' and the `terminal illness 
discourse' 
Introduction 
This chapter will be looking at the discourses that structure the press coverage of 
euthanasia cases. The discourse in terms of which experts discuss euthanasia - the 
`voluntary euthanasia discourse' - is identified as taking the role of a minor discourse in 
newspaper coverage. The major discourse having a bearing on the way in which the press 
conceives of euthanasia cases I will call the `terminal illness discourse'. Both the 
`voluntary euthanasia discourse' and the `terminal illness discourse' will be discussed in 
this chapter in terms of how they assess agency, and how they assign responsibility in 
particular situations both to humans and to non-human entities. 
Euthanasia as a problem 
Euthanasia, as is often pointed out by different parties in the debate, has always existed. It 
is a point of dispute whether the legalisation of euthanasia would increase or decrease its 
incidence. But euthanasia has not always been a problem. Problems are socially 
constructed. A certain situation has to be perceived as a problem. And even when it is 
generally recognised that there is a problem, different points of view lead to different 
perceptions of what the real problem is. 
The media in my sample from 1998/99 recognise euthanasia as a problem (the reasons 
and pressures leading to euthanasia having become a problem, not just in the press but in 
wider society, will not be discussed here - one writer who has addressed this question is 
Emanuel 1994 - see also Chapter (1)). This problem can be presented in two ways: as a 
question of morality, of right and wrong, and as a question of management, centering 
around legalisation. While the former has a bearing on the latter, the two can be 
distinguished analytically as they address quite different concerns. To concede that 
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euthanasia could be right in certain circumstances can, but does not have to, lead to calls 
for legalisation, whereas legalisation does not need to entail that euthanasia is seen as 
something desired, good or right. In the press, on the other hand, the `case for euthanasia' 
(moral) and the `case for the legalisation of euthanasia' (management) often get 
conflated: 
`In theory the case for euthanasia is straightforward. Some people suffering from 
painful, incurable or humiliating illness would prefer to die swiftly and without pain. 
If their doctors are happy to assist them to suicide, the state should not interfere with 
the free, informed choices of its citizens in matters that do not cause others harm. 
The case against is equally plain. Every life has intrinsic value, irrespective of the 
individual's mental state or physical condition. Agreeing to clinical homicide in the 
heart-rending cases would be the start of a "slippery slope" in which today's right to 
die would become tomorrow's duty to do so. ' (The Independent, 16 May 1999). 
Here, discussion of the `case for euthanasia' is made in legal, not moral terms - in terms 
of the `state' and the `informed choices of citizens'. The `case against' addresses a 
problem of management - in terms of a `slippery slope' that would lead to abuse. 
However, the quote also refers to the `intrinsic value' of every life, a moral evaluation: 
this is not seen as out of place, but part of the same problem. This is a good example for 
how the press treats euthanasia as a moral problem, and euthanasia as a management 
problem, not as separate, but as the same: the moral case for or against euthanasia and the 
legal case for or against euthanasia are treated as the same problem. In other words, 
whereas `euthanasia' is problematised by the press, the connection between laws and 
morals is not problematised - it is taken for granted that their connection is straight- 
forward and well understood, that one necessarily follows the other. It appears that press 
discourse tends to conflate issues that `expert' discourse aims at separating: `experts' on 
management and `experts' on morality generally belong to different fields of expertise. 
This conclusion is also corroborated by the way the Moor case is understood by the 
press - it is just as likely to see the Moor case as addressing the problem of the 
management - or legalisation - of euthanasia: 
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But the case - and public interest in it - centred on whether doctors should legally be 
able deliberately to end a terminally ill patient's life (Birmingham Post, 12 May 
1999). 
- as it is to see it as addressing the problem of the morals of euthanasia: 
The case has ignited a nationwide debate about the rights and wrongs of hastening 
the deaths of terminally ill patients (The Guardian, 12 May 1999). 
As I said before, it is not that there doesn't exist a connection between morality and law, 
in fact it is a very complex and problematic one. However, the point I am making here is 
that the press agrees to see euthanasia as a problem, but is less sure whether the problem 
is the management or the morality of euthanasia. In the event, both aspects become 
conflated. 
In general, the emphasis in the press is on the problem of the legalisation of 
euthanasia. The moral aspect is subordinated to this problem, and moral arguments are 
made in support for or against the legalisation of euthanasia. On the whole, however, 
there is a tendency to equate morals with the case against euthanasia - the role of moral 
guardians is given to anti-euthanasia activists: 
Dr Peggy Norris and her pressure group Alert are totally opposed to all attempts to 
have euthanasia legalised or decriminalised. "It is not simply a matter of law - it is an 
ethical and a moral issue, " she said (The Journal, 12 May 1999). 
In general, the legal case for euthanasia centres around the right to choose the 
circumstances of an individual's own death to become enshrined in law, while the legal 
case against addresses the possibility of abuse, individuals being killed against their will 
- as seen in the first quote above. 
The moral case is generally automatically the case against legalisation, and the case 
for the legalisation of euthanasia in general does not need a moral argument: the morality 
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of making the individual the centre of decision-making is already shared by the doctrine 
of the liberal state and the idea that individuals should be allowed to choose the 
circumstances of their deaths'. 
Due to this congruence, the particular morality that involves seeing the individual as 
the centre of things becomes obscured, and morality becomes automatically linked to 
arguments that argue from positions other than the individual: whether that be from a 
concept of the `sanctity of life' deriving from a source beyond the individual, be that God 
or nature; or from the idea of society conceived as a moral collectivity rather than as a 
collection of individuals. 
Again, the latter (society) is a candidate for confusion: writers don't seem to be too 
sure whether to see society as a source of collective morality or an entity to be managed. 
It can be seen as both, of course, and just as in the case of the legalisation for euthanasia 
and the morality of euthanasia, the two can only be separated analytically, in order to be 
able to look at the way in which they are connected and understood to be connected. 
To sum up, the press presents euthanasia as a problem, the nature of which is 
perceived to be legal-moral. 
`Voluntary euthanasia discourse' and `terminal illness discourse' 
In Chapter (4), I have given an overview of the representation of euthanasia in expert 
debates. Experts coming from different fields of expertise, aligned with particular 
institutions and interests, are concerned with particular aspects of euthanasia and with 
developing particular definitions that compete against other particular definitions to 
become the generally accepted definition. 
Doctors are interested in the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, 
because it relates to their actions and brands them as killing or not killing; patients are 
interested in the distinction between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, because it 
relates to their wishes regarding killing or not killing. Looking from the outside, as I have 
i See Billig (1989) on the importance of the ideas of liberalism for contemporary ideology. Billig's analysis 
of the dilemmatic aspects of thinking includes an awareness of the historical creation of thinking, of how 
`our concepts and our ideas reflect the history which has produced these current moments' (Billig 1989, 
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done in Chapter (4), `expert discourse' on euthanasia on the whole appears to be a 
contested field of knowledge and expertise, made up of contested categories and 
boundaries. `Euthanasia' is hardly ever discussed without a qualifying adjective. 
In the newspaper reports, this is very different. `Euthanasia' hardly appears with a 
qualifying adjective. In the 132 articles that make up the case stories discussed in detail in 
the previous chapter, the word `euthanasia' appears 467 times, mainly unqualified. The 
ones that are qualified include 58 mentions of `voluntary euthanasia' (35, that is more 
than half, of which appear in the name `Voluntary Euthanasia Society'), 4 mentions of 
`involuntary euthanasia', none of `non-voluntary euthanasia', 1 mention of `active 
euthanasia' and none of `passive euthanasia'. 
This leads me to wonder whether it could be that `voluntary euthanasia discourse' is 
so engrained in press discourse on euthanasia, that many times when the term 
`euthanasia' is used, it is intended and understood as a shorthand for `voluntary 
euthanasia'2. 
The question is: how should we understand this mainly unqualified use of the word 
`euthanasia' in the press? To answer that question, we have to look at how euthanasia is 
discussed in the context of euthanasia cases. 
In `expert discourse', the most generally accepted distinction between different forms 
of euthanasia appears to be the one between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia. It is 
the same distinction that the Voluntary Euthanasia Society defends, seen in its choice of 
p. 3). Liberalism today contains opposing themes which allows for endless debate and argument, sometimes 
overtly, or, like in this example, covertly by providing the underlying structure of the argument. 
2A small informal questionnaire distributed among ten colleagues (PhD students in sociology at 
Goldsmiths College) suggests that this may well be the case. The questions asked were: 
1. Have you ever (for whatever reason) given any thought to `euthanasia'? Yes/no - elaborate if you 
wish to 
2. How do you understand the term `euthanasia'? 
3. Do you have any particular opinion on `euthanasia'? Please explain: 
- no, not really 
- yes, I think that... 
- yes, I feel quite strongly that... 
4. Have you got any further comments? 
In relation to question (2), which asks how they understand the term `euthanasia', every single one gives it 
the meaning of `voluntary euthanasia' or `assisted suicide'. Here are two examples: `choosing when you 
die - in a situation of pain or terminal illness '-1 `informed consensual assistance to die (preferably written 
and signed) by both parties in the presence of trusted witnesses'. 
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name. This distinction rests on the opposition between choice and coercion, between and 
individual wanting to be killed and an individual being killed against his or her will. 
The question to ask that problematises this distinction would be: how voluntary is a 
particular case of euthanasia? `Voluntary' can mean at least five different things: 
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5 kinds of `voluntary' 5 reasons that make it less than 
`voluntary' 
Ask for euthanasia out of his or her own There is no such thing as free will (social 
free will values become internalised, for example 
that the old, the disabled are worthless) 
Ask for euthanasia after consultation of Consultation with others (who can have 
others (for example family) good or bad intentions) leads to pressures 
to ask for euthanasia when this is not 
what the person really wants 
Consent to euthanasia after the doctor has The person consents for the wrong 
proposed it reasons, found in the unequal patient- 
doctor relationship, where the doctor has 
the power to define the situation - the 
doctor can have the `best interest' of the 
patient at heart or act with other motives 
(personal or institutional) 
Having asked for euthanasia in the past The person might change her mind 
(living will) 
There is reason to believe that the person This relies on close knowledge of the 
would approve of euthanasia (indicators: person, could be the wrong understanding 
religious affiliation, general personal leading to the wrong conclusion, or the 
values, ethical orientation... ) person could be intentionally 
misrepresented 
183 
All of these uses of the term `voluntary' as well as the objections have been used at one 
time or another in the euthanasia debate or court cases relating to euthanasia (see Keown 
1998). 
What is immediately striking regarding this table is that it is the complexity of social 
interactions that appears to render an initially straightforward concept problematic. It also 
illustrates how complex situations can be defined by the mere application of a word: to 
call a case of euthanasia, where the dying person is not capable of voicing her wishes, 
`voluntary' - when `voluntary' has a positive meaning - is to evaluate the situation in a 
particular way as well as to justify it. The next question to ask, then, would be: who is 
talking, where are they coming from and what is the context? - as what we will now be 
dealing with is likely to be a difference in the evaluation/appreciation of a situation, 
relating to different interests of the speakers. On the other hand, if all speakers agreed, 
this would be interesting in itself and raise the question of how this uniform 
understanding could have been achieved. 
The use of the word `voluntary' in what I will call the `voluntary euthanasia 
discourse' has taken root in press coverage of euthanasia. Two striking examples of that 
come from the Coma case [10] and the Dr Moor case [5] respectively. In the Coma case, 
a husband asks the court to be allowed to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration from 
his wife who has been in a coma for over six months. Her mother supports his case by 
saying that her daughter had said to her in the past that she wouldn't want to live `like 
that', that is in a coma. In the event, she is quoted by the newspaper applying a very loose 
definition of `voluntary': 
`Seeing Lorraine like this has made me even more sure that voluntary euthanasia 
should be legalised', she said. `If I could give her some kind of injection now, I 
would' (Daily Mail, 26 August 1999). 
This use of the word `voluntary' can be defended as can be seen from the table above: 
according to the table, the mention of not wanting to live `like that' could be interpreted 
as some kind of `living will'. However, the application of the concept `voluntary' to this 
situation can relatively easily be challenged. Thus, the important thing to note here is that 
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the author of the newspaper article left that comment unchallenged, which could lead to 
the conclusion that `voluntary euthanasia discourse' is seen as legitimate by the press, 
even when it is applied to unlikely cases. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the following example from the coverage of the Dr 
Moor case - this court case aimed to establish whether Dr Moor had given an overdose of 
diamorphine to a terminally ill patient. Even though, throughout the press coverage, there 
is nowhere a mention that this patient asked or was even in a position to ask for 
euthanasia, one can read the following by a member of the VES quoted as saying: 
`Dr Moor was responding to his patient's request - he wanted to relieve his 
suffering. To me, this not guilty verdict shows that slow euthanasia is alive and well' 
(the Journal, 12 May 1999). 
Again, this application of `voluntary euthanasia discourse' to a situation where it 
apparently does not apply goes unchallenged by the journalist, which suggests that the 
legitimacy of `voluntary euthanasia discourse' is such that it is accepted without too 
much questioning. 
The `voluntary euthanasia discourse' might have some presence in the newspaper 
coverage of euthanasia, but looking at the treatment of the different cases, it becomes 
apparent that another contrast to the one that the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' is based 
on is of greater importance in the press. Euthanasia in terms of `choice' or `coercion' 
(from the point of view of the one being killed) gives way to the external evaluation of 
the cases in terms of `tragic' as opposed to `criminal'. This is by no means the same 
thing, although it might appear so to start with. But one should not make the mistake of 
equating `choice' with `tragic', and `coercion' with `criminal'. Choice/coercion and 
tragic/criminal do not map onto each other, they do not mean the same thing. 
The pair choice/coercion rests on the idea that the individual relies on internal forces 
that lead her to make decisions; decisions that can be falsified by outside influence. It 
rests on what Barnes calls: 
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[... ] the stereotype of the independent individual: independently chosen actions are 
normal, good and moral, and social influences on action are potentially causes of 
lapses from what is normal, good and moral (Barnes 2000, p. 61). 
Individually chosen actions are good, social influence is bad. This characterisation runs 
through the whole of the euthanasia debate: the idea of being able to carve out a realm 
where an individual can freely chose to die, free from external constraints on her decision 
(a notable exception is Boyd discussed in Chapter (4), who introduces the idea that a 
`conversation' between patient and those around him must be at the heart of a decision- 
making process). By attempting to create such a realm, 
A domain for action devoid of external interference has been sought, and the explicit 
demand has been for an area of `free choice', one where the individual has a `right to 
choose' created by withdrawal of external constraint. In this discourse choice 
features as absence, and the problem of the nature of free agency never arises 
(Barnes 2000, p. 145). 
In the choice/coercion opposition, agency rests either with one person or another/others. 
Somebody or other can be held responsible - this relates to what Barnes call the 
institution of responsible action'. Voluntaristic discourse rests on the idea that 
individuals chose their actions, that they could always have chosen otherwise. 
Yet, there is another paradigm that can account for action: the `institution of causal 
connection'. In Barnes words, `choice is said to exist only where causation is not, and a 
domain of voluntary action is created beyond the reach of ordinary causal explanation' 
(Barnes 2000, p. 3). Choice and causation thus appear as mutually exclusive - but Barnes 
also says that `much of our everyday discourse manifests a robust compatibilism, in that 
it is content to regard actions as at once chosen and caused' (Barnes, 2000, p. 4). 
This is where I get to my next contrast: the one between `criminal' and `tragic', which 
is important in the press. Whereas the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' rests on a 
particular stereotype of the individual, the `institution of responsible action', and choice 
as absence, this `press discourse' introduces the `institution of causal connection', and the 
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cause is terminal illness. Just as in the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' the central notion 
of `voluntary' can become inflated, in this `press discourse', the central notion of 
terminal illness gets extended: from the terminal state of an incurable illness, to incurable 
illness, to other kinds of states (coma or PVS). 
We generally hold that individuals who chose their actions are to be held responsible 
for them, but that an individual whose action is caused by something beyond her is to be 
seen as less responsible. Terminal illness in `press discourse' is established as such a 
cause that results in individuals being regarded as less responsible. Euthanasia cases that 
involve terminal illness are presented as `tragic'3 in newspapers. It is the absence of 
terminal illness in cases that invoke euthanasia that inspires the press to present them as 
`criminal'. 
As I said before, it is clear that newspaper discourse draws on `voluntary euthanasia 
discourse'. But `terminal illness discourse' is the dominant one in newspapers, and it 
pulls in another direction than the `VE discourse'. I will attempt to show this in the 
following diagram: 
3 In its literary meaning, `tragic' derives from `tragedy'. A tragedy is a drama about the inner dynamics of 
humankind's response to destiny. While stressing man's fate, it does not deny him freedom to act (the 
protagonists of tragedy used to be mainly men). The structure of the drama revolves around notions of 
dilemma, choice, wretchedness of soul, as well as guilt. In Sewall's words, 
`Only man in action, man `on the way', begins to reveal the possibilities of his nature for good and 
bad and for both at once. And only in the most pressing kinds of action, action that involves the 
ultimate risk and pushes him to the very limits, are the fullest possibilities revealed. It is action 
entered into by choice and thus one which affirms man's freedom. And it leads to suffering - but 
choice of a certain kind and suffering of a certain kind. The choice is not that of a clear good and a 
clear evil; it involves both, in unclear mixture, and presents a dilemma. The suffering is not so much 
that of physical ordeal (although that can be part of it) but of mental or spiritual anguish as the 
protagonist acts in the knowledge that what he feels he must do is in some sense wrong - as he sees 
himself at once both good and bad, justified yet unjustified. This kind of suffering presupposes man's 
ability to understand the full context and implications of his action, and thus it is suffering beyond the 
reach of the immature or brutish, the confirmed optimist or pessimist, or the merely indifferent' 
(Sewall 2001). 
The literary vision of tragedy thus deals with the ambiguity at the heart of human life, the ambiguity in our 
own nature and the world around us that has to be endured and cannot be solved. 
I have chosen the term `tragic' to denote the press discourse of terminal illness in relation to euthanasia 
because it shares some elements of the literary vision of tragedy: the press version of the tragic borrows 
from this literary vision the notions of dilemma and choice, the struggle of man with forces beyond him 
(destiny in the form of terminal illness), but it puts less emphasis of the elements of wretchedness of soul 
and guilt. As we will see in the following, the vision of ambiguity at the heart of human life of the literary 
meaning of tragedy gives way to advocacy of particular actions in the face of destiny (terminal illness) in 
the press discourse, as if that ambiguity could be solved. The press vision of the tragic can therefore be said 





As we can see from this diagram, the discourse coming from the perspective of choice 
and the one centering around terminal illness do overlap, suggesting that euthanasia cases 
where both choice and terminal illness are present are doubly legitimated. 
However, if the central notion of `voluntary euthanasia discourse' is choice, then, even 
if the presence of terminal illness is implicitly accepted, it has a tendency of spreading to 
be applied to cases without terminal illness. 
If the central notion is terminal illness, even if choice is implicitly accepted, it has a 
tendency to spread beyond cases where the individual has chosen herself. And this is 
what I think we can find in the press discourse, in what I will call the `terminal illness 
discourse'. I will now go on to substantiate this claim with some examples. 
Tragic cases - the Dr Moor case [5] 
Dr Moor was arrested for the alleged murder of a terminally ill patient. The court found 
that he was not guilty, on the basis that he did not administer an overdose of diamorphine 
with the intent of killing, but a dose adequate to relieve pain. A more detailed account of 
the newspaper coverage of the Moor case was presented in Chapter (6). 
There are two phases in the reporting of the case: the first phase is reporting the arrest 
of a potential criminal, not just a potential murderer but a potential mass-murderer. Phase 
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one of the reporting presents the case as criminal, where Dr Moor is presented to be at 
least potentially a fully responsible agent of a crime. The second phase comes after the 
verdict of not guilty, where Moor is cast by the press as a hero, a caring and humane 
doctor who has stood up for the rights of the dying and euthanasia, although he has done 
nothing like that in court, having pointed to his actions as normal medical practice, not 
euthanasia. 
This phase two in the reporting shifts the case into the realm of the tragic, where 
agency and responsibility are shifted away from Dr Moor, and attention to terminal 
illness as the primary cause for the situation takes over. Dr Moor is presented as 
responding to that situation. The patient is presented as a terminally ill man, he is never 
reported to have spoken at all, let alone about his wishes about dying or being killed, he 
is only reported to have screamed in pain. In reaction to that, Dr Moor is said to have 
given an overdose, or a dose adequate to relieve pain, of diamorphine. The court found 
the latter to be the case, but quite apart from that, there is a unanimous acceptance in the 
press that the patient had not asked to be killed. 
The court found Dr Moor had done nothing approaching euthanasia, but the press 
talks about the case as a case about `the rights and wrongs of hastening the deaths of 
terminally ill patients' (see earlier quote) - note that there is no mention here of choice. 
The press accepts that the Moor case has a bearing on the issue of euthanasia; if we 
accept this, then we are dealing with a euthanasia case that involved a patient who did not 
chose euthanasia, which leads to the conclusion that the sympathy of the press is not 
primarily triggered by the wishes of the dying but by what is perceived as the plight of 
the terminally ill. 
We have also seen above (p. 185) that voluntary euthanasia discourse ('his patient's 
request') gets applied to this case of a patient who has not made any request, going 
unchallenged by the journalist. On the other hand, consider the following quote: 
The pro-euthanasia lobby believes that if someone is suffering pain, has a terminal 
illness and is dying or being prescribed drugs that are killing them, they should be 
able to die with dignity (Northern Echo, 12 May 1999). 
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Whereas the main argument in favour of euthanasia is the argument from the choice of 
the individual, choice in this quote is subordinated, or follows from, the presence of 
terminal illness. Again, this can be interpreted as terminal illness being presented in the 
papers as the main argument in favour of euthanasia, over and above choice. `Voluntary 
euthanasia discourse' features in reports on the Moor case, in an explicit and rhetorical 
fashion, without questioning of its applicability, in a testimony to its high legitimacy. 
`Terminal illness discourse' is the discourse that seems to be used with greater ease and 
naturalness [sic] by the authors of those reports. 
The criminal/tragic dichotomy is sometimes expressed in the press in terms of the 
murder/mercy contrast. The idea is the same. Murder is criminal. The tragic situation of 
terminal illness requires mercy. Mercy is a word that is not acceptable in expert 
discourse. It is, however, very frequent in newspaper accounts. In the 132 case story 
articles, mercy appears 81 times (including mercy kill* 71, mercy 10 [mercy or murder, 
doctor of mercy, mercy doctor, mercy-death doctor, angel of mercy, mercy martyr]). 
Mercy signifies the positive side in an opposition like the following one: 
Jack Kevorkian is either an angel of mercy or an instrument of murder (Western 
Morning News, 15 June 1999). 
The idea of mercy applies to situations that constrain the agency of the actor - to a certain 
extent the situation is made responsible for the action, diverting attention away from the 
actor. The action is perceived as the lesser evil in a bad situation. Mercy relates to the 
actor's appreciation of the situation, his or her compassion with another, and can but does 
not have to include attention to the other's wishes. Mercy is about the actor, not the one 
that is being killed. Mercy is not about choice and voluntariness. In that sense, the 
concept of mercy does not fit easily into the `voluntary euthanasia discourse'. However, 
it sits quite easily with a discourse of terminal illness. 
A headline from the second phase of the Moor case is quite striking: 
ASSISTED SUICIDE, MERCY KILLING OR MURDER? CAN WE EVER HOPE 
TO AGREE ON EUTHANASIA? (Independent, 16 May 1999). 
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`Assisted suicide' is a concept that has developed out of the voluntary euthanasia 
movement and expert debates and their concern with voluntariness and choice, with its 
aim of maximising the involvement of the patient in his or her own killing and 
minimising the role of others; `mercy killing' is used by newspapers in a discourse 
centering on terminal illness; and `murder' relates to the legal situation in this country, 
where euthanasia is illegal. Here we have expert discourse, press discourse and legal 
discourse juxtaposed to each other, in a nutshell. 
Tragic cases - the attempted killing of a man by his wife [3] 
In this case, a woman tried to kill her husband who had `incurable dementia'. The man's 
wishes, when he was still competent, are said to have been in favour of euthanasia, in 
general and for himself. This case is presented as a tragic one, treated with sympathy in 
the press. The tenor of the reporting is captured in this headline: 
I LOVE MY HUSBAND ENOUGH TO KILL HIM (Daily Mail, 15 April 1999). 
The sentiment that is expressed here is close to the one expressed through the use of the 
word `mercy', it implies the `terminal illness discourse', where terminal illness in itself is 
seen as the reason that justifies a drastic action like killing. Action is perceived as a 
reaction to a bad situation, responsibility for the outcome is deflected from the actor, the 
action being mediated by compassion (in the discourse of `mercy'), and in this case 
additionally by love. Love implies strong personal links, a certain merging between actor 
and the one being killed, that leaves the boundary between the individual who makes a 
choice and the individual who carries out the killing blurred. The implication is that the 
`voluntary euthanasia discourse', a discourse of choice based on the stereotype of the 
independent individual, becomes inapplicable. 
The sympathy for the woman that runs through the newspaper coverage of her case is 
based on this stereotype of love, much less on the central idea of the `voluntary 
euthanasia discourse', choice. Even so, just as in the coverage of the Moor case, ample 
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room is given to quotes that promote the `voluntary euthanasia discourse', like the 
following from Age Concern: 
`We'd prefer people to make up their own mind. It's people's right to choose how 
they live and die' (Herald Express, 13 February 1999). 
If the language of choice is being applied to a case like this one (involving a patient 
painted as incapable of making choices), then the meaning of the concept of choice must 
be seen as having been extended: a wife can legitimately seen as choosing for her 
husband. Alternatively, a choice made by a person in the past is legitimately seen as a 
reason for the action of somebody else in the present (the living will scenario). 
The meaning of choice based on the stereotype of the independent individual is 
seriously undermined by this kind of use of the word `choice', and reveals its 
subordination to a `terminal illness discourse'. To construct an `absent patient' 
(incompetent of decision-making in the present through dementia) as a `choosing patient' 
is to make the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' instrumental in both hiding and 
promoting the underlying `terminal illness discourse' - hidden because of the use of buzz 
words such as `choice', thus borrowing the legitimacy of the `voluntary euthanasia 
discourse', at the same time as promoting it by subtly changing the meaning of the 
concept of `choice' by extending it. 
The `terminal illness discourse' is based on concepts like love and mercy, which 
imply action in response to a bad situation, as perceived by the actor. Attributing `choice' 
to somebody who cannot choose only makes visible a general truth that is obscured by 
the proliferation of the `voluntary euthanasia discourse': choice is not an inherent power 
residing inside human beings. To speak of `individuals with a right to choose' is often 
understood to mean `individuals natively imbued with powers of choice' (Barnes 2000, 
p. 149). 
However, choice is always a product of context, of human beings conferring a status 
on each other by recognising and treating others as `individuals with a right to choose'. 
Choice does not reside in the natural makeup of human beings. This is what `voluntary 
euthanasia discourse' does: it advocates that individuals be given the right to choose their 
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own lives and deaths. It does so by means of an argument that insists that individuals are 
born with the right to choose, that by nature they are imbued with the right to chose. The 
use of the language of choice in a case like this one, of a man with dementia -a condition 
which is otherwise seen as rendering an individual incompetent - that is: incapable of 
making choices - only highlights this discrepancy between reality and the representation 
in discourse. 
The use of the discourse of `choice' in cases of dementia points to a reluctance to 
address the problem of euthanasia for incompetent people in a more realistic way: people 
with dementia are generally seen as incapable of making valid choices regarding their 
lives and deaths. This implies that others must make choices for them. The question 
would be: on what basis should what kind of decisions regarding the lives of incompetent 
people be made? The consensus in this society is that people should not kill other people. 
The only discourse available, a discourse which seems to have gained a considerable 
legitimacy over the last years, with the power to challenge this consensus is the one of 
individual choice that allows another to kill the person who has chosen to die. If one 
wants to argue that demented people should be allowed to be killed, this can at present 
only be done by an appeal to `choice'. 
Just as in the second phase of the Moor case, the Vicky case is identified by the press 
as a tragic one, not a criminal one, deserving sympathy, not condemnation. In both cases, 
illness is the decisive factor that justifies sympathy over condemnation for an action that 
by the law in this country could be seen as criminal. Whereas this sympathy cannot be 
openly expressed by stating categorically that `serious illness is enough to justify the 
killing of people', it can be argued that this same sentiment is expressed a lot more subtly 
by making extensive reference to the poor health of the patients ('Besides the Multiple 
Infarct Dementia, Tim has Parkinson's disease, suffers from epileptic fits and is 
incontinent' - Western Morning News, 31 March 1999), and the strain on the relatives ('I 
burst into tears and rushed out of the house and I then realised I was at the end of my 
tether' - Western Morning News, 31 March 1999). When addressing the issue of killing 
more squarely, it is done so in terms of the `voluntary euthanasia discourse'. Any 
problems of applying this discourse to that particular case are being ignored. 
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Criminal cases 
More evidence to suggest that the central notion in press discourse on euthanasia is 
terminal illness comes from cases that are seen by the press as criminal. In the coverage 
of the Dr Shipman case [13], who stood trial accused of having murdered several of his 
patients, most articles quote almost verbatim the following statement of the prosecution: 
Richard Henriques, QC, prosecuting, claimed: `The defendant killed those 15 
patients because he enjoyed doing so. There is no question in this case of euthanasia 
or mercy killing. None of the deceased were terminally ill. He must have found the 
drama of taking life to his taste' (Daily Record, 12 October 1999). 
The reference to euthanasia in this murder case obviously is made because the murderer 
is a doctor. When doctors kill, this can potentially be described as euthanasia. This 
possibility, it seems to have been felt, must be ruled out. However, the justification given 
here for euthanasia is terminal illness. There is no mention of choice. The most obvious 
thing, one would think, would be to state that the victims were killed against their will. 
Two different conclusions can be drawn from this: one, that it is assumed - and 
doesn't need to be stated - that euthanasia applies only to cases where patients chose to 
die. Or two, that the criterion that defines a killing as euthanasia, and therefore as distinct 
from murder, is understood to be terminal illness, regardless of the choice of the 
individual. The case is presented by the press as criminal because it involved healthy 
people, whereas the popular appeal of the above quote leads to the conclusion that if the 
people involved had been terminally ill, its presentation could well have been in terms of 
the tragic. 
One case that has almost exclusively been covered in The Times is the `Backdoor 
Euthanasia' case [2]. This case is slightly different from the others covered so far. The Dr 
Moor, the husband/wife and the Dr Shipman case all involve identifiable individuals, 
both victims and perpetrators. The Backdoor Euthanasia case reports a series of 
investigations into several hospitals in which it is alleged that practices have occurred 
that have led to the untimely death of a whole series of patients. The Times appears to 
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have adopted this case in the manner of a cause. As in the Shipman case, it is asserted 
that `bereaved relatives maintain that the patients were not terminally ill' (The Times, 28 
January 1999) - not that they didn't have a wish to die. 
Whereas the case is not presented as tragic, neither is it presented as, strictly speaking, 
criminal - maybe it would be more adequate to say the tone of the article is centred 
around the notion of the condemnation of negligence. There seems to be a reluctance to 
call doctors murderers; first of all it appears to be appropriate to view their actions in 
terms of normal professional practice or professional negligence, and only secondly, once 
this is ruled out in terms of, maybe, euthanasia. 
There appears to be a lot of scope given by journalists to doctors to explain themselves 
and their actions. This leaves room for the possibility that outsiders (non-doctors) might 
not understand appropriately what is going on, which incidently gives a lot of power over 
to doctors to define and evaluate the situation4. The reluctance to talk about murder leads 
to the newspaper discussing situations that could be seen as euthanasia, involving 
terminal illness, even though the relevance to this case, where people are seen as not 
terminally ill, is not clear. It can only be assumed that the readiness to give doctors the 
benefit of the doubt extends so far as to wait for their own statements of whether they 
understood the patients as terminally ill, regardless of the patients' choice in the matter. 
This of course only makes sense if euthanasia in situations of terminal illness is seen 
as more excusable than in situations were patients were not terminally ill. The following 
quote shows that actions that can be linked to the untimely death of terminally ill people 
can be conceived of as positive in terms of the `terminal illness discourse', but negative 
in terms of the `voluntary euthanasia discourse': 
In general, the practice of denying food and fluids to patients believed to be entering 
the final phase of a terminal illness is defended as `helping nature to take its course'. 
But some doctors condemn it as involuntary euthanasia (The Times, 6 January 
1999). 
4 It is argued that this is going on as well up to the levels of the High Courts - Tassano (1995) concludes 
that in many court cases that involve doctors, as witnesses and as accused, judges are reluctant to make a 
ruling and effectively follow the advice given by doctors. 
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This quote is unusual in respect to newspaper coverage on euthanasia in several ways. 
Firstly, newspapers generally talk about `terminal illness' in a very loose way, not 
making the above distinction between terminal illness as such and the final phase of a 
terminal illness, that is: having entered the process of dying. `Terminal illness' in 
newspaper reports can be understood either in the sense of `a terminal patient, with 
weeks, months or years to live' (The Times, 24 June 1999), thus blurring the boundary 
with `incurable illness', `degenerative illness' or even `chronic condition', or in the sense 
of the terminal/dying phase of illness. 
Secondly, the use of the word `euthanasia' qualified by the adjective `involuntary' is 
very unusual, as we have seen, and is directly reminiscent of the precision of expert 
discourse. Otherwise, the statement is set up in a way typical of newspaper articles, 
setting up an issue in terms of a contrast (see `mercy or murder? '). Although in the light 
of the rest of the article, the contrast has to be seen as a rhetorical device, for the tone is 
wholly one of condemnation of the kind of actions referred to, the nature of it holds some 
clues to the more general issue of discussion in this chapter: the presence of `voluntary 
euthanasia discourse' and of `terminal illness discourse' in the press. This quote seems to 
give air to both. 
`Involuntary euthanasia' refers to the flipside of voluntary euthanasia and choice: that 
of coercion. Euthanasia can only be perceived as right when the person wishes it. 
`Helping nature to take its course' seems, on the face of it, to be linked to the `terminal 
illness discourse', for both nature and terminal illness are conceived of a forces sharing in 
human agency. 
Terminal illness can be seen as a subcategory of the more general concept of nature. 
Making reference to nature is to deflect away from the action of people, perceiving of 
their agency as shared with outside causes: the illness. Even though the presentation of 
the case by The Times is firmly set in the `voluntary euthanasia discourse', by setting up 
this rhetorical and even polemical contrast it nevertheless gives space to that other 
discourse, subordinated in expert discourse but primary in newspaper discourse as a 
whole, which is the `terminal illness discourse' of agency shared with other causes, of 
responsibility for actions deflected away from people. 
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`Nature' and `terminal illness discourse' 
Reference to `nature' is made in a number of other articles about different situations. The 
following extract comes from the Dr Tylor case (Death of a woman with a leg ulcer [12]). 
Here, a doctor was accused by a nurse to have ordered her to stop the tube-feeding of an 
elderly, ill woman -a decision he is said to have taken in agreement with the woman's 
two daughters, about one of whom it is said: 
The youngest daughter described how she had welcomed the decision to stop feeding 
her mother. `I felt a sense of relief at the news that nature could at last take its course 
and she could die peacefully', she told the inquiry (Daily Mail, 27 March 1999). 
As in the `Backdoor Euthanasia' case above, the idea of nature is used to deflect agency 
away from the actor, leaving him to be seen to be less responsible for the action he is 
taking - an action that in other situations he might be held responsible for. The action is 
conceived of as reactive rather than proactive. Nature is conceived of as a set of rules that 
structure what kind of actions are possible, as well as a bedrock of facts that actions come 
up against. The invocation of the idea of nature asserts that nature puts limits on human 
intervention, and/or that nature governs what particular kinds of intervention are sensible 
in particular situations. 
This idea of nature is socially constructed'. This means that whether we give a role to 
nature in our understandings of agency, and what role that is precisely, has differed 
throughout history and across cultures. Apart from the attribution of agency to humans 
and nature, there is also attribution of agency to spirits, gods or creators. 
An understanding of the role of nature in discourses of agency in the sense of a social 
construction can lead to the mistaken conclusion that reference to nature is necessarily 
calculative, a rhetorical device invoked in support of particular arguments. Far from that, 
however, conceiving of nature, or God, as sharing agency with human beings, can be a 
very strong belief. In fact, understanding agency solely in terms of human beings must be 
seen as just as strong and as particular a belief. The idea of nature sharing in agency, 
See Kate Soper's book 'On Nature' (1995) for a detailed discussion of this issue. 
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understood in terms of social construction, can function both as a rhetorical device and/or 
represent a strong belief. 
The reference to nature by the daughter in the newspaper article can be interpreted 
either as her genuine appreciation of the situation, or as a rhetorical device used by her to 
support a particular argument (the daughter might have other reasons to want her mother 
dead). The important thing is to understand that her reasoning for invoking the idea of 
nature does not matter. Different readers might read this differently, depending on where 
they are coming from. The important thing is that reference to nature as sharing in agency 
is a discourse that carries great legitimacy, and that is why it is invoked, whether self- 
consciously or not self-consciously; and that is why the journalist has included this 
particular quote in his article. 
The idea of nature also appears in an article about the grandson (case [11]) who 
switched off his grandmother's life support machines. He is quoted invoking nature in 
accounting for what he did and why: 
He said: `I felt everyone was torturing my gran for their own selfish reasons. She 
was being made to suffer by not being allowed a natural and peaceful death' 
(Evening Standard, 20 August 1999). 
In the idea of a `natural death', nature not simply is - and for that reason has to be taken 
account of - but in addition nature is evaluated as right and good. By implication, 
ignoring nature is wrong and bad. The `natural death' has become an ideal against which 
the reality of particular deaths are set and appreciated. 
The idea of a `natural death' is one that the hospice movement aspires to - not to 
prolong life and neither to hasten death. This idea/ideal of a `natural death' rules out 
euthanasia as not natural. There is no room for euthanasia in this conceptual framework. 
Thus euthanasia is being argued in terms of choice. The invocation of choice in the 
`voluntary euthanasia discourse' sets its own conceptual framework. The `natural death' 
and the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' thus can exist side-by-side, if uneasily. The 
`natural death' discourse positions the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' of euthanasia as 
not being natural, but that misses the point because it is not about nature; and vice versa 
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the accusation that the `natural death' discourse leaves no room for choice does do no 
harm to this discourse, because it is not about choice. 
It seems from the above discussion that the argument against euthanasia rests on 
deflecting agency away from human beings, whereas the argument in favour of 
euthanasia lies agency firmly at the door of human beings. Yet, as we have seen, the 
`terminal illness discourse' that is present in newspaper articles represents a discourse 
that is, if not squarely in favour of euthanasia, so at least sympathetic to euthanasia. 
The central concept of this discourse is `terminal illness', a (natural) force confronting 
human agency, and conceived of as sharing agency with human beings in certain 
situations. While in hospice philosophy, terminal illness and nature are constructed as 
impelling people to refrain from actions (towards hastening death), terminal illness and 
nature in `terminal illness discourse' are seen as compelling people to take actions 
(toward hastening death). The switching off of life support can be seen as taking an 
action towards hastening death, or as refraining from action that interfere with natural 
death. Hospice usually takes the latter view, allowing some kinds of withdrawal of life 
support but not allowing injections of poison (or an overdose of pain-controlling drugs 
given with the intention of killing). But the switching off of life support and the injection 
of poison can also both be seen in the same terms: of helping nature to take its course - 
sharing agency with nature instead of giving over completely to nature. `Helping nature 
to take its course' thus can mean any number of things: to refrain from actions or to take 
action. 
`To allow to die' 
In press discourse on euthanasia, we find a tremendous number of words and phrases 
referring to actions conceived around the poles of `killing' (making reference to actions 
causing death, seen as negative) and `letting die' (referring to causes other than actions 
that lead to death, understood in a more positive way). The following terms and figures of 
speech are derived from the newspaper data: 
" to kill someone 
" to murder someone 
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" to finish someone off 
" to terminate someone's life (at her request) 
" to end someone's life 
" to end someone's suffering 
" to hasten someone's death 
" to hasten someone's demise 
" to speed someone's demise 
" to ease someone's passage 
" to allow someone to die 
" to let someone die 
" to let someone die with peace and dignity 
" to let someone slip away 
" to help someone to die 
" to help someone to die a painless death 
" to help someone to terminate her life 
" to help someone on her way 
" to help to free someone from a life of agony and pain 
" to help someone on their way to a pain-free release from their painful agony and 
suffering 
" to help someone to find peace through death 
" to assist someone to kill herself 
" to assist someone to go to a relaxed end 
" to preside over someone's suicide 
" to give nature a helping hand 
" to help nature take its course 
" to put someone out of their misery 
`To kill' and `to murder' puts agency squarely onto people - one responsible agent, or 
several people sharing agency. The majority of euphemisms, however, hint at a more 
shared conception of agency, deflecting responsibility away from people. `To hasten 
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death' implies that death would have come anyway, no matter what the action of people - 
illness/nature/death is responsible at least partly. `To let die' implies that 
illness/nature/death are the real agents, whereas people are only obstructions on the path 
of the inevitable. 
`To allow to die' similarly hints at a shared agency. It can be understood in two 
different ways: one, not to keep somebody from dying (that is, to refrain from futile and 
burdensome treatment), or two, to help somebody to die (that is, to actively intervene in 
the dying process, to speed it up or to cause it). Hospice would use it in terms of the first 
meaning only, whereas it can be understood just as well in terms of the second meaning, 
as a euphemism for killing. While hospice sees a crucial distinction between the two 
meanings, it is just as possible not to see a distinction between the two at all. 
There is an ambiguity in terms of its meaning inherent in the term `to allow to die'. I 
will further discuss this with regard to an extract from a newspaper article on the 
mother/son case: 
When her 12-year-old son David's condition deteriorated, hospital doctors decided it 
was in his best interests not to give him treatment to prolong his life. They 
administered the strong painkiller diamorphine to ease his suffering and allow him to 
die a peaceful and dignified death. But Mrs. Glass, 38, believed her son's life was 
worth saving and with other relatives kept him alive by refusing to let him slip into 
unconsciousness. Six months later, David is still alive. 
While doctors agree their actions saved David they maintain it was `an extremely 
cruel' thing to do and only prolonged his agony (Daily Mail, 23 April 1999). 
`To allow people to die a peaceful and dignified death' with the help of painkilling drugs 
is something that `hospice' (as the idea that hospices are based upon) is aiming to do. The 
painkilling drugs are conceived as having the potential of hastening death slightly as a 
side-effect to pain relief, but that the importance of pain relief justifies that small risk (see 
the `double effect' in Chapter (6)). This understanding of `allowing to die' is what 
doctors draw upon in their justification for their actions. Anything else would be illegal, 
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as the law, just like hospice, also sees a big difference between `not keeping someone 
from dying' and `helping somebody to die'. 
In conceiving of their actions as `not prolonging his life', the doctors in effect hand 
responsibility for David's death over to illness/nature/death itself, deflecting agency away 
from themselves and their actions. However, the mother and other relatives see things 
very differently - they regard the action of the doctors, the giving of diamorphine, as the 
cause of death if it would result. The fact that `six months later, David is still alive' gives 
a very strong indication that the relatives were correct in their appreciation of the 
situation and the doctors were not. If David had died, he would have died as a result of 
the diamorphine. 
However, the doctors are not said to agree but stick to their version of what they did. 
By characterising the actions of the relatives in the following terms: `it was an extremely 
cruel thing to do and only prolonged his agony', they by implication characterise their 
own actions as compassionate. 
The hospice movement has had tremendous influence over the last years in shaping 
medical practice in relation to people who are dying. The success of medical technology 
in keeping people alive for longer has come at the cost of a situation where at the end of 
their life, some people can be kept alive with an extremely reduced quality of life. This 
has over time led to a change in medical practice at the end of life. Whereas for a long 
time, doctors were automatically doing (and expected to do) everything to prolong life at 
all costs up until the very end of life, over the course of the 20th century this changed: at 
first public opinion and now slowly medical opinion is accepting that there are situations 
in which treatment can become both futile and burdensome, and it can be reasonable to 
withdraw that kind of treatment. 
The hospice movement has been advocating and researching techniques of palliative 
care - moving away from considerations of cure to ones of care. The doctors' rhetoric in 
the above article is testimony to the success of these ideas. However, with the shift away 
from death as the enemy that has to be kept at bay at all costs, there has come a new 
confusion. If death is not the enemy, then what has taken its place? What guides doctors' 
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decision-making at the end of life? `Hospice' argues that futile and burdensome treatment 
is the problem, it should be withdrawn and the patient made comfortable6. 
However, there is another argument that runs as an undercurrent through this debate: 
while death is not the enemy anymore, life itself in particular situations becomes 
conceptualised as the enemy. Life becomes the problem. Instead of treatment being seen 
as futile and burdensome, some kinds of life (life with pain and/or suffering - whether 
physical, psychosocial or existential, disabled life? ) come to be seen as burdensome 
and/or futile. 
The newspaper article above tells us that David was `profoundly disabled [... ] 
throughout his life he has suffered blindness, spastic quadriplegia, cerebral palsy, 
epilepsy and severe learning difficulties'. Considering that David is still alive after six 
months, he cannot have been dying. Even though the doctors must appreciate that, they 
maintain that keeping him alive `only prolonged his agony'. This raises the question what 
kind of agony is being prolonged: if it is not the agony of dying, it must be the agony of 
living - of living a disabled life? If life is the problem, then `to allow to die' appears to 
acquire the meaning of a euphemism for killing. 
The newspaper explains the actions of the relatives in trying to keep him alive in terms 
of them seeing David's life as being `worth saving' (see extract above). Talking about 
human life in terms of its worth, especially in regard to life and death situations, is deeply 
worrying in its implications, but very normal in everyday discourse. Its normality is plain 
in the unselfconscious use of it in the context of this article. Appreciation of the relative 
worth of human beings is exercised constantly in newspapers, through the making of 
judgements of social value and letting those influence the evaluation of their view of 
particular situations. 
A big part of an article on the case of the grandson (case [11 ]) switching off the life 
support of his grandmother is devoted to determining his social status, which accordingly 
must be seen as having a bearing on the evaluation of his case: 
6 See for example Saunders (1979) 
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Shara Karapetian, a `brilliant' 23-year-old university graduate 
He [the judge] described Karapetian as an outstanding young man. He had already 
obtained a masters degree in engineering from Imperial College London and he was 
now studying for a master of science degree which will lead to a doctorate (Evening 
Standard, 20 August 1999). 
Considering that the newspaper relates what the judge has said, it appears that 
newspapers shares their interest in the social status of the accused with judges and 
probably others. Neither the media nor the legal system are independent of considerations 
of social status. This has to be taken into account when looking at the context in which 
`killing' and `letting die' are being articulated. The presentation of the people involved in 
terms of their status is implicated in all portrayals of agency. Although this point is a 
minor one in relation to the argument presented in this chapter, it is one we always have 
to bear in mind. 
Discussion 
In this chapter I have explored press discourse on euthanasia, starting out with the finding 
that it is notably distinct from expert discourse, at the same time as incorporating some of 
its notions. I will now attempt a summary of my conclusions. 
Expert discourse on euthanasia is largely conducted around the organising principles 
of choice and coercion. This is what I have been referring to as the `voluntary euthanasia 
discourse' - talking about euthanasia in terms of it being voluntary or involuntary. This 
discourse rests on the stereotype of the independent individual that informs the basic 
prejudice that individually chosen actions are good (choice as absence is positive), and 
that social influence is bad (coercion by others as its negative opposite). 
Agency is conceived of as resting exclusively in human beings, as enshrined in the 
institution of responsible action, that aims to establish which person/persons to hold 
responsible for a particular outcome. This view of agency is shared by the law which 
holds that the human agent `responsible for something must be its cause and yet not be 
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acting as the effect of some further cause' (Barnes 2000, p. 9), the law is thus aiming to 
establish which human action has been the ultimate cause of a particular outcome, 
reducing complexity as far as possible. The argument in favour of euthanasia thus rests 
on the positive evaluation of choice residing in independent individuals, that can translate 
into an argument against euthanasia by pointing to the negative influence that others can 
have on the choice of the individual, including overriding it (coercion). While coercion 
can be seen by proponents of euthanasia as a problem that is manageable, opponents to 
euthanasia argue that it is not. 
There is another view of agency in another argument against euthanasia: one that 
places agency beyond human beings, that holds that in regard to death and dying, agency 
properly belongs not to human beings but to God or nature. It is a fundamentalist view 
that argues categorically against killing in every form and situation. While the `voluntary 
euthanasia discourse' to a certain extent gets endorsed in the press (it represents what I 
will call a minor discourse), the fundamentalist argument against euthanasia, sometimes 
mixed up with the question of coercion in the presentation of the argument against 
euthanasia, gets reported as the moral element in the euthanasia debate. As such, it is 
quite marginal to press discourse itself. 
That the press discourse has its own morality will become clear once we have looked 
at the structure of it. While the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' has a presence in 
newspaper coverage, when looking at case stories, I have identified the main organising 
contrast to be the one between `tragic' cases and `criminal' cases. This is what I have 
previously called the `terminal illness discourse', representing the major discourse in 
press reports on euthanasia cases. 
Whether a case is presented as tragic, in terms of mercy, or as criminal, in terms of 
evil, rests on the presence or absence of the central notion of terminal illness (the words 
choice/choose/chosen appear 36 times in 132 articles, the terms terminal 
illness/terminally ill appear 95 times, that is almost three times as often, which might give 
another indication of what newspapers concentrate upon). Criminal cases are presented 
much in the same terms as they would be understood by the law (through the institution 
of responsible action). 
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Tragic cases, however, that would mainly be understood by the law as criminal, too, 
are treated completely differently by the press. This difference can be understood in terms 
of a different view of agency. In effect, in those cases terminal illness is perceived as 
sharing in agency. The institution of responsible action gets complicated by adding the 
institution of causal connection. Terminal illness is seen, at least partly, as the cause of 
the death of an individual, deflecting responsibility away from whatever actions human 
beings have taken. 
Reference to illness, just like reference to nature, allows for a more complex appraisal 
of situations in which agency is perceived to lie not solely with human beings - any 
human beings, quite apart from the individual/others pattern of the choice/coercion 
contrast. In any case of euthanasia, the law would look for the one person responsible for 
final action that led to death'. Press discourse, which incidently claims that it represents 
common-sense, is putting forward a view of euthanasia cases where - as long as terminal 
illness is involved -a combination of causes will have led to a particular outcome. 
Press discourse, which presents euthanasia as a legal-moral problem, conceives of its 
own morality in terms of a representation of common sense, at the same time as it is 
mindful of the present legal situation and the principles of law. In cases where the two 
clash - that is in the cases seen by the press as tragic and by the law as criminal - it sees 
its role as questioning the sense of the law, which after all figures as a codification of 
everyday understandings (if more in image than in reality). 
The fact that the press to some extent endorses the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' 
but not the fundamentalist argument against euthanasia is strikingly obvious in the feature 
articles in reaction to the end of the Dr Moor trial (see Chapter (6)). Three articles argue 
for the legalisation of euthanasia. Four argue against it. Nine are discussing the merits of 
both sides. The three articles in favour of legalisation are written by journalists, arguing 
their case in terms of choice - the `voluntary euthanasia discourse', and common sense - 
their own discourse around terminal illness. Three out of the four articles against 
' In Spain, euthanasia is being intensely discussed in the wake of it legalisation in the Netherlands. 
Reference is made to the case of Ramon Sampedro, who had lived as a paraplegic for many years and 
finally decided he didn't want to live like that any more. He got a large number of friends to carry out one 
small action each that in the end led to his death. The Spanish courts, that were looking for the person who 
committed the crime, who performed the ultimate action that killed Sampano, could not prosecute because 
all the people came forward and said `it was me' (see Guerra 1999). 
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euthanasia are not written by journalists but by medical professionals, one by a nurse and 
two by hospice doctors. This deference to `experts' points to an acknowledgement that it 
must be they who know best - but it can also be read as evidence for the fact that their 
particular view (categorically against killing) is at odds with the general tenor of press 
discourse on euthanasia. If this is the case, it further strengthens the argument I have 
made in this chapter. 
Euthanasia at present is being discussed in many countries. Reports in British 
newspapers are not just about British but also about foreign cases. The case of the French 
nurse [8] killing terminally ill patients led a paper to write that `France is divided 
between strong Roman Catholic hostility to euthanasia and mounting liberal pressure in 
favour of decriminalisation' (The Times, 16 June 1999). The contrast here is set up 
between Catholicism and liberalism. It is when we look at what they stand for in terms of 
agency we can derive from this statement a more general argument, with applicability 
also to Britain. 
Catholicism places agency in the last instance beyond human beings - God is the 
ultimate agent. Liberalism imagines agency to reside in human beings, or more precisely, 
in individuals (we are talking caricatures, of course, as both theology and liberal theory 
have much more differentiated things to say on the matter). Liberalism and the stereotype 
of the independent individual are the central notions around which most Western 
societies are organised at present. The pressures to legalise euthanasia are coming out of 
those societies. The arguments in favour of euthanasia are sharing in the same discourses, 
as do to some extent the arguments against, as long as they are presented in terms of 
coercion. An argument that categorically stands against euthanasia on the basis of the 
belief that death and dying is and should always be beyond human agency is utterly alien 
in a system that conceives of agency as solely or necessarily, if only partly, human. That 
explains its marginality in press discourse which endorses the principles of liberalism. 
Still, we have seen that press discourse has a different view of agency in the case of 
euthanasia than the strictly liberal one. Press discourse allows for a conception of agency 
as shared with entities that are `not human' - meaning concepts that have become 
objectified into reified forces, for example God or nature, which implies that they are 
conceptualised (by humans) as having agency independent of human beings. Terminal 
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illness is such an agent, which in the view of the press has to be taken into account for a 
realistic appraisal of euthanasia cases. This is not to say that the press categorically 
argues in favour of euthanasia in each and every case of terminal illness. The partial 
appreciation of the minor discourse of `voluntary euthanasia' in the press points to the 
conclusion that human agency, understood in terms of choice and coercion, is by no 
means something the press is indifferent to. Human agency is fundamental for the press, 
in so far as it endorses liberal discourse. However, in the view of the press, human 
agency can be supplemented by an appreciation of non-human agents sharing in human 
agency. Human agency may the fundamental ingredient, but non-human agency is an 
additional one. This leaves room for discussions of illness, nature, maybe even God, as 
long as agency is not being attributed exclusively to any one of them. It is the 
exclusiveness of the attribution of agency to non-human agents (God or nature) that 
renders the fundamentalist argument against euthanasia, in each and every single case 
and without exception, alien and unacceptable to normal press discourse. 
Conclusion 
The press evaluates and presents euthanasia cases as `tragic' or `criminal'. It makes this 
distinction on the basis of the attribution of agency to different elements regarded as 
making up a particular situation. 
Where agency is attributed to humans only, 'killing'- humans causing death - is 
evaluated as evil, and the case as `criminal'. In cases where terminal illness is seen to 
share in the make-up of a situation, agency becomes diffused and responsibility for death 
somewhat diverged away from human beings - their actions come to be seen in terms of 
`letting die', and the case as `tragic'. 
Also, in a sense, agency is displaced away from human beings onto objectified forces 
(God, nature), that, conceptualised as independent of human beings, can force humans to 
act in a particular way. The precise nature of the actions carried out by humans, whether 
they cause death - `kill' - or whether they don't prevent death from happening, becomes 
irrelevant. 
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Terminal illness comes to be regarded as partly responsible for death, and can thus 
come to justify killing, whereby killing has lost some of the negative connotations it has 
in cases where humans are seen as completely responsible for death. In criminal cases, 
killing is bad, in tragic cases, less so. The presence of terminal illness leads the press 
away from a generalised taboo on killing, to a more differentiated evaluation of killing in 
context - first of all regardless of the preferences of the ill individuals involved. 
The discourse of `voluntary euthanasia' and its central principle of choice nevertheless 
has a presence in the presentation of euthanasia cases in the press, suggesting that 
euthanasia cases where both terminal illness and choice are present are regarded as the 
most legitimate ones. 
There is no room in press coverage of euthanasia for the discourse that denies that 
humans (should) have any agency at all with regard to death, whether in the form of 
actions leading to or causing death, and whether the situations involve terminal illness or 
not, this position being justified with a complete displacement of agency onto non-human 
entities like God or nature. 
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Postscript to Chapter (7) 
Reflections on a television programme: 
Mercy' - part of the BBC1 Series Murder in Mind (Sunday, 20 May 2001) 
I can now show how the categories exposed in Chapter (7) can be applied in the analysis 
of new material. The hour-long murder mystery `Mercy' (in the BBC1 series `Murder in 
Mind') constitutes a wonderful illustration of the distinction routinely made in the media 
between tragic and criminal cases. The Guardian TV guide advertises the program as 
follows: 
`A gentle country doctor reluctantly assists in the suicide of his terminally ill wife. 
To the police he is a criminal, to the local community a loving husband who allowed 
his partner a dignified death - fuelling a public debate on euthanasia. But is there 
more to the case than meets the eye? ' (The Guardian, 19. May 2001). 
The program starts with the scene where the wife takes an overdose of medication, with 
her husband looking on. There is a slightly sinister feel to the whole set-up. The next 
thing we see is that the dead woman is taken away in the ambulance, the doctor 
questioned about the incident by the police who suspect murder, especially as the doctor 
is the sole inheritor of his wife's considerable assets - house and money. 
After that, the doctor comes onto a television program, where in dialogue with a 
journalist in front of a live audience he recounts the whole story, which we see in 
flashbacks to the past - switching between studio (present) and realistic scenes (past). 
The more the doctor explains himself, the more we are taken in by his story. We see him 
as a caring doctor in a small community as well as a caring if not passionate husband to 
his wife. We see him declare: `I disapprove of euthanasia'. We see the woman 
developing headaches and dizzy spells, slowly becoming aware of her condition, 
confirmed by a specialist consultant -a rare brain-deteriorating disease that leads to a 
particularly horrifying death. We witness how she starts thinking about killing herself and 
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finally deciding to do it. We see how the doctor refuses to help her, but then reluctantly 
gives her a substantial amount of painkiller and answers her question when she asks: 
`How much do I take? '. Again, we see the scene from the very beginning, where she 
takes the overdose, filmed from a slightly different angle, hearing a couple of sentences 
spoken between them that we didn't see at the beginning. In the light of the doctor's 
story, the scene takes on a much less sinister feel than initially - at this point, the 
journalist mentions that the press has come down very heavily on the side of the doctor, 
generally expressing support for him - reading out a couple of headlines from newspaper 
articles. The audience in the studio is asked whether they approve of the doctor's actions 
or not: a brief show of hands reveals roughly 80% to approve (the same number routinely 
mentioned in the press referring to approval of euthanasia in the population). The support 
of the doctor in his village is shown to be almost universal, a couple of people come up 
on a screen in the studio speaking their views. The nurse in the doctor's surgery says: 
`I'm not against euthanasia, I think people should have the choice'. The only person not 
universally in favour of what the doctor did is the local vicar, but even he concedes that 
he believes that the doctor believed he was doing the right thing at the time - at the same 
time as he stresses that he believes the doctor did wrong in assisting a suicide. At this 
point, the police enter the studio. They take the doctor away. At the police station, he is 
told that he is being arrested for murder. The policeman tells him of new evidence that 
shows that the doctor has been slowly poisoning his wife - explaining the headaches and 
dizzy spells. He wanted to get rid of her because he was in love with a neighbour, but 
couldn't just leave because everything belonged to his wife, he owned nothing. The 
neighbour played the role of the consultant neurologist telling the wife of her disease and 
the horrific consequences. The doctor planted the idea of suicide in her mind, at the same 
time as he seemed to discourage her from doing it. The doctor confesses to all the 
charges, reflecting how at the time he was thinking he was committing the perfect murder 
where the victim does it for you. In the last scene, we see the journalist alone in the 
studio, looking at a screen where the doctor is seen telling his lies: `If you love somebody 
so much... '. At this point, the journalist shakes his head, throws his jacket over his 
shoulder and heads for the door. The end. 
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This plot is very illuminating of current popular representations of euthanasia as 
exposed in Chapter (7) - indeed, the way it puts them to play is one of the reasons why it 
is so entertaining. The whole story rests on the opposition mercy/murder (tragic/criminal) 
as discussed in Chapter (7). In an exercise of intertextuality, this fictional program refers 
to representations of attitudes of the population as they are presented in real newspapers. 
It recreates the outcome of real surveys (80% in favour of euthanasia) in the show of 
hands of the fictional studio audience. It presents the press as having a positive and 
understanding attitude in their reporting of euthanasia cases, something that my analysis 
of real newspapers clearly shows. The realism of this fictional plot aims to take the 
viewer in, and if it is true that a large percentage of the population is indeed in favour of 
euthanasia, as the real surveys suggest, it is likely that the viewer finds the doctor's story 
more convincing than the murder suspicions of the police and the moral squeamishness 
of the vicar. In the press, the law is seen as not in keeping with the attitudes of the 
population, and there is pressure to change it. The church is seen as a moral guardian that 
is rooted in another time, not having caught up yet with life in a liberal state. The 
spotlight is on the tragedy of terminal illness, as well as the individual and his or her right 
to make their own choices. It is because tragic stories are given a lot of credibility in the 
real press, that it comes as a surprise that in this case the tragic story hides a criminal act - 
that `truth' is on the side of the law and the church, both of which are resurrected as being 
of some use after all. In a way, this program, which is part of the media, makes ironic use 
of the positive - and, in the light of this program, slightly naive - position taken in much 
of the media in general in relation to euthanasia. If there was a moral intended to this 
story, it might be that in their zeal to present the tragedy of euthanasia in terms of good 
people only wanting the best for each other, the media neglect the other possibility of 
people wanting to be rid of others, be rid of responsibility, to indulge greed or 
indifference - and how the readiness to believe the story of the good husband and the 
good doctor might make us blind to bad acts. 
Another striking feature of this story: the husband that is at the same time a doctor, or 
the doctor that is at the same time the husband. In many of the cases that get reported in 
newspapers - the ones that I have looked at - doctors and relatives play different roles. 
The doctor has power in virtue of his or her access to drugs that can kill, and is usually to 
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be found in a professional, detached relationship with the patient. He or she can act at the 
service of the patient, patronising the patient, or even act by overriding the patient's 
wishes. The relatives either are deeply involved with the patient through bonds of love 
and only want the best for the patient, or else they are portrayed as greedy individuals out 
for their own satisfaction, aiming to either get rid of a burdensome dependent or to come 
into inheritance in the form of money or other assets. In this story, both figures merge: 
the doctor with access to deadly drugs is also the greedy relative. This is curious and 
deserves some elaboration. Why was it important in this story that the husband was also a 
doctor? Couldn't it have worked just as well if the husband had been a teacher? It seems 
that there is a basic assumption involved that also underlies the current debate on 
euthanasia: the portrayal of euthanasia as a medical issue. It seems to me that the fact that 
doctors are able to easily and legally get hold of deadly drugs translates into the 
assumption that drugs are the only acceptable means to kill oneself. Other means, that 
people other than doctors have access to, are ruled out completely. The instructions given 
in the book `Final Exit' by Humphry (1991) on how to use a plastic bag, for example, are 
seen as grisly, horrific and unacceptable, whereas drugs are seen as - what? Clean, 
efficient, not messy, success guaranteed (although this might not be what happens in 
reality) - in one word, acceptable. The weight of the decision: `I will kill myself, and I'm 
prepared to do anything it takes to achieve that aim' has become diluted to: `I don't want 
to kill myself, really, but this stupid illness that nobody seems to be able to do anything 
about forces me to take this step, if I don't want to end up as a dribbling idiot that is, 
which of course I don't, so can we at least do it as painlessly and dignified as possible, 
please'... The other thing is that those deadly drugs are used in palliative care, with the 
explicit aim of controlling pain. Death after an overdose can always be attributed to the 
patient having made a mistake in the dosage, whereas suffocation by plastic bag or pillow 
can never be accidental and always involves somebody else. In addition to the efficiency, 
it is the ambivalence of the drugs that doctors have access to that make them so important 
in discussions of euthanasia. Whereas there are doctors that kill just because they can (for 
example, Dr. Shipman), this is a relatively rare scenario. It is generally close, personal 
relationships that engender passions like love and hate that lead a person to kill. The 
husband in this murder mystery combines the role of the doctor with the easy access to 
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drugs which seems almost essential to modern euthanasia cases, and the passionate hatred 
of a close personal, if unwanted relationship - that can always disguise itself as love. 
To sum up: the program `Mercy' reaffirms my finding that the media represent 
euthanasia in terms of the opposition mercy/murder, or tragic/criminal. In an exercise of 
intertextuality, the program makes reference to features of euthanasia coverage in the 
news media, like the fact that newspaper coverage of particular cases is usually 
sympathetic, and that generally a large proportion of the population is portrayed as being 
in favour of euthanasia. The program thus makes ironic use of the categories that 
characterise the contemporary debate on euthanasia, in the media and beyond. 
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Chapter (8) - British newspapers and other countries 
Introduction 
So far, I have looked at euthanasia as the topic of a nationally undefined `expert 
discourse' and of a media discourse of British newspapers. This chapter will address a 
dimension of the debate - of both its content and context - that has until now 
been left 
unexplored: the construction and the `reality' of the euthanasia debate as not just a 
British phenomenon. My main set of data will be the same one as in the last chapters, 
which means I will mainly look at the construction of the international dimension in 
British newspaper articles on euthanasia, but in addition I think it to be important to 
point to what I call above the `reality' of the euthanasia debate as international: the 
fact that it is being discussed in other countries, too. I will make some references to 
German newspaper articles on euthanasia, not claiming to make a proper comparison 
with the British coverage but mainly to point to some similarities and differences in 
the approaches to covering the subject (which could properly be explored in some 
further research project). 
The theoretical framework with which I will think through those issues is the 
globalisation debate in sociology. Discussion of globalisation has proliferated in the 
social sciences for the last decade; some call it an industry or even a `paradigm' (Urry 
2001). I won't go into the contested issues around it in any detail, I will merely use 
the basic assumption that in the world today, the `global' - eclipsing the nation - has 
become the main reference point not just in economic life, but also in the cultural and 
perceptual life of individual people, having direct repercussions for the local. The 
mass media is seen as an important source promoting global consciousness in people 
(Urry, see below). While I do not want to contradict these findings, I will point out 
that the British newspapers coverage of euthanasia, while making reference to other 
counties, is not in any way concerned with presenting the issue as a global 
phenomenon. 
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Media discourse on euthanasia - beyond the national, towards the global? 
My analysis of the international/transnational/global dimension of media discourse on 
euthanasia consists of three parts: first, a discussion of the different cases (British and 
foreign) that have made it into the press; second, a discussion of reference to foreign 
situations as a rhetorical feature of the British discussion on euthanasia in the press; 
and thirdly, a brief aside on the similarities and differences between British 
newspaper coverage of euthanasia and that in other countries, using the example of 
Germany. 
1. British and foreign cases 
Out of my data set of 13 cases of euthanasia reported in British newspapers during 
one year in 1998/99,10 are British and 3 are foreign: there is one American, one 
Austrian and one French case. The British cases that have given rise to many articles 
appear both in the national newspapers (The Times, The Independent, The Guardian) 
as well as in the local papers (for example, the case of the wife trying to kill her 
husband took place in Devon, and is covered extensively by the Herald Express from 
Torquay; Dr. Moor came from Northumberland and was tried by Newcastle Crown 
Court, and his case is covered in greater detail by the Evening Chronicle from 
Newcastle). Some of the smaller cases may only appear in local papers, like the case 
of the grandson which took place in London and was only reported in the Evening 
Standard from London. There clearly is a difference between local interest and 
national interest. This national interest is constructed by the appearance of a case in a 
national newspaper. The existence of a national interest is thus contingent on the 
structure of the newspaper market, divided into local and national. This might be an 
obvious point but an important one for the discussion of the global. As long as 
national newspapers generate national interest, the conceptual category of the national 
will not disappear'. Ulrich Beck says, `there is, for example, no real European 
newspaper. Nor is there a European television programme worthy of the name (that is, 
' See Anderson (1983) on the role that print-capitalism played in the historical constitution of nations 
as imagined communities. The analysis presented here suggests that newspapers continue to play that 
role in an ongoing process. See also Brookes (1999) who in an article on the BSE crisis, newspapers 
and national identity makes that same point that national identities are not just imagined once, but are 
continually being reinvented. 
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which grips its European audience to such an extent that national programmes slip 
down the table of viewing figures)' (Beck 2000. P. 157)2. Neither are there any real 
worldwide newspapers. The largest category on the newspaper market is the national. 
The category of the national gets promoted further in the way foreign cases are 
reported. In the cases of the American Dr. Kevorkian and the French nurse, both are 
treated like symbols that crystallise not just the whole euthanasia debate in their 
respective countries, but much more than that they both stand for the societies they 
come from; they are understood in terms of what is assumed to be known about those 
societies and, being constructed as such, they in turn reconfirm our knowledge about 
those countries. I will give some examples from the Kevorkian case. 
First of all, these quotes connect the man and the country: 
`America's "Dr Death"' (Independent, 26 March 1999), 
`Dr. Jack Kevorkian, America's self-appointed angel of death' (Sunday 
Telegraph, 21 March 1999). 
Whereas these phrases could be seen as simply placing the man on the map, the 
following ones explicitly built on assumed common knowledge between newspaper 
writer and readers about American society: 
`THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH' (headline, Independent, 16 March 1999), 
`Kevorkian's story could only happen in America' (Bath Chronicle, 14 June 
1999), 
2 On the 12'' July 2001, the German weekly paper `Die Zeit' ran an article on the `Financial Times 
Europe', characterising that newspaper, in the subheading of the article, as being the only daily 
newspaper to create a European public ('die einzige Tageszeitung, die eine europaeische 
Oeffentlichkeit herstellt'). In the body of the text, however, this evaluation is being relativised, noting 
that the `FT Europe' is directed at and recognised only by a particular group of people (`eine [... ] 
europaeisch, ja global denkende Klasse habe sich laengst gebildet, `Leute mit Geld, die es nicht 
verlieren wollen oder noch mehr davon haben wollen' - in english, a group of people whose thinking is 
european and global, people with money which they don't want to loose or wanting more of it). It is 
also added that maybe, what the `FT Europe' needs is a pan-european daily newspaper as competition 
(`eine paneuropaeische Tageszeitung'), an as yet non-existent entity. 
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`A lot of people he "helped" were nowhere near the end of their lives, and it may 
say more about American society that they consider themselves better off dead' 
(Western Morning News, 15 June 1999). 
All of those quotes make reference to the particularity of American society, they take 
for granted cultural knowledge about the `American way of life' and more generally 
the social conditions prevailing in that country. `It could only happen there' reaffirms 
what we already know about this society. On a very basic level it also reaffirms that 
there is a category of America, that it makes sense to talk about nations and societies 
- and that as conceptual categories they are still very strong in the media and are 
scarcely in the process of being replaced by a category of the global. 
Another interesting point is that both the case of the French nurse and the 
Kervorkian case are presented in terms of the relevance for the particular country they 
take place in, there is no suggestion that those cases could have some relevance for 
Britain: 
`A French nurse who has admitted to killing terminally ill patients will today be 
charged with murder in a case that has sparked fierce nationwide debate over 
euthanasia. [... ] France is divided between strong Roman Catholic hostility to 
euthanasia and mounting liberal pressure in favour of decriminalisation' (The 
Times, 16 June 1999). 
The Kevorkian case (which has attracted a lot more coverage than the French nurse 
case, for reasons I will not go into here) is treated in a descriptive way, describing 
what has been said in court, what is the background of the case. The articles describe 
and to a certain extent explain the case in terms of American society and in terms of 
the individual's biography. At no point do they suggest that euthanasia is a problem 
for Britain or other countries, too, or that because of that the cases might have some 
relevance beyond the particular country in which it took place. Euthanasia here is 
presented as a particular problem for a particular society. 
The third foreign case, the case of an Austrian doctor involved in euthanasia 
killings during the Nazi regime, is presented as particular in an even more obvious 
way. One could conjecture that the imagined nations of America and France are quite 
close to the British newspaper writer and reader, and the shared images of what they 
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are like are quite detailed, which means that knowledge of those images can be 
presupposed and made reference to in communication, without necessarily spelling 
them out - which can be seen above in the examples from the Kevorkian case. 
The 
concept of Austria on the other hand is largely a blank space devoid of images that 
have to be filled, or a space of confused and inaccurate assumptions. One newspaper 
article on the Austrian case starts as follows: 
`Austria is not a backward country. Opera is subsidised by the state and the 
streets are safe to walk at night. Parks are well maintained and public transport is 
cheap and efficient' (Independent, 30 April 1999). 
It seems as if in the case of America and France, a shared image of the countries is 
presupposed, while in the case of Austria, a common image has to first of all be 
constructed in the text. In addition, the American and the French case refer to 
euthanasia in the present, the Austrian case refers to euthanasia in the past, 
specifically the Nazi pasta, which increases its imagined particularity even further. 
It could be argued that the foreign euthanasia cases are being reported in the 
British newspapers in the first place because some kind of relevance to the British 
readership is being perceived, however the fact is that in the way they are reported, 
there is no suggestion that those cases have any relevance for Britain at all - they are 
firmly linked with the countries in which the events took place. In the British cases, 
we have seen that some are only being reported at the local level, other local cases 
make it into the national news. The Dr. Moor case in particular is constructed as 
having relevance at the national level - it has sparked a large number of articles 
discussing the implications of the case for British society, the meaning of it for British 
society, the particularly British social conditions in which that case occurred in the 
first place. On the one hand, it is not surprising that the discussion of euthanasia 
should be presented as particular to a certain country, as presently the main point of 
discussion centres around the legalisation or legal regulation of the practice, and the 
3 At this point, a reference to what can be called the `Nazi argument' in the euthanasia debate suggests 
itself. The `Nazi argument' is the argument against euthanasia in the present which is based on our 
knowledge of how it was practiced under the Nazi regime. It argues that the legalisation of euthanasia 
would inevitably lead to a society with Nazi traits: brutal, based on fear and suspicion. This argument is 
virtually absent in British newspaper discourse on euthanasia, suggesting that in Britain, the Nazi past 
is not seen as a common heritage of humankind (imagining the global... ) with lessons for British 
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system of law is still to a large extent set within the framework of individual nations. 
On the other hand, however, it is interesting to point out how taken for granted the 
concept of the nation is still today in the era of globalisation, a fact that may be 
overlooked by theorists of the global. 
2. Reference to foreign situations as a rhetorical feature of the British discussion on 
euthanasia in the press 
I will now move on to look in some more detail at the 10 British cases reported in the 
papers. Whereas there is no reference being made to Britain in the articles on the 
foreign cases, the newspaper texts on the British cases do make reference to other 
countries. The country that is evoked mostly is the Netherlands, for the obvious 
reason that for over 25 years it had been moving steadily towards the legalisation of 
euthanasia. At the time of the articles in my sample (1998/99), euthanasia had not yet 
been legalised in the Netherlands but had been decriminalised for some time - 
meaning that doctors could practice euthanasia without being prosecuted provided 
that they followed a certain set of rules of due care, including notification to the 
coroner. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Dutch government set up a commission 
which carried out a national survey (called the Remmelink survey) on the nature and 
incidence of euthanasia in the Netherlands, published in 1991, followed by a second 
study in 1995 (Maas et al, 1991 and 1996). No other country has a similar history of 
engagement with the subject or such an extensive knowledge of actual practice as has 
the Netherlands. Consequently, the Netherlands is an obvious place of reference for 
anybody who wants to make claims about euthanasia. 
Let us look at how the British newspapers treat the Dutch situation. The following 
quotes all come from articles on the Moor case, as that was the case that gave rise to 
discussion and comment, in addition to the simple reporting in most of the other 
cases. 
Nine articles mention `Holland' or `Dutch' or `Netherlands' 21 times altogether. 4 
articles mentioned either of those terms only once, 1 mentions it twice, 1 three times, 
and 2 six times. Analysing the quotes, one notes a curious mixture of the informative 
and the polemical. The recurring story is that euthanasia has been decriminalised in 
society today. Rather, from the point of view of Britain the Nazi past is the past of particular countries: 
Germany, Austria - and only relevant to them. 
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Holland, that the Dutch government is currently considering legalisation of the 
practice which would make it the only country in the world to do so, that the practice 
is governed by strict rules, but that a survey (referring to the Remmelink report, 
without naming it) has shown that the rules were breached and safeguards were 
inadequate. All the articles tell either this whole story or a part of it. This extract from 
the Birmingham Post is typical: 
`In Holland, voluntary euthanasia has been decriminalised since 1984 - but there 
are strict rules and mercy killings can only be carried out at the patient's "explicit 
request" and when there is "intolerable suffering without prospect of 
improvement". 
However, a study published earlier this year showed that the doctors in Holland 
were repeatedly breaching rules and that the safeguards in place were not 
adequate. 
Campaigners against euthanasia claimed the study showed that euthanasia could 
never safely be regulated. 
The Dutch parliament is currently considering legislation to legalise euthanasia - 
which would make it the only country in the world to allow the practice. 
Around 3,000 people a year in Holland die as a result of voluntary euthanasia, 
according to latest figures' (Birmingham Post, 12 May 1999). 
The Remmelink survey referred to implicitly in the newspapers has given rise to 
several interpretations in expert discussions (see Chapter (4)). It is thus interesting to 
see that all the newspapers use it as a marker that shows how bad the situation is in 
the Netherlands. Looking carefully at the quote above, we can see what has happened 
to that particular interpretation of the report - it has become an argument on the side 
of campaigners against the legalisation of euthanasia: 
`Campaigners against euthanasia claimed the study showed that euthanasia could 
never safely be regulated' (see above). 
Are we talking about Dutch or British campaigners? Is it meant that euthanasia could 
never be safely regulated in the Netherlands or in Britain? It can be assumed that 
campaigners against euthanasia are against euthanasia regardless of the country in 
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which it takes place, and that `never' means `never anywhere'. However, to make 
such a universal claim in a British newspaper ultimately means making a claim for 
Britain. 
This leads me to the rhetorical function of making reference to the Dutch situation 
in the discussion of British euthanasia cases, whereas we have seen that in the 
reporting of foreign cases in British newspapers, no link is made between `them' and 
`us'. The American, the French and the Austrian cases are particularised and thus 
distanced, by reference to the particularity of the social context and the national laws. 
The invocation of the Dutch situation, however, is very different. On the one hand, the 
Netherlands have to be particularised - after all, it has its own social and legal context 
as a nation, too - but only to ignore this particularity and stress the similarity or even 
equality between their situation and ours. In the event, the whole complexity and 
particularity of the Dutch situation has been monopolised by an anti-euthanasia 
rhetoric that holds that we know what happens in Holland, and that this tells us 
immediately what would happen here or anywhere. Particularity has become 
universalised. America and France have nothing to do with us, but Holland has 
everything to do with us. Holland has become the negative image of what Britain 
would become if euthanasia would be legalised in this country. The grisly picture is 
fleshed out by gory details and polemics: 
`In Holland, voluntary euthanasia has careered out of control so badly that the 
Dutch now carry cards refusing euthanasia because they are frightened doctors 
will kill them prematurely if they fall ill' (Sunday Times, 16 May 1999). 
`In Holland, more than 10,000 people have started carrying anti-euthanasia 
"passports" because they are frightened of being killed by over-enthusiastic 
doctors' (Northern Echo, 12 May 1999). 
`Nurses in the Netherlands who take part in a mercy killing are allowed to take 
the rest of the day off. Perhaps taking in a movie or a quick trip to the shops is 
enough to get over what you have done' (Sunday Herald, 16 May 1999). 
In effect we can say that the particularity and complexity the Dutch situation has been 
reduced to one anti-euthanasia argument for the British debate. 
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The Netherlands is not the only country invoked in the articles. At the time 
(1998/99), the USA, particularly Oregon, as well as Australia, particularly the 
Northern Territory, were referred to, as in both there had been attempts and partial 
successes in introducing legalisation of assisted suicide and euthanasia respectively, 
as well as Switzerland, where assisted suicide is not illegal. However, in comparison 
to reference to the Dutch situation, reference to the other countries was usually in one 
sentence, sticking to the informative: 
`United States: Dr Jack Kevorkian, known as 'Dr Death', who filmed himself 
giving a lethal injection to a dying man, was recently convicted of second degree 
murder. Doctor-assisted suicide has also been legal in one US state, Oregon, 
since 1997. Legislation is in the pipeline in California. In all other states it is 
illegal. [... ] 
Australia: Euthanasia was legalised in the Northern Territory in 1995, but the law 
was overturned by the supreme court in 1997. Attempts to reinstate it have been 
unsuccessful. In all other states it is illegal. 
Switzerland: Doctor-assisted suicide has been legal since the late 1970s' 
(Guardian, 12 May 1999). 
The mere listing of other countries suggests that euthanasia is not just a British 
problem. Again, although particular countries are mentioned, their particularities are 
erased. It is suggested that something is happening in them that can be categorised 
under the heading of `euthanasia' or `assisted suicide'. The problem of euthanasia 
thus gets some sort of international dimension, although I would hesitate to call it 
global. 
As noted above, the quotes so far come from articles on the Moor case. The Moor 
case was presented as a euthanasia case by the press. The category of euthanasia was 
invoked to encompass that particular case (which was by no means universally seen 
as a case of euthanasia), and once the category and not the particularity of the Moor 
case became the issue, the category was discussed: euthanasia, including euthanasia in 
other countries. One can see a contrast with the `Backdoor euthanasia' case, which 
concerned the alleged illegitimate withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. 
Unlike the Moor case, the `Backdoor euthanasia' case does not centre around one 
particular person or incident, but several. Several hospitals `around Britain' 
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(Birmingham Post, 6 January 1999) are said to be involved. Even though the 
newspaper articles categorise these occurrences under the heading of euthanasia, there 
is no discussion of other countries in any of the articles. The contrast to other articles 
on euthanasia is striking: in the Moor case, understood as a euthanasia case, there is 
reference to an international dimension of the general problem of euthanasia. In this 
case, also presented as euthanasia, there is no reference at all to other countries, 
suggesting that this type of euthanasia is a particularly British phenomenon. The press 
thus seems to recognise different types of euthanasia - one that is a general problem, 
also affecting other countries, and one that is a particular problem, unique to the 
British case. It is not the case that the latter does not happen in other countries - 
indeed Luest 2001 (as yet unpublished) shows that similar things (careless and/or 
deliberate starvation or dehydration of elderly people who are dying as a result - 
albeit this report is about nursing homes rather than hospitals) are happening in 
Germany; the fact is that the British press constructs one type of euthanasia as unique 
to Britain and another as general and international. 
We have seen that, while articles about euthanasia in other countries in the British 
press do not make an explicit link between those foreign and the British case, the 
articles about euthanasia in Britain look towards other countries and their practices 
with respect to euthanasia. Reference to other countries is made in those articles to 
support a particular argument - and given this strategy appears to be a routine 
strategy, it can be assumed that it also tells us something when this (the reference to 
other countries) is absent. 
3. Similarities and differences between British newspaper coverage on euthanasia and 
those in other counties, in the example of Germany. 
In this section, a less formally drawn sample of German newspaper articles (involving 
cuttings from DIE ZEIT, Frankfurter Rundschau, Wendlinger Zeitung -a weekly 
national, a daily national and a daily local paper - from the time just after the 
legalisation of euthanasia in the Netherlands in April 2001) will be compared to the 
British coverage analysed so far. 
In one respect, newspaper coverage of euthanasia seems to be very similar in both 
countries. The concern of newspapers to inform does lead to presentations of what 
constitutes euthanasia, what different groups think about it, and commentaries by 
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journalists weighing up the right and wrongs of euthanasia as well as the rights and 
wrongs and practicalities of the legalisation of euthanasia in the respective countries. 
Even the layout is similar - in response to the legalisation in the Netherlands in April 
2001 both the Guardian and the Wendlinger Zeitung in a box separate from the main 
articles listed a number of countries and their practices regarding euthanasia. In the 
case of the Guardian, the list of countries referred to had changed and diversified 
considerably since 1999 (see the 1999 article above: Britain, Netherlands, America, 
Australia, Switzerland). The 2001 list includes: Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, France, 
Britain, Germany, America, Australia, China (Guardian, 11 April 2001). The German 
paper in 2001 lists Denmark, Sweden, France, Britain, Belgium and Switzerland 
(Wendlinger Zeitung, 14 April 2001). The British comment about Germany reads: 
`Germany: Euthanasia is a highly sensitive issue. The administration of a deadly 
drug is regarded as murder' (Guardian, 11 April 2001). 
The German comment about Britain reads: 
`Grossbritannien: In Grossbritannien ist die Sterbehilfe gegen das Gesetz. 1993 
and 1994 ermaechtigte die Justiz jedoch Mediziner, das Leiden von Patienten zu 
beendigen, die kuenstlich am Leben gehalten werden. In Schottland erhielt eine 
Patientin im Juni 1996 zum ersten Mal die "Erlaubnis zum Sterben` [Great 
Britain: In Great Britain, euthanasia is against the law. In 1993 and 1994 
however, the courts authorised doctors to end the lives of patients who were 
artificially being kept alive. In Scotland in 1996, a woman was firstly "allowed to 
die"] (Wendlinger Zeitung, 14 April 2001). 
These short captions cannot do justice to the complexity of the issues as they appear 
in the respective countries. What they can do is to create the impression that 
euthanasia is an international, and not just a Western but - with the introduction of a 
reference to China in the Guardian -a world-wide issue (a global issue? ). 
That is as far as the similarities go. The differences have really to be seen in the 
detail of the discussion determined by the historical and social context of the different 
countries. In Germany, the history of Nazi euthanasia programmes during the Nazi 
dictatorship is a constant negative reference point in discussions of euthanasia. The 
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word `Euthanasie' derives its negative connotations from that time, and today the 
term `Sterbehilfe' ('help with dying') is preferred4. Maybe as a consequence, the 
situation in Holland is presented in a more differentiated way and not as negatively in 
the German as compared to the British press, where Holland represents the negative 
reference point, while reference to the history of Nazi Germany does not appear. This 
extract should give an example: 
`Sie nennen es Euthanasie, und uns ueberlaeuft es kalt. Wir denken an "unwertes 
Leben", die Nazis - und blocken ab. Dies aber ist ein deutsches Problem, 
ausschliesslich ein deutsches. Erstens sind die Niederlande keine Moerderbande. 
Zweitens bedeutet Euthanasie, griechisch flier guter oder auch schoener Tod, laut 
Lexikon schon die Erleichterung des Sterbens, besonders durch 
Schmerzlinderung mit Narkotika' [They {the Dutch} call it euthanasia, and we 
get the cold shivers. We think of "life unworthy of life", the Nazis - and block it 
out. This however is a German problem, and only a German one. Firstly, the 
Netherlands are no gang of murderers. Secondly, euthanasia, Greek for good or 
beautiful death, means according to the dictionary the easing of dying, especially 
through the reduction of pain with narcotics] (Frankfurter Rundschau, 12/13 
April 2001). 
Paradoxically, the awareness of the particularity of the German historical context 
seems to lead to an attention to the particularity of the other country, Holland - but by 
reference to the `real', original meaning of the word `euthanasia', ultimately with the 
aim of making a universal point that in turn has repercussions for the particular 
German context with regards to euthanasia. The same Greek definition is also used in 
British newspaper discourse to make a particular rhetorical point: both here and there, 
the particular definition of euthanasia already places the speaker/writer into a 
particular version of the discourse on euthanasia. It is clear that if a positive definition 
4 See Battin (1994) on euthanasia in Germany - as well as PAS: while the term `Euthanasie' has more 
negative connotations in German than its English equivalent, German has several categories for 
suicide one of which, the term `Freitod' (`free death' or `voluntary death') has positive connotations 
that are absent from the English term `suicide'. Battin argues that the German language thus opens up a 
conceptual space for an acceptable type of suicide (and by extension, and that is the core of her 
argument, physician-assisted suicide) that the English language is lacking, obstructing the way to a 
positive understanding of any type of suicide. 
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of euthanasia is chosen, a positive attitude to euthanasia is implied: calling euthanasia 
the `good death' is making a rhetorical point in support of euthanasia. 
In conclusion to this section it can be said that at least in the case of Britain and 
Germany, discussion of euthanasia in newspapers consists of largely a similar 
structure of argumentation, even though the discussion is geared to the particularity of 
the national social and political (and historical) context. Reference to other countries 
is made in both cases, where the objective and/or effect is not to deepen an 
understanding of what happens in other countries, but to support a rhetorical point. 
What is said to happen or not to happen there gets universalised, and the universal 
leads back to the particular and directs what will or should happen here. The quote 
above is an even more complex example of the same basic structure: what happens 
here is different to what happens there, but that is because we are different; but maybe 
we are particular whereas (and from here it is the same as above) what happens there 
is universal and thus is the standard for what will or should happen heres. 
In conclusion to this whole part it can be said that in newspapers, euthanasia is 
discussed within particular national contexts. Rhetorical arguments strategically make 
references to particular countries to make universal claims that translate into 
particular claims for one particular country. A major side-effect of this is that the 
concept of national societies is promoted and strengthened by this kind of discourse, 
and is by no means in the process of disappearing. 
Real places versus rhetorical strategies: 
(a) the rhetorical use of the term `world' 
We have seen that the units in which newspaper articles frame their discussions of 
euthanasia are countries. These countries are either put into a category of their own, 
constituting their own world, or put into the category of the universal, where 
processes happening in one country are imagined to apply anywhere in this world 
regardless of particular contexts. The word `world' I have used here deserves some 
attention, for does it not refer to the same thing as the global? `World' can mean the 
5 To spell this out for the sake of clarity - the argument goes that what happens in Germany is different 
to what happens in the Netherlands, because of our different histories; but maybe we (Germany) are the 
odd ones out, which would mean that we should take what happens in the Netherlands to represent the 
universal standard for what should happen also in Germany (what happens in the Netherlands being 
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globe, but it does not have to. In the newspaper discussions on euthanasia, `world' 
refers to a self-contained whole. There can be several worlds, and these worlds have 
no point of connection with each other. Here are some examples (coming from the Dr. 
Moor case, the Kevorkian case and the case of the woman trying to kill her husband): 
`The Dutch parliament is considering legislation to allow euthanasia - which 
would make it the only country in the world to allow the practice' (The Journal, 
12 May 1999). 
`EUTHANASIA: CONTROVERSY AROUND THE WORLD' (headline, 
Guardian, 12 May 1999). 
`The subject of euthanasia is one which inflames opinion the world over [... ]' 
(Bath Chronicle, 14 June 1999). 
The world referred to here is the globe, or all the countries on the globe. `The only 
country in the world' states a fact about one country among all other countries. 
`Controversy' and `inflamed opinion' around the world conjures up images of the 
globe and wherever one looks, people are putting their heads together discussing 
euthanasia. This is a rhetorical use of the concept of the world, not literal, conveying 
the urgency of the topic rather than saying something that is really happening 
everywhere. It is relating to something real, as under the headline of the Guardian a 
list of countries and their legal context concerning euthanasia is discussed (see 
above), suggesting that people in other counties do discuss the issue. However, 
whether that literally justifies talking about the whole world is doubtful. 
The next set of quotes is not about the globe: 
`VERDICT FUELS ROW IN THE MEDICAL WORLD' (headline, Herald, 12 
May 1999). 
`Choice is what puts humans above the animal world' (Northern Echo, 12 May 
1999). 
universally valid). Our particularly odd, historically conditioned, approach to euthanasia should yield to 
the universal reason of the Dutch example. 
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`We can regret the passing of the world of complicity. The world in which we 
now live will not allow it' (Independent, 12 May 1999). 
"'There is a world of difference between going out and violently killing a 
stranger and helping a loved one to die"' (Herald Express, 13 February 1999). 
Instead of referring to one world, the one encompassed by the globe, these quotes talk 
about different worlds. Worlds are imagined as self-contained wholes that have no 
connection with each other. Reference to the medical world or to the animal world 
constructs the entities belonging in those worlds (medical professionals, animals) and 
their interactions with each other as Other, as far removed, as utterly different (from, 
as implied, the non-medical or the human world). The `world of complicity' of the 
past is severed from the `world in which we live now', and `worlds of difference' are 
constructed between two actions that could also be put under the same heading: 
`violently killing a stranger' and `helping a loved one to die'. 
The word `world' is thus a flexible concept that we can think with. It is not only 
tied to real physical space, but can conjure up imaginary spaces. The `world' is a 
concept for thinking a whole, but it doesn't specify what whole. The world of the 
globe, of the earth can be opposed to the world of space. The world of humans can be 
opposed to the world of animals. Invoking worlds is invoking difference, 
incompatibility and incommensurability. The concept `world' works on different 
levels, it can refer to the globe but it does not have to: it can also work in terms of a 
spatial reference (either larger or smaller than the globe), or it can discard that spatial 
reference altogether. 
(b) Nationalism as an ideology 
In his book `Banal Nationalism' (1995), Michael Billig presents an analysis of the 
structures of nationalism. He reminds us that `nationalism as an ideology [... ] was 
always an international ideology' (p. 53). In that sense, it has never been inward 
looking - nations have always looked towards other nations. Billig says: 
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`Nationalism inevitably involves a mixture of the particular and the universal: if 
`our' nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a 
nation among other nations' (p. 83). 
`The particular nation can claim to talk for the whole world: `our' particular 
interests can appear as the interests of universal reason' (p. 88). 
In British newspaper reporting on euthanasia, we can see exactly that being played 
out: the comparison of Britain with other countries - for it matters for a nation in the 
international system what happens in other nations - as well as the search for a 
universal rationality for what should happen here. The same seems to go for the 
current struggle over human rights: it is a struggle over the universality of human 
rights on the international level by countries who have their particular version of the 
human rights they hold to be universally applicable. It is hard to see what a concept of 
the `global' can add to this analysis6. 
Discussion of euthanasia in British newspapers is being conducted in and for the 
present British context. This discussion includes statements about morality that are 
general and not restricted to this country (having universal rather than global 
application), for example: 
`[... ] if a patient whose life has been all but destroyed by a debilitating and 
painful disease explicitly requests to be freed from their suffering, the only 
humane course of action is to comply' (Birmingham Post, 13 May 1999). 
Much more, though, the particular British conditions (practices, laws) are referred to: 
6 It is tempting to add at this point to add with Billig that `the theories of national identity and 
postmodernity, which assert the decline of the nation-state, are being formulated at a time when a 
powerful nation, the United States of America, is bidding for global hegemony. The global culture 
itself has a national dimension, as the symbols of the United States appear as universal symbols' (p. 11). 
Billig's analysis of nationalism in an international world can deal with this issue. Imagining the world 
to be `globalised', on the other hand, will have the tendency to divert attention away from issues of 
power differentials between nations. 
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`The law on euthanasia in Britain is perfectly clear -- if you shorten someone's 
life even for a few moments then you are committing murder' (Northern Echo, 12 
May 1999). 
`A survey in 1994 revealed that one in three doctors in Britain had performed 
euthanasia. A further study by BBC TV's Close Up North in 1997 revealed that 
of 250 North-East GPs, 84 admitted carrying out euthanasia' (Northern Echo, 12 
May 1999). 
The British context is not only constructed by reference to its particular laws and 
practices, but also by constructing a British history: 
`Dr Moor, who practised in Newcastle upon Tyne, was the first British doctor to 
be tried for murder purely for the mercy killing of a patient. In the only other 
murder case that of John Bodkin Adams in 1957 the crown alleged that the doctor 
profited from the death of an elderly widow. He was acquitted' (Guardian, 12 
May 1999). 
In British newspapers, euthanasia is presented as a problem of and for Britain, which 
is constructed in terms of the prevailing social conditions in this country as well as 
universal morality. Reference to other countries is instrumental in this construction. 
Euthanasia in other countries is discussed in articles that have euthanasia in another 
country as their topic. The global does not appear. 
Conclusion 
Previous chapters have shown that euthanasia is presented in British newspapers as a 
problem. This chapter has shown that that problem is constructed as a problem of and 
for Britain, or of and for another country. There are two reasons for this, one external 
and one internal to the press: firstly, individual countries still set the law through 
which the legal status of euthanasia within a particular country is defined. Secondly, 
newspapers are still being produced for the local or the national market, and this 
defines their reference points as to who and what they write for. 
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In this chapter, I found that in contrast to the current importance of the global in 
the thinking in the social sciences, the global is a category that is irrelevant to press 
discussions of euthanasia. I came to see that the nation/the national is still immensely 
relevant here, which leads me to tentatively make the general point that a one-sided 
emphasis on globalisation (even if it incorporates its opposite of regionalisation) may 
obscure the importance that states and nations still possess in the contemporary world 
- both in people's cognitive understanding of the world and in the organisation of our 
lives. Maybe the disappearance of the nation state is a phenomenon more internal to 
social scientific thinking than of the external world. 
My discussion of globalisation and the global has of necessity been relatively 
simplistic in this chapter. The global is not only imagined as a whole with its own 
properties. There are attempts to imagine the global in more sophisticated ways. Urry 
in his recent book `Sociology beyond societies' (2000) takes as his starting point that 
the social as society has to be rethought in terms of the social as mobilities. Attention 
has to be shifted from what happens within particular nation states to investigating the 
networks and flows that crisscross the borders of nation states. There is no doubt that 
there are processes in the social world that cannot adequately be explained within the 
framework of the particular conditions of a particular society. The fact that opinion 
polls in several countries (at least in the Western world) consistently show a massive 
increase of public support for euthanasia over the last decades, now reaching 60% to 
90% in favour of euthanasia (that is, a majority regardless of who does the survey and 
how the questions are phrased), suggests that there are reasons for this which 
transcend the particularity of national contexts. 
Attention to networks and flows has the advantage that it can both tease out what 
networks and flows exist, as well as what networks and flows are blocked. Attention 
to mobilites must involve attention to struggles over mobilities. This is an extract 
from a recent newspaper article: 
`DOCTOR PLANS EUTHANASIA BOAT IN UK WATERS 
An Australian doctor plans to moor a floating euthanasia clinic off the UK 
administrating lethal injections and drug dosages in an attempt to raise the 
political profile of the mercy killing debate [... ]. 
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Dr Nitschke is investigating whether the Dutch parliament's recent decision to 
legalise euthanasia would enable him to circumvent the law in Australia, Britain 
and other countries where the practice is illegal [... ]. 
A spokesman for the Dutch health ministry said the project would be impossible 
under their legislation, as the patients must have a long-standing relationship with 
the doctor and get a second opinion from another physician [... ]' (Guardian, 19 
June 2001). 
Here, Dr Nitschke, who wants to break through the boundaries set by nation states, 
comes up against the laws of those states. His mobility is restricted by the laws of 
nation states. 
Within globalisation theory, there are two contrasting ideas: one that says that 
globalisation (networks and flows) is just happening and will eventually make the 
nation state redundant. The other holds that globalisation is dependent on nation 
states, that it `presupposes the tacit consent of national states' (Beck 2000, p. 37). 
Beck outlines Gilpin's approach (which he does not agree with) that suggests that 
`globalisation is necessarily contingent and under threat, in the sense that the 
emergence and development of transnational social spaces and players presupposes a 
hegemonic power structure and an international political regime' (ibid). The fact that 
the jury is out on whether the global or the nation are the primary driving forces 
behind social and other developments in the contemporary world leads me to think 
that the answer might be different for different processes. With regard to euthanasia, 
the structure of thinking might be similar in different countries due to processes that 
transcend the nation state, yet at the same time the nation state still has the power to 
set and enforce the laws relating to euthanasia. While both the British and the German 
newspapers use references to other countries as a rhetorical strategy in their 
argumentation, the same country (Holland) is represented in radically different ways: 
either as the positive example that should be followed, or as the negative reference 
point of how not to do it. Whether the different countries that are debating euthanasia 
at the present time will develop similar or very different approaches to the regulation 
of euthanasia remains to be seen. 
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Chapter (9) - Conclusion 
Introduction 
The study of media representations of euthanasia deals with a topical issue: euthanasia 
has arrived on the agenda in Europe, where the European Union strives for ever greater 
integration between its member states, since two of those members - the Netherlands and 
Belgium - have made some form of euthanasia 
legal. This is only one of the reasons that 
euthanasia is being debated in Britain. Britain has its own long-standing debate about 
euthanasia, which so far has never resulted in practical social policy neither in terms of 
involuntary euthanasia (or mercy-killing), nor any form of voluntary euthanasia. Britain's 
particular contribution to the improvement of the situation of the terminally ill and dying 
(particularly of cancer) has been the development of the hospice movement and the 
medical speciality of palliative care, which has spread to other countries. This has 
become the context in which euthanasia is being debated in Britain, where many argue 
that hospice is the answer to all the problems of the dying, and that consequently there is 
no need for euthanasia at all. 
Yet, support for euthanasia has been rising - the Voluntary Euthanasia Society has 
developed from an elitist group into the voice of what is perceived to be a popular 
movement. This rise of the support for euthanasia is explained by the increasingly 
widely-held and deeply felt belief that individuals should be able to make decisions 
regarding their own lives, including their deaths. 
It is the current debate about euthanasia that has been the focus of interest in this 
thesis, which has been approaching the euthanasia debate through its expression in 
newspapers. 
Press discourse and expert discourse 
It has been noted already in the introduction, and was repeatedly stated throughout the 
chapters of this thesis, that the purpose of this study was not a concentration on the 
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differences between newspapers, but an exploration of newspaper coverage as a whole. If 
there was an implicit comparison, it was the comparison between expert discourses on 
euthanasia and the media presentation of the issues. Expert discourse is characterised by 
the struggle over categories and boundaries, and at first sight it appears that the press 
coverage echoes the way that experts argue the pros and cons of euthanasia. At first 
glance, too, the media seem to report on the issues in a balanced way - presenting `both 
sides'. 
However, far from just presenting a balanced picture, or having regard to the 
categories and boundaries present in expert discourse, I found media discourse to 
expound a tentative support for a particular kind of euthanasia: voluntary euthanasia of a 
terminally ill person - whereby the concepts of `voluntary' and `terminal illness' were 
used in a flexible way and little importance was given to any boundary between `killing' 
and `letting die'. Euthanasia as a `good death' is a definite feature of press discourse. 
This does not mean that every single article on euthanasia that appears in the papers 
argues this, but it does come out of a body of articles collected from different British 
newspapers over the course of one year. 
In one more respect, newspaper coverage of euthanasia seems to follow expert 
discourses on euthanasia: discussion in medical ethics revolves around individual cases 
that are presented as dilemmas. Newspapers discuss euthanasia within reports of a 
particular case that has come before court or have been brought to the attention of the 
police. The implicit assumption, both in the discussion of cases in medical ethics and 
cases in newspapers, is that there are general categories that can be applied to a case 
resulting in the solution of a dilemma, a solution which in turn will be applicable to other 
similar cases. However, a closer look at the elements of the cases as they are represented 
in the newspapers tell another story: far from the picture of a dilemma faced by an 
individual, and potentially solved by an individual, we see conflicts between different 
groups: between doctors and patients, patients and relatives, relatives and doctors, doctors 
and nurses, any of those and the state - and it does not follow which group will support 
what course of action. In addition, most of these conflicts take place in institutional 
settings - hospitals or nursing homes. This fits in with what other critics of the approach 
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of medical ethics have said, for example the sociologist Daniel Chambliss who has 
looked at the work of nurses in American hospitals: 
`The language of dilemmas individualises ethics, making morality a personal issue. 
The individual is advised to get more education, to change her thinking, to clarify her 
principles. `Dilemma' refers to an ethical difficulty as something to be solved in the 
mind of the professional person, an internal balance of positions. The troubled 
person is said to `be conflicted', as if in a fight with herself. 
This neatly avoids the possibility that she has a conflict with someone else' 
(Chambliss 1996, p. 92). 
Chambliss also says that `ethical issues reflect conflicts of groups' moral agendas' (p. 96) 
- however, these moral agendas, in relation to euthanasia, are far from straightforward. 
Relatives may variously want to see the suffering of their loved ones to be ended by 
whatever means, or reject any intervention by medical professionals that could have the 
result of shortening what they conceive of as the `natural' life-span. Doctors may 
variously want to attend to their duty to save life, or follow a moral obligation to relieve 
suffering. Nurses may see their duty in caring for a dying person till the end, or find that 
caring might mean ending the agony. From the cases that made it into the newspapers in 
the year that I studied, we can follow that it is near impossible to predict what precise 
form a conflict will take. 
The composite picture that arises from looking at a range of cases in newspapers that 
are discussed in terms of euthanasia then gives us interesting results that a narrow 
concentration on individual cases - as individual cases - cannot produce. 
What about the taboo on killing? 
The most striking difference between expert discourse (particularly philosophical 
discourse), and press discourse, on euthanasia is the different emphasis on the boundary 
between `killing' and `letting die'. For expert discourse, this boundary is crucial - in 
press discourse, the boundary seems to all but dissolve. This seems to me to point to an 
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essential difference in the conceptualisation of the life of individuals in society: expert 
discourse seems to hold that the categories and boundaries are what matter principally - 
categories and boundaries found to be correct have to be upheld even if this causes deep 
rifts within society (those categories and boundaries, if they are not supported by all, 
having to be enforced by power). Abstract moral imperatives are valued over a life in a 
society of harmony. With respect to press discourse, a charitable interpretation would 
find that priorities seem to be reversed: it appears that the achievement of living in 
harmony is valued over the importance of the defence of abstract principles. 
In philosophy, it is often argued that the taboo on killing represents an essential 
boundary that guides our actions, and if that boundary is being eroded, for example by 
allowing some form of euthanasia - as has happened in the Netherlands and Belgium 
very recently -, then the taboo on killing in general will be weakened and it will 
automatically follow that all kinds of killing will become habitual in our society. This is 
what is called the `slippery slope' argument. It is immediately obvious that seen from this 
standpoint, the blurring of the boundary between `killing' and `letting die' in press 
discourse must appear menacing and threatening. From the point of view of philosophy, 
cognitive categories are primary: the only reason why we do not go round killing people 
is because we have this category in our head that says: don't kill. However, we can also 
think of categories as abstractions from our experience in society: this experience is 
shaped by learning as children from the example of those around us, and as adults 
through our engagement with those we interact with (following Barry Barnes (2000) who 
has defined human beings essentially as mutually susceptible and mutually accountable 
creatures). Rather than rigid cognitive categories, we learn strategies of how to respond to 
complex situations. In the light of these considerations, it seems unlikely that the 
legalisation of a defined form of euthanasia will result in anything like a switch in our 
cognitive categories from `don't kill' to `do kill', leading to an actual increase in killing. 
In fact, this assumption starts to look rather too simplistic. 
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The fundamental collective sentiment in media representations of euthanasia 
It seems, then, that the fundamental collective sentiment present in media representations 
of euthanasia is not that no human being should ever kill another human being under any 
circumstance. Rather, the fundamental collective sentiment appears to be the appreciation 
of the tragedy of terminal illness which is seen to warrant radical measures, including 
euthanasia. We have seen that the `voluntary euthanasia discourse', which is based on the 
autonomy of the individual, forms part of the press discourse on euthanasia, but that it is 
secondary to what I have called the `terminal illness discourse'. The `voluntary 
euthanasia discourse' starts from the premise of the autonomy of the individual, assuming 
that the autonomy of the individual means that individuals should be allowed to make 
their own decisions at the end of their lives, including make the decision to die from 
euthanasia. The weakness of this argument is that euthanasia is fundamentally a social 
issue, by definition always involving more than one person: one person who kills and 
another person who dies. There are attempts at making this social connection less 
obvious, for example by advocating physician-assisted suicide (where the person who 
kills and the person who dies are one and the same). However, ultimately it cannot be 
denied that there is always a social dimension to the problem - even in physician-assisted 
suicide, the physician is involved in the action, and society is involved by sanctioning the 
action. As Durkheim said: `liberty [... ] is always the product of a set of rules' (Durkheim 
1991, p. xxxiii). While for many supporters of euthanasia, the `cult of the individual' 
(Durkheim) provides an answer to the problem ('individuals should decide for 
themselves, that's why we have to allow euthanasia'), for Durkheim, the `cult of the 
individual' constitutes only the beginning of finding an answer to the problem. For him, 
increasing individualisation means increasing liberation from both from the organic and 
the social environment (p. 335). Increasing individualisation, then, both gives us the 
freedom to make up our own rules - and at the same time gives us the responsibility of 
making up rules that are just, for we cannot defer to `some ideal powers completely 
different in nature from ourselves, powers who follow their own course without heeding 
the interests of men' (p. 338). In a sense, we are condemned to be free. We cannot defer 
to nature or Gods, we are the only agents of our individual and social lives. The 
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autonomy of the individual then does not provide us with an argument in support of 
euthanasia, all it does is provide us with the reason for our obligation to make up rules 
about euthanasia that are not based on arguments that displace the agency to make up 
those rules from human beings unto `powers completely different in nature from 
ourselves'. 
`Terminal illness discourse' 
However, the `terminal illness discourse' in press discourse on euthanasia does just that. 
It holds that the presence of terminal illness can justify euthanasia. In a sense, the rhetoric 
of the `terminal illness discourse' displaces the responsibility to make up the rules on 
euthanasia from people onto nature. It argues that nature made the rules in the first place; 
in the case of terminal illness, nature wins out over people by killing a person, without 
other people being able to prevent this. Euthanasia, in this understanding, only takes 
partial responsibility for the death of the ill person - nature, which is given agency in this 
conceptualisation, shares in the responsibility for the death'. In Durkheim's time, the 
I The question of the attribution of agency and responsibility - to humans or `nature' respectively - is also 
coming up in a more recent argument employed in relation to euthanasia. Since the full implementation of 
the European Convention on Human Rights into British law through the Human Rights Act 1998/2000, 
Article 3 is being invoked to argue in favour of euthanasia. This article states: `No one shall be subjected to 
torture or inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment'. The recent Diane Pretty case -a motor neurone 
disease sufferer who lost her case in the British High Court to allow her husband to help her to commit 
suicide - made reference to this article, which was also reported by the newspapers (for example: Guardian, 
29.11.01). The law regulates the conduct of people in relation to each other. Therefore, a claim in favour of 
euthanasia based on Article 3 would have to argue that continuing medical treatment amounts to torture. In 
that sense, it would follow that medical treatment would have to stop, but not that a suffering person should 
be killed. A cursory search for the application of the word `torture' in arguments on euthanasia on the 
Internet reveals different ways of understanding what amounts to torture: 
" People are understood to be `tortured by their underlying disease'; 
" Somebody is said to have endured `almost four years of endless torture from cancer'; 
" It is considered to be inconceivable that `doctors are standing by ineffectually while torture 
continues'; 
" `life is indistinguishable from torture'; 
" `it is complete torture to allow the patient to suffer past his or her wishes' 
" inadequate palliative care' is understood as `torture'; 
" and also, `medical technology will be made to torture them'. 
What has to be concluded from this admittedly random exercise is that a person can be understood to be 
tortured either by medical professionals administering medical treatment, but equally by a disease (nature) 
and by medical professionals not responding adequately to reduce the effects of torture by the disease, 
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relationship between human beings and nature (both in the sense of our biological make- 
up and the external environment) was conceptualised in terms of an evolutionary 
progression in humanity's increasing emancipation from nature. Today, our extraordinary 
scientific and technological achievements are simultaneously pointing towards the limits 
of humanity's emancipation from nature. The re- conceptualisation of the relationship 
between humanity and nature is a major issue for contemporary society. The shift can be 
characterised by the move away from an opposition of humanity and nature, to a more 
integrated view of `humanity in nature'. From this position, the view that human beings 
and nature are to a certain extent sharing agency and responsibility in a holistic world 
where everything is interconnected does make perfect sense. However, even when we 
conceptualise terminal illness as sharing in the responsibility of death by euthanasia, the 
involvement of the human agents means that we are not able to abstain from all 
responsibility. The idea that nature is sharing in our responsibility does not translate into 
a particular prescription for the actions of the people involved. What this rhetoric does is 
make the people involved in euthanasia in the context of terminal illness less responsible, 
make the killing less morally prohibitive than killing in other circumstances. 
Press discourse on euthanasia combines the `voluntary euthanasia discourse' and the 
`terminal illness discourse'. Both discourses work together to provide a justification for 
euthanasia in the case of a terminally Al individual who asks for euthanasia, justified first 
of all by the creation of a category of killing which is less morally prohibitive than killing 
in general (terminal illness), and secondly by invoking the right of the individual inflicted 
as such (by terminal illness) to make their own decision about wanting to be killed in 
therefore becoming complicit with the disease (nature). Agency and responsibility for torture is thus 
attributed either wholly to people, wholly to nature, or understood to be shared between people and nature. 
I want to argue that it is only possible to apply Article 3 in an argument favouring euthanasia, if one 
understands torture to be resulting primarily from the disease (nature), leaving medical professionals only 
the option to either be complicit with disease (nature), or `do something' to stop the torture, up to the point 
of killing the victim of torture. It can be seen from the quotes above that doctors in general are not seen to 
be neutral. Therefore, we have the curious situation that a law that aims at regulating conduct between 
people may be invoked on the basis of an attribution of agency and responsibility to `nature'. 
The above can be seen as a version of the `terminal illness discourse' (where agency and responsibility is 
understood to be shared between people and `nature') which is present in newspaper articles on euthanasia, 
thus further testifying to its wide application and legitimacy. 
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those circumstances. In that sense, together they open up a space where decisions about 
euthanasia can be made. While in the press, both discourses are often used separately to 
make arguments in favour or against euthanasia (as if the presence of `terminal illness' 
would not just justify but proscribe euthanasia; as if rules in society should be changed 
purely on the basis of wants of individuals), together, as I hope to have shown in this 
theoretical elaboration of my findings, they point towards the fundamental collective 
sentiments that form the basis for understanding the large public support for euthanasia. 
Although voices arguing for the prohibition of euthanasia under every circumstance with 
reference to the fundamental taboo on killing can be found in the press, their 
marginalisation must mean that euthanasia is seen to be a subject that is open to 
discussion, in that agency and responsibility for euthanasia (even if conceptualised as 
shared) rest firmly with us human beings. The press thus seems to express implicitly what 
Durkheim theorised explicitly: that it is us who have to make rules for ourselves, and that 
making arguments that invoke the reference to `powers who follow their own course 
without heeding the interests of men' is seen as illegitimate. 
Morality and the law 
As Durkheim says, 
`law and morality represent the totality of bonds that bind us to one another and to 
society, which shape the mass of individuals into a cohesive aggregate. We may say 
that what it moral is everything that is a source of solidarity, everything that forces 
man to take account of other people, to regulate his actions by something other than 
the promptings of his own egoism, and the more numerous and strong these ties are, 
the more solid is the morality' (Durkheim 1991, p. 331). 
In the case of euthanasia, law and morality seem to be moving apart. There are those that 
argue that the law must express ideas of morality (thus euthanasia should be legalised), 
and there are others who say that the law must create a sense of morality (thus euthanasia 
should remain illegal). Either way, law and morality are recognised to be intimately 
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connected. While legislation is limited to a particular jurisdiction, morality today is 
understood to be something transcending borders. Morality has come to be associated 
with humanity as a whole - something that does not necessarily need to be the case, 
considering that throughout the history of humanity, there have been groups whose ideas 
of morality have differed significantly depending on whether they concern their own 
people or strangers. For Durkheim, morality is part of the collective conscience of the 
group, for `where should we turn to look for the characteristics of our model if is it not 
within ourselves and those around us? ' (Durkheim 1991, p. 329). Durkheim's `group' is 
the nation. Since he wrote, increasing individualisation, mobility and information 
technology have transformed our ideas of the nation - the ties binding the individual to 
the nation have been weakened (not disappeared), while groups smaller than the nation 
and transcending the nation state appear to develop a collective conscience. Barry 
Barnes' (2000) definition of human beings as `mutually susceptible and mutually 
accountable' creatures who create culture as a matter of course seems to fit the 
contemporary condition of mobilities better than the concept of `collective conscience' 
which raises the question as to what that collectivity is that it is referring to: is it the 
`nation', is it `society'? Is it a `subculture'? Essentially, however, Durkheim's and 
Barnes' concepts are not so different, only with respect to the definition of the 
`collective' in `collective conscience'. We have seen that while newspapers still operate 
primarily in and for a national context, thus continuing to promote the concept of the 
nation, moral questions are discussed in terms of universal moral rights and wrongs - in 
terms of how human beings should treat each other. With regard to euthanasia, a quest for 
a universally valid morality that should be reflected in national law is indicated by the 
frequency with which cases and developments involving euthanasia not just in Britain, 
but in other countries are reported in the British press. Reference to the situation in other 
countries is a recurring feature of newspaper articles on euthanasia. In most cases, the 
reference to another country is used as a rhetorical device to support a particular 
argument - it serves its purpose within the structure of the article, it never does justice to 
the complexity of the country's situation. However, in my view this does not mean we 
should dismiss the importance of the recurring reference to other countries which is such 
an substantial feature of press discourse on euthanasia as doing nothing but serve an 
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argument - it also legitimises that kind of argument. The House of Lords Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics in 1994 decided not to recommend a change in the 
legalisation regarding euthanasia in Britain partly on the basis of what they had seen on a 
visit to the Netherlands. How far the situations in two countries as different as the UK 
and the Netherlands in all matters of history, culture, social arrangements and so on can 
be compared in a straightforward way is a question that is asked less and less if any 
simple reference to another country is easily accepted as a valid argument (promoted by 
press discourse on euthanasia). 
The particularity of expert discourses 
The media have often been shown to present a simplistic picture of complex issues. 
From the point of view of expert discourse, this might actually appear to be the case. 
However, if instead of comparing how experts and how the media represent complex 
scientific (or, in this case, moral) issues - starting from the categories given in expert 
discourse - one is prepared to look at media discourse in its own right, then, in addition 
to gaining a better understanding of what media discourse is all about, one might obtain a 
new appreciation for the particularity of expert discourses. 
The problem posed by the increased public support for euthanasia in the light of a 
continuing prohibition of killing in law and codified medical ethics will not be resolved 
by expert discourse - the struggles of philosophers, lawyers, theologians and clinicians 
over categories and boundaries. What is needed is a much better understanding about 
what abstract categories like killing or letting die might mean to people in the context of 
their lives. A lot more work (see below) has to be done before we can clarify whether the 
newspapers' blurring of the boundaries between killing and letting die is a disturbing 
sign, foreshadowing an increasing brutalisation of society, or indeed a sign for the 
maturity of the public in its response to complex moral issues. If it is found that the taboo 
on killing is indeed not the most fundamental collective moral sentiment that structures 
people's ideas about euthanasia, then all of society will have to come to terms with that. 
The fact that `terminal illness' is of such relevance to press discourse on euthanasia, 
that `terminal illness' is evocative particularly of cancer, and that it is the hospices that 
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deal mainly with terminally ill cancer patients, means that in practice, the findings from 
this study of euthanasia in the media will be of particular importance to the hospice 
movement - especially considering that the hospice movement 
is vehemently opposed to 
euthanasia (even though individual hospice workers may feel differently). The issue of 
euthanasia will have to be addressed by the hospice movement; this is what some 
commentators on contemporary palliative care (palliative care having moved beyond 
hospices) are already arguing. Their `viewpoint emphasises the need for palliative care to 
itself become reflexive in orientation, more willing to take on the position of the other 
(particularly ethical matters relating to euthanasia) [... ]' (Clark and Seymour 1999, 
p. 179). 
The message that the media gives out about the link between `terminal illness' and 
euthanasia will be of particular concern to people with cancer, people who treat them and 
those who fund research into cancer. It is only through the concerted effort of all the 
different groups who come into contact with cancer and cancer patients that the image of 
cancer has changed over the last few decades from an illness that stigmatises its victims 
to one that has lost those connotations2. An automatic link between cancer and euthanasia 
in the public mind cannot be regarded as desirable by those groups, in a context where 
euthanasia is regarded as controversial. There may be a moral change taking place where 
the absolute prohibition on killing is coming to be seen in more relational terms by large 
parts of society (thus justifying talking about a `fundamental collective sentiment'). At 
the same time, it is generally acknowledged today that neither `society', nor any other 
collectivity, can be considered to form a coherent unit. A `fundamental', or widely 
shared, `collective sentiment' will still be countered by other sentiments and arguments, 
for as Billig says, an argument is always `arguing against' something. For both the social 
reproduction of morality and moral change to take place, the argument has to continue. 
2 Susan Sontag observed already in 1988 that in the decade since she wrote her book on tuberculosis and 
cancer ('Illness as a metaphor'), `attitude about cancer has evolved', and `cancer is not as much as a 
stigma' anymore (Sontag 1989, p. 15). 
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Final comments 
When I started work on this thesis, there was no country in the world in which euthanasia 
was legal (apart from a short period of time in Australia's Northern Territory and several 
attempts in Oregon, USA - in both places the pressure to legalise euthanasia was met 
by 
equal pressure to keep it or make it again illegal). In Europe, the Netherlands have had a 
long history of consensus building over euthanasia. Euthanasia was first decriminalised, 
meaning that doctors could practice it, escaping prosecution if they kept to strict 
guidelines. In April 2001, euthanasia was finally legalised. Since then, Belgium has 
followed suit - in October 2001, new legislation on euthanasia was passed 
by the Belgian 
Upper House (still awaiting approval from the Chamber of Deputies, regarded as a 
formality) (Guardian, 26 October 2001). 
One curious characteristic of working with newspapers is that they are read for 
information, and they are read for analysis. Nowhere else did I learn about the 
legalisation of euthanasia in the Netherlands and Belgium. Both events happened after 
the time period (1998/99) covered by the data in my thesis. After analysing this data, I 
now read more recent newspaper articles with a view to how they are similar and how 
they are different to my data. Looking at the Guardian article on the legalisation of 
euthanasia in Belgium (see above), I can conclude that the same features are still there: a 
survey is mentioned (three quarters of the Belgium population in favour of euthanasia), 
quotes from people arguing for as well as against euthanasia are given, the conditions 
under which euthanasia has become legal are presented. I mention this here because I 
want to point to one thing that seems to have changed since I gathered my data. The first 
paragraph of the article reads: 
`Belgium became the second country in the world to approve a law legalising 
euthanasia last night. The move will give fresh impetus to campaigns for legal mercy 
killing elsewhere in Europe - especially in Britain, France and Italy, where 
significant movements are pressing for it' (Guardian, 26 October 2001). 
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In my data, nowhere did I read about `movements'. This is significant not only in itself, 
but also because in the last couple of years social scientists have directed their attention 
to the social movement character of the organised pressure for legalising euthanasia'. 
This is an aspect that I have not looked at in this thesis as it did not appear in my data. 
However, apart from this it seems to me that although my data is a few years old, the 
issues it raises and that have been analysed are more pertinent now than ever. 
This study into media representations of euthanasia has been very data-led. The data 
was selected on the grounds that it was recent. Therefore this study makes generalisations 
that may be particular to the time period selected. Further projects could look into 
whether there are differences to be detected over time, by effecting a comparison with a 
time period either nearer to the present or further into the past. The comparison with 
Germany could have been expanded and put on firmer methodological basis by obtaining 
a data sample large enough to be equivalent to the British sample. My findings in that 
area thus have to remain provisional. 
Further research could concentrate on a more systematic international comparison of 
press coverage of euthanasia in different countries. Such a systematic comparison could 
well be conceived in terms of a content analysis, making use of the findings of this study: 
it could, for example, investigate one particular issue, such as the portrayal of the relation 
between euthanasia and terminal illness. 
The findings of this study could be tested by conducting interviews with a range of 
people, to see how far their views endorse or differ from the predominant contemporary 
media representations of euthanasia. Another interesting research project could be to take 
a closer look at the actual construction of questionnaires that aim at establishing people's 
views on euthanasia, to find out about how they represent people and how they normalise 
particular ways of talking about euthanasia. 
A further exploration of the patient-doctor relationship as it is played out in relation to 
the subject of euthanasia could make an interesting case study providing us with more 
information about the dynamics of medical authority in a consumer-oriented society. 
'For example: "Requested Death': a new social movement' by F. McInerney (2000), `Come Lovely and 
Soothing Death: The Right to Die Movement in the United States' by Elaine Fox et al (1999). 
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More work also needs to be done situating the euthanasia debate within social theory, 
theorising it in the context of postmodern society, risk society, globalisation, and so on. 
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Appendix 
Below is the list of LexisNexis British newspaper sources - the underlined newspapers 
are the ones that were mentioned in the ABC list of British newspapers and The 
Newspaper Society's lists of Top Ranking Regional Newspapers by Circulation. The 
starred newspapers are those newspapers that did not appear in the above mentioned lists, 





2828 Newspapers > 204 UK or united kingdom 
AAP News (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Aberdeen Evening Express 
Aberdeen Evening Express (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
Aberdeen Press & Journal 
Aberdeen Press & Journal (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
X Bath Chronicle *)( 
x Belfast News Letter x 
Belfast Telegraph 
Belfast Telegraph (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Birmingham Evening Mail 
Birmingham Evening Mail (England) (Marketing and 
Advertising Reference Service from Information 
Access Company) 
Birmingham Post 
The Birmingham Post (England) (Marketing and 
Advertising Reference Service from Information 
Access Company) 
Birmingham Post (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
The Birmingham Post (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
Bristol Evening Post 
Bristol Evening Post (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
The Business 
Business a. m. 
Business Telegraph (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
Chemical Business NewsBase 
Chemical Business NewsBase: The Independent (Global 
News Wire from Financial Times) 
Coventry Evening Telegraph 
Coventry Evening Telegraph (England) (Marketing and 
Advertising Reference Service from Information 
Access Company) 
The Daily Mail and Mail on Sunday (London) 
Daily Mail (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT Information 
LTD. ) 
Daily Mail (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Daily Mail (Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News from 
Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News) 
Daily Mail (London) (RDS Business & Industry Database 
from Responsive Database Services, Inc. ) 
Daily Post (Liverpool) 
Daily Post (Liverpool, England) (Marketing and Advertising 
Reference Service from Information Access Company) 
Daily Record & Sunday Mail 
Daily Record (Glasgow, Scotland) (Marketing and 
Advertising Reference Service from Information 
Access Company) 
The Daily Star 
The Daily/Sunday Telegraph (London) 
The Daily Telegraph (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
Daily Telegraph (Marketing and Advertising Reference 
Service from Information Access Company) 
Daily Telegraph (Overview of Markets & Technology from 
Information Access Company) 
Derby Evening Telegraph 
Derby Evening Telegraph (Northcliffe Newspapers) 




The European (Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News from 
Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News) 
Evening Chronicle (Newcastle, UK) 
)C Evening Herald (Plymouth) X 
Evening Herald (Plymouth) (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
Evening News (Edinburgh) 
The Evening Post (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Evening Standard (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
Evening Standard (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Evening Standard (Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News 
from Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News) 
The Evening Standard (London) 
The Evening Standard (London, England) (ASAPII 
Database fron Information Access Company) 
The Evening Standard (London, England) (Marketing and 
Advertising Reference Service from Information 
Access Company) 
Evening Standard (London) (RDS Business & Industry 
Database from Responsive Database Services, Inc. ) 
Evening Tunes - Glasgow 
Exchange (IAC (SM) Newsletter Database (TM) from 
Information Access Company) 
The Express 
Express & Echo (Exeter) 
Express & Echo (Exeter) (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
The Express (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT Information 
LTD. ) 
The Express (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
The Express on Saturday (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
The Express on Sunday (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
The Express On Sunday (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
The Financial Gazette (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
Financial Mail on Sunday (London) (RDS Business & 
Industry Database from Responsive Database Services, 
Inc. ) 
Financial News 
The Financial News (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
Financial 'l'imes (London) 
Financial Times (UK) (India Business Insight Database) 
Gateshead Post (UK) 
The Gleaner (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
The Gloucester Citizen 
The Gloucester Citizen (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
Gloucestershire Echo 
Gloucestershire Echo (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
Grimsby Evening Telegraph 
Grimsby Evening Telegraph (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
The Grocer 
The Grocer (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT Information 
LTD. ) 
The Guardian (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
Q LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
A-G 1 29 August 2002 ((9: 30) 
LexisNex s Sources Source Locator 
2828 Newspapers > 204 UK or united kingdom 
The Guardian (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
The Guardian (London) 
The Guardian (Overview of Markets & Technology from 
Information Access Company) 
Herald & Post (UK) 
X Herald Express (Torquay) A 
Herald Express (Torquay) (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
The Herald (Glasgow) 
The Herald (United Kingdom) (Europe Intelligence Wire 
from FT Information LTD. ) 
The Herald (United Kingdom) (Global News Wire from 
Financial Times) 
Hull Daily Mail 
Hull Daily Mail (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Hull Daily Mail (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
The Independent and Independent on Sunday (London) 
The Independent (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
The Independent (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Independent on Sunday (Europe Intelligence Wire from IT 
Information LTD. ) 
Independent on Sunday (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
The Independent (Overview of Markets & Technology from 
Information Access Company) 
Information World Review 
Insurance Day 
International Financial Adviser 
Investment Adviser 
Irish Independent (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
Irish Independent (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Irish News 
The Irish'I'imes 
Irish'l'imes (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT Information 
LTD. ) 
Irish Times (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Irish Times (Overview of Markets & Technology from 
Information Access Company) 
The Journal (Newcastle, UK) 
Leicester Mercury 
Leicester Mercury (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
Leicester Mercury (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
Liverpool Echo 
Lloyd's List 
Lloyd's List (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT Information 
LTD. ) 
The Mail on Sunday (United Kingdom) (Europe Intelligence 
Wire from FT Information LTD. ) 
The Mail on Sunday (United Kingdom) (Global News Wire 
from Financial Times) 
Manchester Evening News 
x Manchester Guardian Weekly X 
Midland Independent Newspapers (Group Source) 
Mid Week Pink 
The Mirror (London, England) (Marketing and Advertising 
Reference Service from Information Access Company) 
The Mirror (The Daily Mirror and The Sunday Mirror) 
Morning Star 
Network News 
Network News (VNU Business Publications from VNU 
Business Publications Ltd. ) 
The News of the World 
Northcliffe Newspapers 
The Northern Echo 
The Northern Echo (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
The Northern Echo (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
Nottingham Evening Post 
Nottingham Evening Post (Global News Wire from 
Financial Times) 
Nottinghacn Evening Post (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
the Observer 
The Observer (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Off Licence News 
Off Licence News (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 




The Racing Post (London, England) (Marketing and 
Advertising Reference Service from Information 
Access Company) 
Regional Independent Media 
Scotland on Sunday (Edinburgh, Scotland) (Marketing and 
Advertising Reference Service from Information 
Access Company) 
Scotland on Sunday (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
The Scotsman & Scotland on Sunday 
The Scotsman (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
The Scotsman (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
Scotsman (The) (Marketing and Advertising Reference 
Service from Information Access Company) 
Scunthorpe Evening Telegraph 
Scunthorpe Evening Telegraph (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
Selected UK News Stories (Group Source) 
'The Sentinel (Stoke) 
The Sentinel (Stoke) (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
South Wales Echo 
South Wales Echo (Cardiff, Wales) (Marketing and 
Advertising Reference Service from Information 
Access Company) 
South Wales Evening Post 




Sunday Business Post (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
Sunday Business Post (Global News Wire from Financial 
Times) 
The Sunday Express 
Sunday Express (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
Sunday Herald 
© LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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LexisNexi ° Sources Source Locator 
2828 Newspapers > 204 UK or united kingdom 




The Sunday Telegraph - United Kingdom (Europe 
Intelligence Wire from FT Information LTD. ) 
The Sunday Telegraph - United Kingdom (Global News 
Wire from Financial Times) 
The Sunday Times (United Kingdom) (Europe Intelligence 
Wire from FT Information LTD. ) 
The Sunday Times - United Kingdom (Global News Wire 
from Financial Times) 
Sunday Tribune 
TelecomWorldWire (M2 Communications from M2 
Communications, Ltd. ) 
The Times and Sunday Times (London) 
The Times (Global News Wire from Financial Times) 
The Times (London) (Europe Intelligence Wire from FT 
Information LTD. ) 
Times (London, UK) (Overview of Markets & Technology 
from Information Access Company) 
UK Nationals Group File, Most Recent 90 Days (Group 
Source) 
UK Newspapers Group File, Most Recent 90 Days (Group 
Source) 
UK Newspaper Stories (Group Source) 
UK Newsquest Regional Press - This is Hampshire 
UK Publications Group File, Most Recent 90 Days (Group 
Source) 
UK Publications (Group Source) 
VNU Business Publications 
Wales on Sunday 
Western Daily Press 
Western Daily Press (Global News Wire from Financial 
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Western Morning News (Northcliffe Newspapers) 
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Worldwide Computer Product News (M2 Communications 
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